• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.29-36
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• 2019

Previous resarch demonstrated that moral judgment is not an outcome of rational reasoning, but an independent variable determined by diverse factors. The effects of disgust on moral harshness, audience effect on moralistic punishment are some examples that support this view. The variability of moral judgment raises a question on what effects video stimuli might have on moral judgments. Although a few studies (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) have shown that watching a prosocial video clip promote moral behavior, no research have simultaneously tested the effects of both positive and negative video clips on moral (not bahavior but) judgments. Hence, this research tested the effects of viewing videos about good and evil on moral judgments regarding the self and others. To this end, participants were asked to view a video clip depicting content of either positive or negative human behavior and required to make moral judgments on conduct described in a scenario assuming that the person committing the act was either themselves or another person. The results showed significant effects of both video contents (positive, negative) and the actor (self, others) on moral judgments, but they were qualified by the interaction between the two. In particular, participants who watched evil deed of others made harsher judgments on others' moral transgression. Theses results demonstrate that video contents influence moral judgments, and the effect depends on the actor of the immoral behavior. In general discussion, we interpreted the results based on moral disgust, framing effect, and fundamental attribution error.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.15-24
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• 2015

Past experimental research reported that people become stricter in moral judgements when cleanliness-related concepts are activated. However, it is not clear whether pre-experimental individual differences in cleanliness desire is also related to moral judgment. This research examined whether cleanliness desire in various daily activities is related to diverse types of moral judgments (Study 1), and whether experimentally manipulated physical cleanness affects the relationship between cleanliness desire and moral judgments (Study 2). The results showed reliable relationship between everyday cleanliness desire and moral judgements in that people who were high (or low) in the desire was stricter (or more tolerant) in moral judgments. The relationship was also observed when physical cleanness was manipulated, but there was no difference in moral judgments depending on actual physical cleanness.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.121-132
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• 2016

Emotion is considered to be involved in the moral decision-making process consisting of moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. This research investigated the distinct role of two specific moral emotions, guilt and shame, when they are suppressed, on moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior through an online experiment. Moral emotion (guilt vs. shame) as well as suppression of these emotions (suppressing vs. control) was manipulated to infer the causality of moral emotions and the moral decision-making process when they are suppressed. The results suggest that suppressing guilt was involved in moral judgment and moral intention, but was not involved in moral behavior. In particular, participants who maintained guilt evaluated moral vignettes as more moral and perceived that they would follow the behavior described in the vignettes than those participants who suppressed their guilt. On the other hand, our data showed that suppressing shame was not involved in moral judgment and intention but was in behavior. Participants who maintained shame engaged in moral behavior more than participants who suppressed shame. We delineate the different mechanisms between guilt and shame on the moral decision-making process with the discrete emotion theory.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.47-75
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• 2008

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rational factor or moral emotion, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning or moral intuitions. This research demonstrates that offender' anger can influence moral judgment. The study examined the role of offender's anger (control group versus anger group) on moral domain ( life, interpersonal ethic, traffic regulation: 6 case) : 2(groups) ×6(cases) mixed design. Participants were asked to judge the offender, case, sympathy and one's anger about the him or her who offended against the law or convention. Participants who perceived the offender's anger tended to assess questionnaire generous. In interpersonal ethic domain, participants have not been affected by anger. There was not significantly differences between two groups in interpersonal ethic domain. The results of experiment confirmed hypotheses that influence of anger varies with the moral domains affected a value system of culture. These findings indicate functional emotion for moral judgment and suggest people may be decide how much emotion is considered on moral judgment performance according to moral domains.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.137-155
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• 2019

The present study investigated the relationships between autistic trait and socio-moral judgments. We used Autism Spectrum Quotient, a moral judgment task in which participants needed to consider both the intention and outcomes of a person's actions, a moral judgment task in which participants were asked to evaluate a person's utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas, and Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Autistic traits were negatively correlated with blame for failed attempts to harm others, suggesting that higher autistic traits were associated with difficulty in considering intentions in moral judgments. Also, higher autistic traits were associated with higher endorsement of utilitarian option on personal moral dilemmas, and lower endorsement for no-harm principle of moral foundations. These correlations were confirmed as group differences between high autistic-trait group (AQ >= 26) and a low autistic-trait group (AQ < 26). Our findings suggest that individuals with high autistic trait may have difficulty in considering others' intentions and show lower sensitivity to no-harm principle in moral judgment tasks.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.411-424
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• 2009

Morality is one of the references when people judge the world. In two studies we addressed the impact of social distance and mood on moral judgment. Participants judged the people who kill one person to save the many by moral and action appropriateness. In study 1 Social distance was induced in best friends and strangers condition. We hypothesized that judgments rely on deontology depends on social distance. Study 1 showed that same actions in moral dilemmas are judged more severely when the people are more socially distant(strangers). But this effect of social distant was found only judgment of moral appropriateness. Study 2 examined how mood can affect moral judgment. There have been many work investigated the role of mood in determining the kind of cognitive processing. Results from study 2 showed participants in positive mood condition are judged more severely. This difference between positive and negative mood was found only judgment of action appropriateness in contrast with study 1. These results suggested that moral judgment can be affected by social distance and mood. We also found that these factors have selected impact on moral and action appropriateness.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.85-104
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• 2019

Past research showed that presence of others induces morally desirable behavior and stricter judgments. That is, presence of others makes people become a moral being. On the other hand, little research has been conducted to test what effects facial expression of others have on moral judgments. In this research, we tested the effects of emotion exposed by facial expression on moral judgments. To this end, we presented descriptions of immoral or prosocial behavior along with facial expression of various emotions (in particular, disgust and happiness), and asked participants to make moral judgments on the behavior in the descriptions. In Experiment 1, facial expression did not affect moral judgments, but variability of judgments was increased when descriptions and facial expression were incongruent. In experiment 2, we modified potential reasons of the null effect and conducted the experiment using the same procedure. Subjects in Experiment 2 made stricter judgments with disgust faces than with happy faces for immoral behavior, but the effect did not occur for prosocial behavior. In Experiment 3, we repeated the same experiment after having subjects to consider themselves as the actor in the descriptions. The results replicated the effects of facial expression in Experiment 2 but there was no effect of the actor on moral judgments. This research showed that facial expression of others specifically affects moral judgments on immoral behavior but not on prosocial behavior. In general discussion, we provided further discussion on the results and the limitations of this research.

• Journal of Educational Research in Mathematics
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.279-294
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• 2011

The purposes of this study are to confirm the standard of ethical judgement ability of the mathematically gifted students and examine which factor makes on the ethical judgement ability among the mathematically behavior characteristics. For it, correlation analysis and regression analysis between the two things were conducted with SPSS 12.0 based on the results of mathematically behavior characteristic inspection and ethical judgement ability inspection. Also, the interview was conducted for students whose KDIT score is the highest and the results were intended to apply the results as the material supporting the results of qualitative test results. The interview with students examined which mathematically behavior characteristic factor made an effect on his own ethical judgement ability through the structural questionnaires.

• The Journal of Korean Association of Computer Education
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1-8
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• 2013

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of Internet copyright education on ethical consciousness, moral judgement and piracy intention in Internet copyright. The result of empirical research shows that Internet copyright education effects on piracy intention through moral judgement in order to make a right or wrong decision about the actual piracy behavior. On the other hand, the internet copyright education does not effect on ethical consciousness and piracy intention directly. This result implies that internet copyright education do not actually impact on the attitude and consciousness of online piracy, and that right understanding and proper internet ethic education program have to be considered to protect negative consequences by online piracy.