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A critical review and implications of the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment

도덕 판단에서 나타나는 도덕-인습 구분에 대한 논쟁과 함의

  • Received : 2018.06.21
  • Accepted : 2018.06.24
  • Published : 2018.06.30

Abstract

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

본 논문은 도덕 판단에서 나타나는 도덕-인습 구분에 관한 최근의 논쟁들을 개관하고 그 함의를 검토하고자 한다. 전통적인 도덕 판단에 대한 연구들은 규범 위반에 대한 판단에서 타인의 규범 위반 행위에 대한 평가와 함께 위반한 규범의 도덕-인습 차원에서의 분류를 함께 고려해왔다. Kohlberg와 Piaget의 인지 발달 이론을 발전시킨 Turiel(1983)은 도덕 원칙이 인습과 명확하게 구별된다고 보고 도덕-인습 구분의 기준을 제시하였다. 도덕은 보살핌과 정의의 영역에 특수하며, 보편성/객관성을 지닌다는 것이다. 이러한 관점은 전통적인 도덕 심리학에서 일반적으로 받아들여져 왔으나 최근 들어 지속적인 도전을 받아왔다. 본 논문에서는 도덕-인습 구분 기준에 대한 비판을 도덕 감정 이론(moral sentimentalism)과 도덕 지역주의(moral parochialism), 도덕 다원주의(moral pluralism)로 구분하여 살펴본다. 도덕 감정 이론은 도덕 판단에서 정서의 역할을 강조하며 도덕과 인습이 정서-비정서 차원의 연속선상에 혼재할 수 있다고 제안한다. 도덕 지역주의는 인류학과 비교문화 심리학의 연구 결과들을 바탕으로, 규범 위반 행위가 집단의 유지와 집단 내 개인의 존속에 의미가 있는 경우에만 규범 위반에 대한 부정적 평가와 처벌 의사가 강하게 형성될 수 있기 때문에 도덕 위반에 대한 판단도 인습에 대한 판단만큼이나 상대적일 수 있다고 주장한다. 도덕 다원주의에서는 문화와 개인차에 따라서 다양한 종류의 도덕적 직관이 존재할 수 있다는 점에서 보살핌과 정의의 차원만 도덕에 해당한다는 가정에 의문을 제기한다. 이러한 새로운 관점들은 기존의 합리주의적 도덕 발달 이론에서 가정하였던 도덕-인습의 구분이 사람들이 실제로 규범 위반을 판단하는 양상을 적절하게 반영하지 않을 수도 있음을 시사하며 체계적인 후속 연구의 필요성을 제안한다.

Keywords

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