• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.39-49
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• 2018

An SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) seriously threatens the national security due to its stealthiness that makes it difficult to detect in advance. We consider a destroyer deployment optimization problem for effectively detecting an SLBM. An optimization model is based on the two-person zero-sum game in which an adversary determines the firing and arriving places with an appropriate trajectory that provides a low detection probability, and we establish a destroyer deployment plan that guarantees the possibly highest detection probability. The proposed two-person zero-sum game model can be solved with the corresponding linear programming model, and we perform computational studies with a randomly generated area and scenario and show the optimal mixed strategies for both the players in the game.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.285-303
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• 2021

The purpose of this study was to investigate the reliability and validity of the Korean version of the zero-sum belief scale among a sample of Korean adults. The original scale was developed by Różycka-Tran, Boski, and Wojciszke (2015) based on the Belief in a Zero-Sum Game (BZSG) model. A total of 508 participants (252 college students and 256 non-student adults) completed an online survey comprised of the scales of zero-sum belief, social trust, subjective socioeconomic status, individualistic-collectivistic tendencies, and social comparison orientation. Results of the exploratory factor analysis and the confirmatory factor analysis indicated that zero-sum belief scale has one factor. The internal consistency of the zero-sum belief scale was good. The Zero-sum belief scale did not have a significant relationship with social trust and subjective socioeconomic status. However, the scale was positively associated with vertical individualistic and vertical collectivistic tendencies and negatively associated with horizontal collectivistic tendencies. There was no significant relationship between zero-sum belief and horizontal individualistic tendencies, but there was a significant positive relationship between zero-sum belief and social comparison orientation. However, the results from the college student sample and the non-student adult sample were different. Lastly, this study could facilitate future research on zero-sum belief in South Korea, and future studies are needed to reveal the predictors and effects of zero-sum belief.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.71-74
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• 1981

The purpose is to discuss the relationship between zero-sum two-person game with vector-payoff and multiple objective linear program. Further this paper shows that game against nature with vector payoff can be reduced to linear program.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.21-23
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• 1981

It is known that two-person zero-sum game with vector payoff can be reduced to a multiple objective linear programming. However, in this case, solutions for the game nay not be one, but many, In many cases in reality, one may need only one solution rather than all solutions. This paper develops a method to find a practical solution for the game by linear programming.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.21-32
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• 2017

Computer games must keep the user immersed for fun. According to the immersion theory, maintaining the user's immersive state requires a continuous balance of game skill level and game difficulty level This study proposes a game skill estimation method of 9th grade that can be applied to a casual action game that can assume a zero-sum game, and additionally proposed a difficulty guessing method. The proposed methods can be implemented quickly and easily because it is a method determining by conditional mathematical expressions. Experiments on the accuracy of the proposed methods for the customized Pac-Man game show that the accuracy of the skill level was 1.2 grade as the difference on the average and the accuracy of the game difficulty level was 1.81 grade the difference on the average. The results show that the proposed methods are accurate enough to be applied to casual action games satisfying the zero-sum condition.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.95-105
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• 1986

This paper presents an adaptive algorithm to generate a near-optimal closed-loop solution for a non-zero sum differential game by periodically updating the solutions of the two-point boundary-value problem. Applications to competitive advertising problem show that the adaptive algorithm can be used as an efficient tool to solve the differential game problem in which one player may take advantage of the other's non-optimal play.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.137-153
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• 1979

The duel is an extreme case of game situations. The duel is of zero-sum type, but a infinite game. This duel situation appears not only in extreme competitive situations such as war, but also in economic situations such as bidding. The study on duel situations started from late 1940's, but considerable contributions have been made in 1960's by Ancker, Restrepo, Yanovskaya, Kimeldorf among others. Specially Kimeldorf recently has made big contribution in developing the theory of the game-theoretic duel. The purpose of this paper is to summarize and systemize the theory of the game-theoretic duel. In the first part, noisy duel situations shall be dealt with, and in the second part, silent duel shall follow. Finally these two situations shall be generalized in the form of continuous firing model.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.107-121
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• 2005

In this study, a new fictitious play (FP) procedure is presented to solve two-person zero-sum (TPZS) Blotto games. The FP solution procedure solves TPZS games by assuming that the two players take turns selecting optimal responses to the opponent's strategy observed so far. It is known that FP converges to an optimal solution, and it may be the only realistic approach to solve large games. The algorithm uses dynamic programming (DP) to solve FP subproblems. Efficiency is obtained by limiting the growth of the DP state space. Blotto games are frequently used to solve simple missile defense problems. While it may be unlikely that the models presented in this paper can be used directly to solve realistic offense and defense problems, it is hoped that they will provide insight into the basic structure of optimal and near-optimal solutions to these important, large games, and provide a foundation for solution of more realistic, and more complex, problem