• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.127-138
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• 2018

Spoofing attacks including meaconing can provide a bogus position to a victim GPS receiver, and those attacks are notably difficult to detect at the point of view on the receiver. Several countermeasure techniques have been studied to detect, classify, and cancel the spoofing signals. Based on the countermeasure techniques, we have developed an anti-spoofing equipment that detects and mitigates or eliminates the spoofing signal based on raw measurements. Although many anti-spoofing techniques have been studied in the literatures, the evaluation test system is not deeply studied to evaluate the anti-spoofing equipment, which includes detection, mitigation, and elimination of spoofing signals. Each study only has a specific test method to verify its anti-spoofing technique. In this paper, we propose the performance evaluation test system that includes both spoofing signal injection system and its injection scenario with the constraints of stand-alone anti-spoofing techniques. The spoofing signal injection scenario is designed to drive a victim GPS receiver that moves to a designed position, where the mitigation and elimination based anti-spoofing algorithms can be successively evaluated. We evaluate the developed anti-spoofing equipment and a commercial GPS receiver using our proposed performance evaluation test system. Although the commercial one is affected by the test system and moves to the designed position, the anti-spoofing equipment mitigates and eliminates the injected spoofing signals as planned. We evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing equipment on the position error of the circular error probability, while injecting spoofing signals.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.5 no.4
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• pp.165-172
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• 2016

A Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which is typically exemplified by the Global Positioning System (GPS), employs a open signal structure so it is vulnerable to spoofing electronic attack using a similar malicious signal with that used in the GPS. It is necessary to require a spoofing test evaluation environment to check the risk of spoofing attack and evaluate the performance of a newly developed anti-spoofing technique against spoofing attacks. The present paper proposed a simulation method of spoofing environment based on simulator that can be implementable in a test room and analyzed the spoofing simulation performance using commercial GPS receivers. The implemented spoofing simulation system ran synchronized two GPS simulator modules in a single scenario to generate both of spoofing and GPS signals simultaneously. Because the signals are generated in radio frequency, a commercial GPS receiver can be tested using this system. Experimental test shows the availability of this system, and anti-spoofing performance of a commercial GPS receiver has been analyzed.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.296-303
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• 2010

The term "spoofing" refers to the transmission of counterfeit signals to provide undetectable falsification of GPS service. A spoofing can be accomplished using information from open literature which defines the signal format and the data structure. Spoofing is intended either to produce erroneous navigation solutions or saturate the processor of the victim receiver. The GPS receiver has no way to get rid of the effect of a spoofing because GPS receivers for civil service do not have an anti-spoofing scheme. This paper analyzes the spoofing characteristics, spoofing methods and environment conditions. And the spoofing effects on GPS receiver are analyzed in detail using the designed software-based spoofer and the Nordnav receiver.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38C no.11
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• pp.1044-1050
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• 2013

This paper analyzes what is mitigated as spoofing attack using the U-Blox Receiver and GPS RF signal generator developed at ETRI. Generally the spoofing attack made the target receiver to be wrong navigation solution by providing false measurement of code and carrier. So we analyzed the impact of spoofing attack through the signal strength and navigation solution. In oder to test of effect of anti-spoofing signal, we consider the signal with antiphase code to spoofing signal and generated GPS normal signal and spoofing signal and anti-spoofing signal using GPS RF signal generator. This paper analyzed that the GPS receiver was responded to the spoofing attack according to code phase difference between spoofing and anti-spoofing signal. We confirmed that the spoofing signal was disappeared by anti-spoofing signal if code phase is an exact match.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.793-800
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• 2010

GPS spoofing is an intentional interference which uses the mimic GPS signals to fake the receivers. The generic GPS receiver is hard to recognize the spoofing signal because the spoofer generates the fake signals as close as possible to the GPS signal. So the spoofer can do critical damage to public operations. This paper introduces a basic concept of spoofing and analyzes the effect of the spoofing signal to the GPS receiver. Also for stand-alone GPS receivers, two anti-spoofing methods are implemented : RAIM based method and the SQM based method. To evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing method, the software based spoofing signal generator and GPS signal generator are implemented. The performance of the anti-spoofing methods obtained using the output of the software based GPS receiver shows that SQM based method is more effective when multiple spoofing signals exist.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.181-189
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• 2022

The public open signals from Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) including Global positioning system (GPS) are used widely by many peoples in the world except for the public regulated restriction signals which are encrypted. Nowadays there are growing concerns about GNSS signal spoofing which can deceive the GNSS receivers by abusing these open services. To counter these spoofing threats, many researches have been studied including array antenna techniques which can detect the direction of arrival by means of Multiple Signal Classification (MUSIC) algorithm. Originally the array antenna techniques were developed to countermeasure the jamming signal in electronic warfare by using the nulling or beamforming algorithm toward a certain direction. In this paper, we study the anti-spoofing techniques using array antenna to overcome the jamming and spoofing issues simultaneously. First, we will present the theoretical analysis results of spoofing signal response of Minimum Variance Distortionless Response (MVDR) algorithm in array antenna. Then the eigenvector algorithm of covariance matrix is suggested and verified to work with the existing anti-jamming method. The modeling and simulation are used to verify the effectiveness of the anti-spoofing algorithm. Also, the field test results show that the array antenna system with the proposed algorithms can perform the anti-spoofing function. This anti-spoofing method using array antenna is very effective in the view point of solving both the jamming and spoofing problems using the same array antenna hardware.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.173-180
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• 2015

In this study, an algorithm that detects a spoofing signal for a GPS L1 signal was proposed, and the performance was verified through RF spoofing signal simulation. The proposed algorithm determines the reception of a spoofing signal by detecting a correlation distortion of GPS L1 C/A code caused by the spoofing signal. To detect the correlation distortion, a detection criterion of a spoofing signal was derived from the relationship among the Early, Prompt, and Late tap correlation values of a receiver correlator; and a detection threshold was calculated from the false alarm probability of spoofing signal detection. In this study, an RF spoofing environment was built using the GSS 8000 simulator (Spirent). For the RF spoofing signal generated from the simulator, the RF spoofing environment was verified using the commercial receiver DL-V3 (Novatel Inc.). To verify the performance of the proposed algorithm, the RF signal was stored as IF band data using a USRP signal collector (NI) so that the data could be processed by a CNU software receiver (software defined radio). For the performance of the proposed algorithm, results were obtained using the correlation value of the software receiver, and the performance was verified through the detection of a spoofing signal and the detection time of a spoofing signal.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.63 no.9
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• pp.1273-1280
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• 2014

This paper considers a GPS anti-spoofing problem. Spoofing is an intentional interference that mislead the GNSS receiver. The spoofing attack is very significant since the target receiver is not aware of being attacked from spoofing. Accelerometers can be used to detect the spoofing signal by being compared with the acceleration obtained from GPS information using Kalman filter. In this paper we propose an N by N-point average and M-point window algorithm to detect GPS spoofing by using accelerometers and GPS outputs. The performance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed using actual vehicle trajectory and spoofing trajectory generated from INS and GPS toolbox for simulation.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.173-179
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• 2022

The satellite navigation deception technology disturbs the navigation solution of the receiver by generating a deceptive signal simulating the actual satellite for the satellite navigation receiver mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle, which is the target of deception. A single spoofing technique that creates a single deceptive position and velocity can be divided into a synchronized spoofing signal that matches the code delay, Doppler frequency, and navigation message with the real satellite and an unsynchronized spoofing signal that does not match. In order to generate a signal synchronized with a satellite signal, a very sophisticated and high precision signal generation technology is required. In addition, the current position and speed of the UAV equipped with the receiver must be accurately detected in real time. Considering the detection accuracy of the current radar technology that detects small UAVs, it is difficult to detect UAVs with an accuracy of less than one chip. In this paper, we assume the asynchrony of a single spoofing signal and propose a region defense technique using multiple spoofing signals.

• Journal of Institute of Control, Robotics and Systems
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.113-118
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• 2013

In this paper, spoofing effects on a GNSS receiver were analyzed. The spoofer (spoofing device) was classified to two categories. One is an active spoofer and the other is a passive spoofer. The active spoofer was considered for analysis. For the analysis of spoofing effects on a GNSS receiver, a real-time GNSS spoofing simulator was developed. The simulator was consisted with two parts which are a baseband signal generation part and a RF up-conversion part. The first GNSS baseband signal was generated according to spoofing parameters such as range, range rate, GNSS navigation data, spoofing to GNSS signal ratio, and etc. The generated baseband signal was up-converted to GNSS L1 band. Then the signal transmitted to a GNSS signal. For a perfect spoofing, a spoofer knew an accurate position and velocity of a spoofing target. But, in real world, that is not nearly possible. Although uncertainty of position and velocity of the target was existed, the spoofer was operated as an efficient jammer.