In a so-called cleft (or, pseudocleft), the kes-phrase seems to refer to a person, even though kes is generally incompatible with human beings. In this paper, I claim that in a cleft, the kes-phrase can refer to a concept, and that a concept of human beings is not a person. I give some pieces of evidence for this claim. In a cleft, the kes-phrase cannot be pluralized only when it is supposed to denote a human being. Moreover, in such a case, the NP before the copula cannot be interpreted as the meaning of a predicate. Furthermore, in a cleft two kes-phrases are not conjoined with (k)wa only when they seem to denote human beings. All the observations can be explained by the claim that the kes-phrase denotes a concept in such cases. A concept cannot be used as a predicate, pluralized, or conjoined to refer to objects that are subsumed under a concept. When the kes-phrase denotes a concept, the cleft sentence is an identity statement.