This paper introduces a computer program ARAP, explaining how it automatically analyzes and evaluates academic research articles and books. It also shows how ARAP can help trace the trend of a certain theory by reviewing existing publications. As an illustration, ARAP is used to review Korean linguistic publications in order to show how Western semantic theories have influenced semantic studies in Korea.

Nouns in the Korean language are subcategorized for various frames(called SUBCAT lists) in much the same way as verbs are. Assuming a monostratal grammar and building on analyses of various 'little elements' as clitics, such as the ones given by No(1991), Chae(1995,1996), and Oh(1991), I delineate the ranges of SUBCAT lists for the Korean verbs and nouns and show that the two word-classes have heavily overlapping frames. Twenty five SUBCAT lists are identified for verbs, and twenty four for nouns, of which twenty three find associated lexical items in both. By the way of justification, I offer analyses of noun--verb collocations in terms of the new five-valued syntactic feature COLLOC along with SUBCAT, which subsume 'light verb' constructions. It is hoped that this work will have given clear syntactic underpinnings to those who are concerned with practical lexicography.

This paper investigates the semantics of English there existential sentences. By examining discourse functions and pragmatic facts, it accounts for semantic facts which have not been discussed elsewhere. Further, it is a new attempt to incorporate information-theoretic notions into formal semantics. I propose that existential statements as expressing Austinian propositions. The proposed meanings account for the fact that post-copular NPs cannot constitute the restruction of an adverb of quantification nor admit a partitive reading.

The purpose of this paper is to capture the intuition that imperatives and deontic modal sentences are alike in some way but different in other ways, I show that imperatives and deontic modal sentences are alike in that both types of sentences have the modal force of deontic modality, but that they are different in that while imperatives make a contribution that there is an obligation or a permission issued by the speaker as an essential part of their meaning, deontic modal sentences assert the existence of an obligation or a permission in the current world.

This paper discusses several basic issues of the 'focus' phenomenon. One of them is the issue of the nature of focus, i.e., what constituent of the sentences gets focused. Another is the issue of to what aspect of meaning the focus contributes. The other is the issue of the functions of focus-sensitive operators. As for the first issue, it is observed that the basic function of focus is to mark all and only the new information of the sentence. But for the cases in which this principle is not observed, it is proposed that the focus in these cases in general plays a secondary function of triggering an additional emphatic scalar meaning. And yet, in these cases, the state of the matter is different between free focus and bound focus. It is also shown that contrary to the general belief that free focus contributes to the meaning semantically. Concerning focus-sensitive operators, we classify them into two groups, i.e., quantificational and scalar operators, and try to formalize their meaning in the framework of Pulman's(1997) 'higher order unification theory'.

The semantic and pragmatic effect of inerrogative illocutionary operator is analyzed in a dynamic setting in the framework of structured meaning representation with respect to the dialogue participants' shared common ground. I propose a framework for an optinal interpretation of focus phrases in terrogatives share the essential properties of focus in general, namely that they introduce alternatives to be taken advantage of by relevant focus-sensitive operators. The theory makes an interesting prediction on the distribution and interpretation of double questions in which one question gets modified by another. A further extention of the theory is spelled out to account for other non-assertional illocutionary operators like imperatives and their foci.

There has been no nuanimous analysis of specific indefinites. It is still disputed even whether specificity is a matter of semantics of pragmatics. In this paper, I introduce some properties of specific indefinites, and explain them based on the meaning of specificity. Specificity intuitively means that the speaker or someone else in the context has some individual in mind, which is generally accepted among liguistics. The main issue is how to represent the meaning of 'have-in-mind'. I review some philosophical discusstions of cognitive contact and show that when the use of an expression involves 'have-in-mind', the expression is rigid designator in the belief of the agent who has an individual in mind. in the use of a specific indefinite, this applies only to the information state of the agent of 'have-in-mind'. To represent this asymmetry, I propose a new theory of dynamic semantics, in which a common ground consists of multiple information states, as many as the number of the participants in a conversation. Moreover, each information state is structured as a set of epistemic alternatives, which is a set of possible information states of a participant in the context. Based on this semantics, the properties of specific indefinites are explained.