This paper is concerned with the distribution and interpretation of yekan and its cognates. Syntactically they require negation, but semantically the sentences in which they occur are positive ones that make monotone increasing inferences possible. This syntax-semantics discrepancy can be best accounted for by showing that yekan and its cousins must be strictly c-commanded by metalinguistic negation at the surface structure and that the positive meaning of the sentences they are part of is derived from the cancellation of the pragmatic upper-bounding implicatum associated with them. These also enable us to explain why they do not occur in the environments where typical NPIs do and why only certain forms of negation license them.

Connectivity effects have been central issues in dealing with specificational pseudoclefts. While syntactic approaches motivate their analysis in order to explain connectivity effects in terms of a connected clause, these accounts have numerous problems including a wide range of anti-connectivity effects that constitute crucial counterevidence. On the other hand, semantic accounts of connectivity effects treat BV and BT connectivity by independent interpretive mechanisms providing a more fundamental explanation for connectivity effects. Yet existing semantic accounts have limitations in explaining syntactic properties and syntactic connectivity effects in SPCs, and in accounting for BV anti-connectivity effects in English. Focusing on BV connectivity, this paper explores how the relevant (anti-)connectivity facts can be accounted for by an analysis that provides both an elaborate syntactic analysis of SPCs and a semantic mechanism for bound anaphora. Based on Yoo's (2005) non-deletion based, question-answer pair analysis of SPCs, this paper shows that a functional question analysis of a specificational subject, when combined with a theory of operator scope and a non-configurational condition on bound anaphora, can explain various BV (anti-)connectivity patterns in SPCs and related constructions.

In this paper I address the problems of defining the semantics of numerals and accounting for how pragmatic inferences are made. I basically assume that a numeral n simply means '${\lambda}P{\lambda}x[#(x)n\;&\;P(x)]$', as commonly assumed. Even when a numeral n has 'at least' interpretation, a sentence with the number does not entail a sentence with n replaced with n-1. But when a sentence with n-1 holds, it is possible that a sentence with n or a larger number holds too. This is not based on a semantic relation, but on pragmatic informativeness. In addition to pragmatic strength, the actual reading of a numeral is affected by some background knowledge of generalizations about the world, but the ordering of pragmatic strength among numbers always plays a role in determining unilateral interpretations. In such a case, we can assume that a set of numbers relevant in the context forms a scale. Forming a scale does not necessarily lead to a unilateral interpretation. The bilateral interpretation of a number is possible in the context where it is known whether or not alternative sentences with contextually salient alternative numbers are true.

This paper revisits some old issues of irony, i.e., situational vs. verbal irony, and irony vs. paradox, in order to further clarify the issues. Although these issues seem to have been fully discussed, there are still unresolved and/or vague aspects that need to be accounted for. This paper also revisits the issue of theorizing the phenomenon of verbal irony, which has long been scrutinized by many philosophers and linguists including Aristotle, Grice, Sperber and Wilson, and recently, Utsumi and Attardo.