• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.5-28
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• 2020

In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State issued two reports to announce their plan to fulfill "free and open Indo-Pacific". Two reports commonly insisted on the support and participation from allies and partners to maintain security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In response to this, neighboring states in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, India, ASEAN, and Taiwan have different perspectives and stances based on their national interests. South Korea, too, has not clearly announced its position because they need to consider the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea as well as relationships between South Korea and China. This report focuses on the stances of neighboring states to the Indo-Pacific strategy and expected pros and cons of the participation of the strategy. In addition, when considering the name of strategy, the Indo-Pacific, naval power will be a main instrument to implement the strategy. Thus, this study also investigates the role of naval power in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.5-32
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• 2019

The paper introduces US Indo-Pacific Strategy and discusses its meanings and implications for international security and our strategy. It tries to look at the Indo-Pacific strategy(IPS) through the lenses of international political theories. The paper provides three important observations. First, the US Indo-Pacific strategy is a declaration of the national identity of the US as an Indo-Pacific nation. The paper argues that the IPS reflects the US leadership that would facilitate the formation of, so called, the Indo-Pacific community. In arguing these points, the paper notes that the IPS has rich elements of constructivist approaches including norms and national identity. Second, the paper observes that the IPS report serves as an effective deterrent strategy. The IPS does not call out China as an enemy. But, it tries to deter against a range of actors including China by warning that whoever violates the rules-based order in the region would have consequences. Third, the paper maintains that the IPS is an effort by the US to mitigate the risk of a great power war between the US (an established power) and China (a challenging power) because the IPS articulates the United States's willingness to work with China as long as it plays by the rules. There will be challenges to the US and other countries in the region including South Korea particularly because of economic interdependence. However, the paper argues that the IPS stands for an optimistic sign of the future security in the Indo-Pacific region because it is a manifestation of the US for its national will to defend the status quo characterized as Pax Americana which has been maintained since the end of the Second World War. It also argues that South Korea also can, and should make the most of this opportunity by enhancing our capacity in national defense.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.71-123
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• 2021

Seoul is under increasing pressure to choose between the US-led IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, this paper undertakes a detailed appraisal of the IPS and the BRI in the context of Korea's national policy imperatives. Based on a study of network structure by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright (2007), the present study seeks to identify a particular network structure within the IPS and the BRI. Through this analysis, the relationship between the core and the participant states will be addressed. Awareness of specific configurations of the IPS and the BRI is important as these reveal what participant states can expect from each network. According to Nexon and Wright, there are four types of network structure: unipolar anarchy, hegemonic order, constitutional order, and imperial order. Based on this, we argue that the IPS has a constitutional order and the BRI has an imperial order. Therefore, we suggest to Seoul that participating in the IPS may make more room for an independent foreign policy than would a BRI partnership with China. South Korea would benefit by participating in the IPS in terms of its national security, striking a favourable regional balance of power.

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.83-107
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• 2023

To Republic of Korea in the Indo-Pacific region, the stability and prosperity of the area are directly coupled with national survival, interest. Currently, on account of strategic competition between U.S.A, and China in this area as well as supranational·non-conventional threats, the security environment is unstable, required joint/allied responses. So, lots of states inside(U.S.A., Japan, ASEAN, etc.), also, out of this Indo-Pacific area like EU-NATO, open their own strategy related in Indo-Pacific issues to be involved. R.O.K. government took its own line with publishing self strategy following this international trend, it can be shown korean government's strong intend to join in the pending security issues in this region with 'strategic clarity'. Now, R.O.K. Navy has to back up governments, policy. First, R.O.K. Navy should strengthen the relationship inside and take part in the multilateral cooperation of security. Second, to convey this deterrence message to potential threats, Navy is required to show of forces and have combined exercises. Also, as naval forces of advanced countries, Korea, Navy should be taken action in non-traditional threats, and help developing states improve their sea power. To fulfill this tasks in the wide ocean area, Navy need five inherent characteristics(mobility, flexibility, sustainability, capability of presence and projection). In the end, this paper propose the development plan following operational environment (SWOT) analysis as well.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.23-31
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• 2023

The core of the foreign policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol government is the promotion of active economic and security diplomacy as indicated in Policy Tasks No. 98. To this end, economic consultative bodies such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement(RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are taking the initiative to respond to the formation of supply chain, human rights, environment, and digital-related norms, and actively support Korean companies' overseas expansion. Due to the nature of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) as an organization established centered on the space of the ocean, the MOF faces difficulties in bringing the functions of other ministries into the space of the ocean. Considering the vision, objectives, and detailed plans of the MOF, the contribution of the MOF in the field of active economic security, one of the main foreign policies of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, is perhaps too obvious. However, since the re-launch of the MOF, the ODA budget for the oceans and fisheries sector is too small compared to other ministries, so even if new policy demands are discovered, there are many difficulties in implementing these policies in practice. Recognizing these problems, this paper examines the background and contents of foreign policies that have been promoted for the efficient promotion of RCEP, CPTPP and IPEF and introduces the areas of cooperation in the oceans and fisheries sector in these foreign policies.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.115-140
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• 2021

The South China Sea is a significant maritime shipping route with abundant submarine and fishing resources. Over 40,000 ships pass through the South China Sea every year, constituting around 50% of global shipping and 66% of crude oil. In particular, 30% of Korea's import cargo and 90% of energy imports pass through this body of water. The US and China realized the significance of this sea area from early on and are embodying national interest through maritime security at the national strategic level by implementing the 'Indo-Pacific' and 'One Belt One Road' strategies, respectively. Such geopolitical conflicts are manifested in the 'freedom of navigation operations' by the US in the South China Sea. Despite its significance, there is a lack of studies in Korea on the freedom of navigation operations, and most previous studies only focus on analyzing international law and agreements. This article examines the origin and background of the strategic perception of the freedom of navigation operations and derives implications for the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula as the strategic competition between the US and China continues.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.82-108
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• 2023

As tension escalates between the US and China, scenarios for maintaining peace in Northeast Asia imply that secondary powers will perceive increasing incentives to reappraise their respective international roles. This analysis proposes that an analysis of France's Cold War role in Europe and the world under President Charles de Gaulle provides insights into conflict management in an increasingly multipolar international political environment. Their respective interests in preventing a so-called new Cold War emerging between the US and China include avoiding its excessive economic costs, if only because China is a massive trade partner. This study engages in theoretical framework-informed process tracing of de Gaulle's role. It explicates the assumptions that functionally underpinned de Gaulle's policy of soft balancing between the US and China. The analysis explores de Gaulle's contribution to the decay of the Cold War. It illuminates de Gaulle's contribution to a regional international environment that made West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik strategy more feasible politically. This study applies these findings in the formulation of strategy recommendations focusing on Japan. Valid inferences regarding the predominant motivations driving American and Chinese international interaction are necessary for this task. To the extent to which the US and China have entered into a conflict spiral, Japan's hedging towards Washington is further incentivized. Tokyo would necessarily need to convince the Chinese that Japan is no longer Washington's unsinkable aircraft carrier off its coast. Tokyo, like de Gaulle's France, would maintain close relations with Washington, but it would need to project to its interlocutors its commitment to its own strategic autonomy. Tokyo's emphasis on closer relations with liberal democratic Indo-Pacific actors would potentially fit well with a commitment to strategic autonomy to defend the global liberal order.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.25-29
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• 2024

After the Russia-Ukraine War, NATO broke away from the peacekeeping strategy that it had maintained and declared that it would strengthen the multilateral security consultative body, pursue strategic stability, expand armaments, cooperate security, and strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Changes in NATO's strategy directly and indirectly affect Korea's security environment. Only by clearly analyzing this and establishing policies and strategies to respond to it can the threat be suppressed and national interests protected. NATO designates China and Russia as threats. By using cooperation and solidarity with NATO as an opportunity, we will be able to strengthen security cooperation and alliances, develop and expand the defense industry market, and expand opportunities to participate in the Ukraine reconstruction project.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.