• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.97-106
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• 2005

This paper presents a method for evaluating the nash equilibrium of the Cournot model for N-Gencos in wholesale electricity market. In wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Gencos can be applied to the game model under the conditions, which the Gencos determine their strategies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm has known as the approach to evaluate the mixed nash equilibrium in the only two-player game model. In this paper, we have developed the necessary condition for obtaining the mixed nash equilibrium of N-player by using the Lemke algorithms. However, it is difficult to find the mixed nash equilibrium of two more players by using the analytic method since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, we have formulated the object function satisfied with the proposed necessary conditions for N-player nash equilibrium and applied the modified particle swarm optimization (PSO) method to obtain the equilibrium for N-player. To present the effectiveness the proposed necessary condition and the evaluation approach, this paper has shown the results of equilibrium of sample system and the cournot game model for 3-players.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.9
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• pp.3312-3334
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• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.1554-1566
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• 2014

Cloud Computing allows application providers seamlessly scaling their services and enables users scaling their usage according to their needs. In this paper, using queuing game model, we present service scheduling schemes which are used in software as a service (SaaS). The object is maximizing the Cloud Computing platform's (CCP's) payoff via controlling the service requests whether to join or balk, and controlling the value of CCP's admission fee. Firstly, we treat the CCP as one virtual machine (VM) and analyze the optimal queue length with a fixed admission fee distribution. If the position number of a new service request is bigger than the optimal queue length, it balks. Otherwise, it joins in. Under this scheme, the CCP's payoff can be maximized. Secondly, we extend this achievement to the multiple VMs situation. A big difference between single VM and multiple VMs is that the latter one needs to decide which VM the service requests turn to for service. We use a corresponding algorithm solve it. Simulation results demonstrate the good performance of our schemes.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.89-98
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• 2007

In this paper the economic value of weather forecasts is valuated for profit-oriented enterprise decision-making situations. Value is estimated in terms of monetary profits (or benefits) resulted from the forecast user's decision under the specific payoff structure, which is represented by a profit/loss ratio model combined with a decision function and a value score (VS). The forecast user determines a business-related decision based on the probabilistic forecast, the user's subjective reliability of the forecasts, and the payoff structure specific to the user's business environment. The VS curve for a meteorological forecast is specified by a function of the various profit/loss ratios, providing the scaled economic value relative to the value of a perfect forecast. The proposed valuation method based on the profit/loss ratio model and the VS is adapted for hypothetical sets of forecasts and verified for site-specific probability of precipitation forecast of 12 hour and 24 hour-lead time, which is generated from Korea meteorological administration (KMA). The application results show that forecast information with shorter lead time can provide the decision-makers with great benefits and there are ranges of profit/loss ratios in which high subjective reliability of the given forecast is preferred.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.10
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• pp.3810-3830
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• 2015

In this paper, we investigate the differential game theoretic approach for distributed dynamic cooperative power control in cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRANETs). First, a payoff function is defined by taking into consideration the tradeoff between the stock of accumulated power interference to the primary networks and the dynamic regulation of the transmit power of secondary users (SUs). Specifically, the payoff function not only reflects the tradeoff between the requirement for quickly finding the stable available spectrum opportunities and the need for better channel conditions, but also reveals the impact of the differentiated types of data traffic on the demand of transmission quality. Then the dynamic power control problem is modeled as a differential game model. Moreover, we convert the differential game model into a dynamic programming problem to obtain a set of optimal strategies of SUs under the condition of the grand coalition. A distributed dynamic cooperative power control algorithm is developed to dynamically adjust the transmit power of SUs under grand coalition. Finally, numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm for efficient power control in CRANETs.

• IEMEK Journal of Embedded Systems and Applications
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.195-201
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• 2023

The degree of contribution each sensor makes towards the total information gathered by all sensors is not uniform in spatially correlated sensor fields. Considering bit allocation problem in such a spatially correlated sensor field, the number of bits to be allocated to each sensor should be proportional to the degree of contribution the sensor makes. In this paper, we deploy Shapley value, a representative solution concept in cooperative game theory, and utilize it in order to quantify the degree of contribution each sensor makes. Shapley value is a system that determines the contribution of an individual player when two or more players work in collaboration with each other. To this end, we cast the bit allocation problem into a cooperative game called bit allocation game where sensors are regarded as the players, and a payoff function is given in the criteria of mutual information. We show that the Shapley value fairly quantifies an individual sensor's contribution to the total payoff achieved by all sensors following its desirable properties. By numerical experiments, we confirm that sensor that needs more bits to cover its area has larger Shapley value in spatially correlated sensor fields.

• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.383-398
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• 2006

We consider a geometric Levy process for an underlying asset. We prove first that the option price is the unique solution of certain integro-differential equation without assuming differentiability and boundedness of derivatives of the payoff function. Second result is to provide convergence rate for option prices when the small jumps are removed from the Levy process.

• East Asian mathematical journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.301-310
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• 2016

Lookback options, in the terminology of nance, are a type of exotic option with path dependency whose the payoff depends on the optimal (maximum or minimum) underlying asset's price occurring over the life of the option. In this paper, we exploit Mellin transform techniques to find a closed-form solution for European lookback options in Black-Scholes model.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.51-64
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• 1998

Conflict resolution methodology is discussed with fuzzified Pareto frontier. Four solution concepts namely the Nash solution the generalized nash solution the kalai-Smorodinsky concept and a solution method based on a special bargaining process are examined. The solutions are also fuzzy, the corresponding payoff values are fyzzy numbers the membership functions of which are determined. Three particular cases are considered in the paper. Linear quadratic, and general nonlinear pareto frontiers with known shape are examined.