• 대한토목학회논문집
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• 제40권4호
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• pp.429-435
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• 2020

북한은 2017년 6차 핵실험 이후 스스로 핵 무력의 완성을 선언하였다. 한반도 비핵화를 위한 국내외의 노력에도 불구하고 그 해결전망은 밝지 않다. 북한의 WMD위협을 억제하기 위한 정치·외교적 노력과 함께 유사시 예상되는 '재앙적 상황'에 대비한 사후관리 능력의 강화가 요구된다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 CBRN 위협에 대비한 사후관리 강화방안을 제시하기 위해 수행되었다. 연구모델은 국가 차원의 재난관리 계획발전모델 중 미 국토안보부가 채택하여 활용 중인 THIRA 프로세스를 일부 보완하여 활용하였다. 한국의 사후관리 체계는 재난에 대비한 위험관리와 위기관리를 포괄한다. 이 체계는 전·평시 CBRN의 확산 또는 사용의 억제, 위협의 대응, 예상피해 최소화 등을 목적으로 민·관·군 통합방위작전의 형태로 수행된다. 예방단계에는 CBRN의 개념과 사후관리 절차를 국가관리체계 속에 반영, 통합경보체계의 보완, 대피시설의 준비 그리고 통합훈련체계의 구축 등이 요구된다. 대비단계에는 관련 법규와 매뉴얼의 정비, 정부 조직의 정비와 수행절차의 발전, 통합대응이 가능한 현장 지원체계의 구축, 그리고 주기적인 훈련 등이 필수적이다. 대응단계에는 응급처치와 구호를 위한 의료지원체계의 정상가동, 제염시설의 설치 및 운영, 그리고 피해평가 및 통제지침의 발전이 중요하다. 복구단계에서는 안정화 평가 기준 및 절차의 발전, 피해복구에 필요한 자원의 확보 및 운용, 그리고 지역방위군과 향토예비군, 민방위가 연계된 지역피해복구 역량 강화가 필요하다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제18권2호
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• pp.167-177
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• 2018

미국, 영국, 독일 등 주요국들은 2001년 9/11 테러 이후 초국가적이고 비대칭적이며 포괄적인 위협에 직면하여 국가정보체계를 개혁하고, 대테러리즘, 대량살상무기(WMD) 확산저지, 국토안보, 극우 극좌 과격주의 위협에 대한 정보역량을 강화하였다. 2017년 출범한 한국의 문재인 정부는 국가정보원의 불법적 정치적 개입과 권력남용을 청산하고, 국가안보를 위한 효율적인 국가정보기관으로 재탄생시키기 위해 개혁방안을 마련하여 논의하고 있다. 국가정보원의 개혁방향을 논의할 때 중요한 사항은 첫째, 정보기관의 분리형 모델을 채택하여 국가정보원의 국내정보 활동을 일부 제한하고 국외정보 활동에 전념하게 할 것인지 또는 새로운 국내정보활동 기관을 설치할 것인지에 대한 심층적인 검토가 필요하다. 둘째, 국가정보원의 대공수사권을 경찰에 이관하는 문제는 북한의 지속적 군사도발, 대남공작 및 사이버 위협이 지속되는 상황에서, 정보기관 활동의 효율성과 전문성의 균형 측면에서 신중히 접근해야하는 사안이다. 셋째, 행정부와 국회의 정보기관 통제 감독 기능을 강화하여 민주화시대에 부합하는 국가정보원의 정치적 중립성 유지, 시민기본권 보장 및 예산집행의 투명성 제고를 위해 노력해야할 것이다.

• 한국방재안전학회논문집
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2023

코로나 19 이후 도시 안전에 대한 관심이 높아지면서, 여러 기관에서 도시의 안전성을 평가하는 지표가 개발되어 활용되고 있다. 용산구는 2021년 사회안전지수 평가에서 1위로 선정되어 한국에서 가장 안전한 도시로 선정되었으나, 2022년 이태원 참사로 인해, 많은 인명 피해가 발생하기도 하였다. 이것은 도시의 안전을 평가하는 지표가 담지 못하는 영역이 있으며, 이에 대한 연구가 필요함을 의미한다. 본 연구의 목적은 국내·외 안전도시 모델을 살펴보고 이를 통해 각 모델의 차이점과 안전도시를 평가할 때 사용되는 지표를 검토하기 위한 것이다. 본 연구에서 11개 안전도시 모델을 수집하고 각 평가지표를 분석한 결과, 안전도시 모델은 세계보건기구의 국제 안전도시와 유엔재해경감기구의 국제안전도시와 같이 기관에서 인증을 하는 "프로그램 기반의 안전도시 모델"과, 기관별 안전 관련 평가지표의 점수에 의해서 안전도시 순위 및 등급이 결정되는 "점수기반의 안전도시 모델"로 분류할 수 있으며, 안전한 도시가 되기 위해서는 이 두 가지 모델이 상호 보완적으로 활용될 때 도시 안전을 위협하는 제반 요소를 전방위적으로 대응할 수 있음을 알 수 있었다. 안전에 대한 위협이 다양해짐을 고려해볼 때 안전도시를 평가할 때 디지털 보안, 보건 안전, 인프라 안전, 개인 안전, 환경 안전, 교통 안전, 화재 안전, 범죄 안전, 생활안전, 자살, 감염병 등을 종합적으로 고려하는 것이 타당하는 결론을 얻었다.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제10권4호
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• pp.395-416
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• 2008

The advance information for oceangoing cargoes destined to th United States enable CBP to evaluate the potential risk of smuggling WMD and to facilitate the prompt release of legitimate cargo following its arrival in the Unites States. On January 1, 2008, CBP promulgate regulations, also known as 10+2 rule, to require the electronic transmission of additional data elements for improved high-risk targeting, including appropriate security elements of entry data for cargo destined to the United States by vessel prior to loading of such cargo on vessels at foreign seaports. The potential impact to an importer's international supply chain will be as follows ; Firstly, importers will take incremental supply chain costs and filing costs. Secondly, anticipate delay in shipment of containerized cargo. Thirdly, importers could be charged fines if they fail to file and file inaccurate or missing data. Companies exporting to the United States should be interested in 10+2 rule, analyze their current processes and procedures to ensure that they are prepared to handle the additional filing requirements of 10+2 rule. And they should focus on how 10+2 impacts their supply chain in terms of costs and sourcing. They will be necessary to revise service legal agreements with their forwarders, customs brokers or carriers in order to meet filing requirements of 10+2 rule.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권3호
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• pp.169-196
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• 2005

The point of Bush administraion’s foreign policy is to support the promotion and stability of Democracy in Iraq and counter terrorism and spread of WMD with his strong propulsive force caused by his reelection. In such an environment, there are his leadership, his team, himself, Kim Jung Il, and a new understanding of North Korea after September 11 as the effective factors of Bush administration’s policy toward Pyongyang. Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea also shows the process of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program and the future scenario of the Korean Peninsula with "the persistence of solving North Korea’s nuclear weapon program such as the method having done in Lybia", "the holding unconditional talks with Pyongyang, and "the continual concerns with human rights in North Korea." The purpose of Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea is to make North Korea do not support terrorism rather than remove the nuclear weapon in North Korea. The process of outlining South Korea’s policy toward North Korea must be considered for "national interest" with reasonable analyses not just hopes For this, South Korea must access systematically human rights of North Korea, prepare projects for a daring approach on North Korea, and strengthen South Korea’s defense ability toward North Korea with deep alliance with U.S and systematize the mutual understanding channel between U.S and South Korea. In conclusion, South Korea must try to get specific methods and practices about Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea with national wisdom

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• 한국재난정보학회 논문집
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.50-73
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• 2009

This paper is about the establishment of "Initial Response System." Initial response system is most important and should be treated urgently among all preparations for chemical terrorism. The objects of Initial response system are to protect civilians and the first responder who are exposed directly to chemical terrorism. Therefore, this paper suggests two main issues about Initial response system. One is to prepare immediate and exact information service system which assures the safety and survival of exposed people. The other is to build Scene Response System integrated with Command-Control Procedure for early finished situation. Compared to United States, overcoming the Chemical Terrorism requires to improve the contents of two categories: Counter Citizen Response part and Initial Scene Response part. For Counter citizen response part' s sake, the web-sites of Response leader agencies for searching information about chemical terrorism should be modified specifically. These web-sites have to be re-organized in detail. The existing Information service system which has been vaguely informed as "CBRNE Accident" needs to be divided as "CBRNE Accident" and "WMD terrorism." Further, each of them should be specialized in "Chemical', "Biological", and "Radiological" categories. There is a need to rearrange current Emergency Instruction for civilians against chemical terrorism in feasible way. At the same time, it should be applied consistently to all organizations through agreement between experts and related-organizations. For Initial Scene Response part's sake, "Initial scene response procedure (SOP)" and "Operational conception" should be produced through Simulated Exercises and workshops of all organizations related with initial response. These organizations have to cooperate with Ministry of Environment which is the main leader Agency as the center. Next, there is a need to develop a technology and Scene Response Equipments, and to standardize the response equipments which consider the capability of First Responders for chemical terrorism. Especially, improving capability of equipments is required to overcome the vulnerability of Scene Response Equipments.

• 한국재난정보학회 논문집
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.358-365
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• 2014

북한은 화생방 무기체계운용의 경제성과 재래식 무기의 한계성을 인지하여 비대칭 전력을 활용한 대량살상무기에 대해 꾸준한 준비를 하고 있는 상황이다. 그러나 현재의 민방위 대피시설은 실질적으로 재래식 폭탄 및 미사일 등에 대한 위협만을 고려하고 있으며, 화생방 및 각종 테러 등의 재난 발생 시 적절하게 대응하지 못하여 민간의 피해를 가중시킬 수 있는 위험성을 내포하고 있다. 이에 본 연구는 우리의 실정과 재난 특성에 따라 적절히 대응할 수 있는 민방위대피시설의 계획 및 설계 방안을 도출하기 위해 화생방 재난을 중심으로 민방위 대피시설의 현황 및 설계기준을 파악하였으며 연구를 통해 얻은 결과 및 제안사항을 제시하고 있다.