• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.19-27
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• 2022

This study compares and analyzes wholesale(or price-only) contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity-flexibility contract, and channel-rebate contract in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. By setting the parameters of each coordination contract based on the previous results, we conduct simulations using @RISK for several combinations of these parameters. Under the supply chain coordination, we evaluate the probability of successfully signing a contract and the participant in favor of each contract. As a result, the quantity-flexibility contracts is most advantageous for the retailer and the channel-rebate contracts is most advantageous for the supplier. It revealed that revenue-sharing contracts can be used more flexibly because they can be selected in the widest range to redistribute profits between supplier and retailer.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.17-31
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• 2010

This study investigates two-stage return policy and recycling issues in an e-marketplace supply chain consisting of consumers, a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer, a focal company in the e-marketplace supply chain, considers the recycling of commercial returns so offers the retailer a buy-back contract of which transfer payment consists of a wholesale price and a buy-back price. Then, under the given contract offer, the retailer determines a selling price and a return policy to control consumers' demand and return requests. We consider the retailer's opportunistic behavior and supply chain coordination issues based on the principal-agent paradigm. We compare the first-best and second-best optima and conduct comparative static analyses to evaluate the performance results of the buy-back contract and provide important managerial implications.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.513-526
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• 2023

Supply chain coordination plays a critical role in improving the enterprise performance and the competitive advantage of fresh e-commerce. This study explores the coordination problem of a two-echelon fresh produce e-commerce supply chain comprising a fresh e-commerce enterprise and a fresh supplier in a novel framework. In this framework, the fresh e-commerce sells fresh produce and provides promotion effort; meanwhile, the fresh supplier deliveries fresh produce and provides freshness-keeping effort. Specifically, the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized decision-making are compared, and it is found that centralized decision-making is more profitable. Based on this work, we created a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing combination contract. This study demonstrates that this contract effectively coordinates the supply chain and makes both parties achieve Pareto optimization when the parameters meet certain conditions. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the contract are presented through a numerical example.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2016

Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.173-186
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• 2007

This research consists of (1) building (or molding) the Dynamics Simulation Model on Return Policy mainly used in publications, phonographs, and computer industry; which are seen used in supply chain contract known as effective control mechanism under the varied supply chain situations, and (2) analyzing the effects that return rates and seller's contract parameters have in the outcome of the model and (3) observing how the effectiveness of Return Policy changes under such circumstances where the buyer's sales ability and the seller's risk inclination are taken into account. Thus, the main purpose of this research lies in analyzing what exactly are the effects (and or outcome) that sales ability and risk inclination have in Return Policy, and additionally by conducting comprehensive research on Supply Chain Policy Dynamics Simulation Model, we will try to prove that not only the Systems Dynamics approach is highly contributive in supply chain management but also that it will serve as a foothold in future research. As a result of the research, supply chain achievement level turned out to be high when Return Policy is enforced, and the achievement level was even higher when seller's sales ability was taken into consideration along with the Return Policy. On the other hand, the achievement level decreased when the seller had risk aversive tendencies.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.81-112
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• 2012

This study investigate the impact of supply chain contracts on supply chain performance. This study employed Price adjustment contract(PAC) and Quantity adjustment contract(QAC) as two main types of a vertical coordination mechanism. We simulate different types of coordination mechanisms with various degrees of demand uncertainties and several capacity tightness scenarios. This study shows that PAC and QAC significantly enhance the supply chain profits and fill rates suggesting that supply chain performance can be improved by implementing a proper coordination mechanism depends on the level of a capacity tightness and demand uncertainty.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.25-36
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• 2006

Consider a supply chain in which a vendor supplies a product to a buyer. We assume that the buyer's and vendor's inventory cost structures are different, resulting in differences in inventory order/delivery cycle times. Here, if one party insists on its individually optimal order/delivery quantity, the other party will suffer from mismatches in cycle times. Under this scenario, coordination contracts that make use of either a Net Term/Two parts Term Trade Credit or a Quantity Discount are designed to align individually optimal order Quantities. We compare and analyze the perform ances of these contracts. The focus of the comparison is the ability of contracts to generate a lower cost for the supply chain. We show that a Trade Credit policy can be effectively used to coordinate a supply chain. In many cases it will result in a lower supply chain cost compared to that achieved by using a Quantitative Discount policy.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.68-75
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• 2011

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a supplier and buyer's pricing decision strategy model with discount-policy over a long-term replenishment contract in a supply chain environment by small and medium size manufacturing company. We assume that the buyer has a superior economic power over a supplier and each agent in a supply chain is unaware of each other. The supplier proposes pricing decision strategy to induce the buyer to choose the terms of contract for the benefit of the supplier. Then buyer decides the terms of contract to maximize her profit considering supplier's discount-policy. We also present a numerical example to illustrate the efficiency of pricing decision strategy.

• Proceedings of the Society of Korea Industrial and System Engineering Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.343-348
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• 2002

We are concerned with a long-term replenishment contract for the ARIMA demand process in a supply chain. The chain is composed of one supplier, one buyer and consumers for a product. The replenishment contract is based upon the well-known (s, Q) policy but allows us to contract future replenishments at a time with a price discount. Due to the larger forecast error of future demand, the buyer should keep a higher level of safety stock to provide the same level of service as the usual (s, Q) policy. However, the buyer can reduce his purchase cost by ordering a larger quantity at a discounted price. Hence, there exists a trade-off between the price discount and the inventory holding cost. For the ARIMA demand process, we present a model for the contract and an algorithm to find the number of the future replenishments. Numerical experiments show that the proposed algorithm is efficient and accurate.