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Reverse Logistics in the E-Marketplace Supply Chain: A Two-Stage Return and Recycling Policy  

Yoo, Seung-Ho (선문대학교 경영학부)
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Abstract
This study investigates two-stage return policy and recycling issues in an e-marketplace supply chain consisting of consumers, a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer, a focal company in the e-marketplace supply chain, considers the recycling of commercial returns so offers the retailer a buy-back contract of which transfer payment consists of a wholesale price and a buy-back price. Then, under the given contract offer, the retailer determines a selling price and a return policy to control consumers' demand and return requests. We consider the retailer's opportunistic behavior and supply chain coordination issues based on the principal-agent paradigm. We compare the first-best and second-best optima and conduct comparative static analyses to evaluate the performance results of the buy-back contract and provide important managerial implications.
Keywords
Return Policy; Recycling; Pricing; Buy-back Contract; Principal-Agent Paradigm;
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