• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.97-122
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• 2013

The basic stance of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'quiet diplomacy'. However, there had been demands for specific plans for practical protection of Dokdo. In 2011, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik mentioned that they are reviewing measures of stationing marines on Dokdo, while on August 10th, 2012, former president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo. The visit itself was meaningful as he was the first supreme commander to visit Dokdo. This paper studies on the necessity of naval power on Dokdo to maintain its effective control. The effective control must be done by a national organization in a peaceful and unimpaired method. If so, can stationing naval power, whether directly or indirectly, on Dokdo be considered a violation of 'peaceful' method? A 'peaceful' effective of control meas the right of sovereignty over a territory without other country's protest. In such terms, protecting a territory falls under practicing the right of sovereignty, and therefore does not violate 'peaceful'. In addition, looking at international cases such as Ligitan/Sipadan Case and Pedra Blanca Case, evidences such as 'navy activity', 'flyng ensign', and 'military communication facility installation' was used. In ter case of Yemen-Eritrea dispute over Hanish, methods on effective control over island and sea was also ruled by the installation of military posts and military surveillance activities. Thus, stationing naval power on Dokdo can be a way of maintaining effective control per international law. To station naval poer on Dokdo, Presidential Instruction 24 integrated Defense Guideline Enforcement Ordinance, which is domestic law, must be revised. Reason being, the Enforcement Ordinance states that the navy area of responsibility excluded Ullundo, where Dokdo is under jurisdiction of Ullungdim thus excluding navy control. In addition, considering the diplomatic situation, it is more fut to install navy radar site on Dokdo rather than 'stationing marines'. In other words, enforcing surveillance in the vicinity of Dokdo and installing radar site instead of stationing direct combatants is one way of practicing effective control without stimulating diplomatic disputes.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.5-28
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• 2020

In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State issued two reports to announce their plan to fulfill "free and open Indo-Pacific". Two reports commonly insisted on the support and participation from allies and partners to maintain security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In response to this, neighboring states in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, India, ASEAN, and Taiwan have different perspectives and stances based on their national interests. South Korea, too, has not clearly announced its position because they need to consider the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea as well as relationships between South Korea and China. This report focuses on the stances of neighboring states to the Indo-Pacific strategy and expected pros and cons of the participation of the strategy. In addition, when considering the name of strategy, the Indo-Pacific, naval power will be a main instrument to implement the strategy. Thus, this study also investigates the role of naval power in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.293-317
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• 2017

A series of immoral conducts are repeatedly occurring by some commanders and high-ranking officers in the ROK navy. They are seriously compromising not only harmony and solidarity of the organization, but also pride and morale of members of the service. They seem to be results of the fragile ethical background of the service as well as of failures in military education and training on ethics. This paper sees backgrounds of weak ethical foundations of the navy as follows: the enduring legacies of cultural factors, such as the toxic military culture of the Japanese colonization, dark side of mariners' traditions, the sea-aversive Confucian culture, and unique characteristics in any small organization or society, etc... This paper also suggests the current ethnic systems of the navy are primarily based on responsive measures against misdeeds, rather than fundamental prescriptions for immoral behaviors, in the absence of ethical instrument for warriors. The paper also emphasizes the importance of developing character-based leadership, founded on, above all, respects for human integrity and strong sense of honor. Moreover, the importance of accountability in charging the command, as advocated by the US navy, is also stressed in order to establish a more robust ethic ground within the navy. Based on these analyses, the author proposes that in order to become a stronger and healthier fighting force, the navy needs to make continuous command efforts and organizational innovations to improve ethic principle and moral standard of the service, to strengthen ethics of naval leaders by a robust system of ethical education and training programs, and ultimately to solidify a navy culture in which moral passions and energies are spreading over.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.224-257
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• 2017

As the Trump administration withdraws the Paris Climate Agreement and shows its antipathy toward free trade, the U.S.'s soft power is most likely to weaken and its behaviors could be perceived as acts to surrender the U.S. hegemonic leadership in the world stage. Hegemonic stability theory notes that the existence of a hegemonic power contributes to international stability in the sense that it provides international public goods. A lack of the U.S's leadership in international politics, however, could be recognized as its denial of a hegemonic status. Is it intentional or accidental? The U.S's denial of hegemonic roles is the byproduct of the Trump administration's "American First" policy, not the showcase of its intention to transit hegemony to others. What is noteworthy is that China targets a niche market of hegemony as the U.S. denies its roles as the international leader. Put it another way, China attempts to ride hegemony for free when the U.S. denies its hegemonic roles accidentally. Faced with a niche market of hegemony, China has begun to accelerate its national strategy to make "Chinese Dream" come true. To that end, China promised again to keep the Paris Climate Agreement and attempts to play more active its roles in Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), Asia Infra Investment Bank(AIIB), and "One Belt, One Road". Despite all these efforts, the U.S. is most likely to withdraw its denial of hegemony any time soon. The U.S's resumption of Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPs) could be a precursor of the return to a hegemonic power's willingness. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the South China Sea serves as a quasi-war zone for hegemonic conflict.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.5-31
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• 2015

The Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) started from scratch. However, ROKN demonstrated its Blue Navy capabilities successfully to the entire world by conducting "Operation Early Dawn" at the Aden Bay, Yemen in Jan 2011. On the event of the 70th anniversary of the ROKN, I would like to retrospect past gleaning from voyages and challenges we had in the past. At the very inception of the ROKN, Korean government as well as senior military leaders recognized that it had no time to spare to clean up military those were insinuated deeply by communist agents. It was the top priority of the government. The Mongumpo Operation which was not well known, conducted by ROKN was one of the clean-up drive. The Korean War sometimes called as "a fire from land put-off at the sea". The world famous "Incheon Landing" which reversed war situation from the Nakdong Perimeter also done by Sea Power. ROKN conducted various maritime operations including not only Incheon Landing, but amphibious operation at Hungnam, mine sweeping, sea convoy, Wonsan Withdrawal. On the same day of the Korean War started, 25th June 1950, unless the victory of the ROKNS Baekdusan (PC 701) at the Korean Strait, the waning lamp light of Korea could not be rekindled by the participation of the U.N. The ROKN rescued the 17th regiment of Korean Army from the isolation at the Ongjin Peninsular and transported gold and silver bars stored at the Bank of Korea to the Navy supply deposit in Jinhae safely. ROKN special intelligence unit conducted critical HUMINT which led Incheon Landing success. One of important mission ROKN conducted successfully was not only transporting war fighting materials but also U.S. provided grains to starving Koreans. ROKN participated Vietnam campaign from 1960s and conducted numerous maritime transportation operations supplying materials to Vietnam military forces along the long coastal lines. Experienced Naval Officers and enlisted men who discharged and acquired as merchant marine certificate supported most of the U.S. sea lift operations throughout the Vietnam campaign. ROK-US Combined Forces which had been honed and improved its war fighting capabilities through the Korean War and out of Vietnam jungle playing key deterrent against threat from north Korea. However, those threat level will be completely different when north Korea finish its nuclear weapon ambition. In order to stand firm against north Korean nuclear threat, I would like to expect strong political leadership supporting nuclear submarine for ROKN.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.205-238
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• 2020

The origin of mission command can be traced to the era of the Prussian military reforms led by General Gerhard von Scharnhorst after defeats in battle of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 against Napoleon I. Mission Command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Commanders issue mission-type orders focused on the purpose of the operation rather than details of how to perform assigned tasks. The mission command has become the command philosophy of the German military and recently many countries in the west accept it as a command philosophy. This study compare and analyze the Battle of St. Vincent and the Battle of Jutland to make sure if the army-initiated mission commands were also useful for the navy. From the late 18th century, represented by the era of Nelson, Royal navy changed from the inherited rigid command culture to guaranteeing the disciplined initiative of its subordinate commanders. In the Battle of St. Vincent in 1797, Nelson acted contrary to the commander's orders at the crucial moment, which gave Britain a decisive victory. On the contrary more than 100 years later, the command culture of the Royal navy changed into a centralized command culture. In the Battle of Jutland in 1916, Royal Navy couldn't win because the rigid command culture did not guarantee initiative of subordinate commanders and subordinate commander's passive attitude of waiting for the commander's instructions even at critical moments. Therefore, a mission command that guarantees the initiative of subordinate commanders is a useful concept even in the navy because it makes subordinate commanders to take full advantage of a sudden change in battle. Today's advanced information and communication technologies have raised questions about mission command. But even advanced technology can't completely eliminate the fundamental nature of the war-the fog of war. War is chaotic and unpredictable. In the flood of lots of informations, senior commander's judgement is not always right because he(she) is also human, he(she) can make mistakes. In the age of informatization, mission command is still effective because it involves increasing interaction and synergy between senior and subordinate commanders by ensuring their independence. Therefore ROK navy also needs to activate mission command. ROK navy must dismantle the zero-defect mentality and apply from educations as Prussian did to establish a mission command culture.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.44 no.6
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• pp.501-508
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• 2020

His paper looks more closely at the Republic of Korea's (ROK) Navy submarine berth-allocation strategies, with the study's results ultimately resulting in the proposition of an integer programming model. Current submarine berth-allocation planning problems include the need for more minimal berth-shifting and general support service failures, as a lack of efficient submarine berth-allocation often leads to submarines unable to receive the support service they need due to the inadequacy of their assigned berths. Currently, the ROK Navy allocates berths by only taking available reserve resources and the full-capacity limits of support services into account. This paper expands upon this strategy, and proposes a model which would allow for submarine berth allocation planning to also take submarine support service scheduling into account, allowing for more efficient and timely submarine servicing. This proposed model in turn minimizes berth shifting, support service failures, and allows for full coordination with the submarine support service request schedule. The construction of this model was carried out through data gathered on the ROK Navy's fleets and forces, allowing for a more nuanced analysis of existing issues with submarine berth-allocation planning.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.53-82
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• 2017

Samuel Eliot Morison (1887-1976) was one of the pre-eminent historians of his generation. He was not only a famous historian at that time, but also was promoted to the rank of Admiral in U.S. Navy Reserve. Fifteen volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II was published between 1947 and 1962, was not only a comprehensive report on the Navy's projection of power over two oceans, but a classic of historical literature that stands as the definitive treatment of it subject. Although he was fifty-five when war come to America in December 1941. Samuel Eliot Morison was determined to play a role. A professor at Harvard at the time, he joined volunteering for duty in the Navy. An experienced sailor, Professor Morison had earlier sailed that same routes taken by Christopher Columbus while researching his biography, Admiral of the Ocean Sea, which appeared in January 1942 th much acclaim and later got a Pulitzer Prize. Thus Morison plunged into the war, crossing the Atlantic aboard a destroyer. He assumed himself as "Parkman on the sea", tried to follow Parkman's historiographic method, not only participatory history but also literary style. And during writing History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, He emphasized two principles, publicity and objectivity. In terms of publicity, he always worried about who read history and why. In his pamphlet, "History as a Literary Art", he asserted it is useless if readers do not read a history which historians wrote. So he thought historians have forgotten that there is an art of writing of history. Therefore, he built his narratives around brightly rendered visuals and used the present tense to describe actions he witnessed firsthand, he wrote of the U.S. combat in very vividly. But strongly driven by publicity, he sometimes lost his balance in writing the naval history. For instance, the naval history became the focus of criticism for its prejudiced comments about the commanders. Also some reviewers asserted he did not secure the objectivity on writing the naval history. Although he sometimes deliberately torpedoed the objectivity of his work for strengthening publicity, by writing an extensive U.S. naval history, he introduced maritime history and naval history to the public widely. Until in early twentieth century, U.S. historians usually had been focusing their effort to the traditional areas, for example politic, economy, and etc. His intensive effort on the operations of U.S. Navy in World War II aroused a public interest in maritime and naval history. In conclusion, through using literary style and realistic narratives, historian Morison wrote a naval history for all the people which could appealed to the public.