• 한국정보통신학회논문지
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• 제16권5호
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

미국의 한반도 정책은 비핵화이다. 미국정부는 북한의 핵위협을 제거하기 위해 군사행동의 가능성을 고려했었다. 군사행동 고려는 1993년 중반부터 1994년 중반까지 정점에 달했다. 그러한 공격은 직접적으로 한국전을 일으켰을 것이다. 당시 북핵위기는 북미협상과 한미동맹에 의해 해결되었다. PSI의 목적은 지구적 또는 지역적 안보에 심각한 위협을 일으키는 국가나 비국가행위자에게 대량살상무기, 운반체계, 관련 물질의 확산을 막거나 적어도 억제하는 것이다. PSI의 가장 논쟁의 여지가 있는 활동은 차단이다. 북한은 구상에 대해 심각한 우려를 표명하면서 다음과 같이 언급하였다. 무기를 개발하고, 배치하고, 수출하는 것은 주권이다. 그리고 자신들의 선박에 대한 차단은 선전 포고로 간주할 것이다. 한국이 북한선박에 대한 차단을 시행하면 북한은 도발로 대응할 것이므로 한반도의 긴장은 극적으로 증가할 것이다. 한국은 한미동맹과 남북관계를 고려해야하기 때문에 PSI에 매우 조심스럽게 접근하지 않을 수 없다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제50권7호
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• pp.1106-1111
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• 2018

Electromagnetic waves potentially have been used to heat overdense nuclear fusion plasmas through a double mode conversion from ordinary to slow extraordinary and finally to Electron Bernstein Wave (EBW) modes, OSXB. This scheme is efficient and has not any plasma density limit of electron cyclotron resonance heating due to cut-off layer. The efficiency of conversion depends on the isotropic launching angles of the microwaves with the plasma parameters. In this article, a two-step mode conversions of OSXB power transmission efficiency affected by the fast extraordinary (FX) loses at upper hybrid frequency are studied. In addition, the kinetic (hot) dispersion relation of a overdense plasma in a full wave analysis of a OSXB in Wendelstein 7X (W7-X) stellarator plasma has been numerically simulated. The influence of plasma dependent parameters such as finite Larmor radius, electron thermal velocity and electron cyclotron frequency are represented.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.118-126
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• 2016

North Korea has continued developing ballistic missiles with various ranges. Even through the recent launch long-range missiles, it can be inferred that North Korea's Missile technology has reached a level where it can even threaten the US. moreover, through the three times nuclear tests, North Korea is known to have succeeded at gaining 10~20KT of explosive power as well as the minimization and lightening of nuclear warhead. Considering the short length of war zone in Korean peninsula and the possibility of nuclear equipment, if be the most severe threat across the whole peninsula. Since the midcourse phase flight takes the longest time, ROK should establish the ability to intercept at this middle phase. From this perspective, this paper describes mission effect of a sea-based BMD system through empirical threat and flight characteristic analysis using MIT model that was not suggested in original research.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제6권4호
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• pp.209-217
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• 2020

북한은 국방력 강화를 위하여 꾸준한 국방개혁을 실시해왔으며, 특히 군사기술개발과 군수산업역량 강화를 국방개혁의 중점으로 삼아왔다. 이러한 북한의 국방개혁은 궁극적으로는 핵전력 확보를 목표로 했으며, 김정은 시기에 이르러 기술적 성과가 축적됨에 따라 수소탄과 ICBM/SLBM 등 전력의 발전으로 이어졌다. 이렇게 핵전력을 확보한 북한은 또다시 국방개혁을 통하여 재래식 무기체계의 첨단화를 추구함으로써 전략적 우위를 확보함으로써 재래전력에서의 대칭성까지 추구하고 있다. 여태까지 북한의 국방개혁은 성공적이었으며, 김정은의 새로운 집권체제 확립과 대미협상 등의 동력을 만드는데 성공했던 것으로 볼 수 있다.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.299-304
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• 2024

미국과 소련이 맞서는 제1차 핵시대를 넘어 지금은 크고 작은 국가들로 핵 사용 결정권자가 다양화된 제2차 핵시대라고 할 수 있다. 이에 해당하는 국가인 인도와 파키스탄은 서로 적대국으로 맞서며 핵무기를 보유하고 있지만 핵태세, 핵전략은 상반돼 있다. 두 국가의 사례는 우리나라가 마주한 북한이 앞으로 어떤 핵태세를 취할 것인지에 대해 실마리를 줄 수 있다. 특히 파키스탄이 선택한 선행적 확전 태세는 상대 위협에 대해 핵무기를 선제적으로 쓸 수있다고 위협해서 적의 침략을 억제시키는 매우 공세적인 핵태세이다. 이는 선제공격할 수 있는 소규모 핵무기로도 할수 있는 옵션이다. 따라서 핵능력이 열세한 파키스탄이 인도의 위협에 대응하여 선택할 수 있는 최적의 태세로 보인다. 미국과 한국에 비해 열세인 북한은 앞으로도 파키스탄처럼 핵무기를 선제적으로 사용할 수 있다고 위협할 것으로 보인다. 반면 정권 유지를 위해 실제 사용하기까지는 인도와 같이 수세적이고 상당히 보수적일 것으로 전망된다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제17권3호
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• pp.83-93
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• 2017

본 논문의 목적은 트럼프 행정부 등장 이후 미국과 중국의 한반도 주요현안에 대한 입장을 분석하고 미중관계 속에서 한국의 대응을 모색하는데 있다. 이 글은 세력전이 측면의 미중관계 담론을 바탕으로 (1) 북핵 (2) 한반도 사드배치 (3) 한미동맹의 세 가지 조건 하에서 두 가지 가정을 전망케 한다. 하나는 미국의 세계질서가 지역질서를 지배하여 지역 질서가 안정적으로 관리되는 것과, 다른 하나는 중국 중심의 지역질서가 세계질서에 영향을 주어 미국과 역내 패권적 갈등이 발생하는 경우이다. 연구결과, 미중관계에서 압도적인 미국의 객관적 힘의 우위는 북핵, 사드, 한미동맹 등 세계 및 지역질서를 리드하는데 상당부분 유지할 것으로 보이며, 중국은 미국과의 갈등 속에서도 미국적 세계질서 유지가 가져올 정치 경제적 이익에 편승하여 한반도 주요현안들에 일정 정도 영향력과 협력이 기대된다. 이러한 전망에서 한국은 북핵, 사드, 동맹의 주요 제 문제들이 한미관계 강화를 우선으로, 변화하는 강대국 세력경쟁 사이에서 현실적 국익에 부합한 외교를 균형 있게 추진해야 할 것이다. 이른바 '시소외교(see-saw diplomacy)'가 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.1137-1147
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• 2020

The discrete ordinates method (S_N) is one of the major shielding calculation method, which is suitable for solving deep-penetration transport problems. Our objective is to explore the available quadrature sets and to improve the accuracy in shielding problems involving strong anisotropy. The linear discontinuous finite-element (LDFE) quadrature sets based on the icosahedron (in short, ICLDFE quadrature sets) are developed by defining projected points on the surfaces of the icosahedron. Weights are then introduced in the integration of the discontinuous finite-element basis functions in the relevant angular regions. The multivariate secant method is used to optimize the discrete directions and their corresponding weights. The numerical integration of polynomials in the direction cosines and the Kobayashi benchmark are used to analyze and verify the properties of these new quadrature sets. Results show that the ICLDFE quadrature sets can exactly integrate the zero-order and first-order of the spherical harmonic functions over one-twentieth of the spherical surface. As for the Kobayashi benchmark problem, the maximum relative error between the fifth-order ICLDFE quadrature sets and references is only -0.55%. The ICLDFE quadrature sets provide better integration precision of the spherical harmonic functions in local discrete angle domains and higher accuracy for simple shielding problems.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.