• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.141-166
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• 2014

Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory of Mencius combined xìng(性) that means physical characteristic of human together $sh{\grave{a}}n$(善) that means moral value or moral behavior. Therefore in other to verify the meaning of xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) we need to analysis human nature in Psychology and moral norm in Ethics simultaneously. And that necessity justified Moral Psychological approach to xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). Mencius combined a priori morality and a priori moral norm and asserted xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). And than he presented an example for a basis or a clue of mora norm and explained grounds of moral behavior. But various theory Moral Psychology considered morality as an attachment or derivation of human nature. So another new Moral Psychology is needed to investigate Mencius Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory in a viewpoint of Moral Psychology. And than that must managed morality and moral norm as essential problems firstly. That because Mencius considered human as a moral subjectivity and seek the clue or basis morality and moral norm in human nature. And secondly that must managed moral intelligence as a emotional intelligence, because of $li{\acute{a}}ng$ $n{\acute{e}}ng$(良能) $li{\acute{a}}ng$ zhī(良知) of Mencius meaned moral intelligence which was derived from blood tied and moral emotion.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.121-132
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• 2016

Emotion is considered to be involved in the moral decision-making process consisting of moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. This research investigated the distinct role of two specific moral emotions, guilt and shame, when they are suppressed, on moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior through an online experiment. Moral emotion (guilt vs. shame) as well as suppression of these emotions (suppressing vs. control) was manipulated to infer the causality of moral emotions and the moral decision-making process when they are suppressed. The results suggest that suppressing guilt was involved in moral judgment and moral intention, but was not involved in moral behavior. In particular, participants who maintained guilt evaluated moral vignettes as more moral and perceived that they would follow the behavior described in the vignettes than those participants who suppressed their guilt. On the other hand, our data showed that suppressing shame was not involved in moral judgment and intention but was in behavior. Participants who maintained shame engaged in moral behavior more than participants who suppressed shame. We delineate the different mechanisms between guilt and shame on the moral decision-making process with the discrete emotion theory.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.15-24
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• 2015

Past experimental research reported that people become stricter in moral judgements when cleanliness-related concepts are activated. However, it is not clear whether pre-experimental individual differences in cleanliness desire is also related to moral judgment. This research examined whether cleanliness desire in various daily activities is related to diverse types of moral judgments (Study 1), and whether experimentally manipulated physical cleanness affects the relationship between cleanliness desire and moral judgments (Study 2). The results showed reliable relationship between everyday cleanliness desire and moral judgements in that people who were high (or low) in the desire was stricter (or more tolerant) in moral judgments. The relationship was also observed when physical cleanness was manipulated, but there was no difference in moral judgments depending on actual physical cleanness.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.555-570
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• 2011

In order to do morally right behavior that we cognitively know, prosocial moral motivation is necessary. Previous studies revealed emotion is important for prosocial moral motivation. This was supported by cognitive neuroscience studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI) in which the activity of ventral striatum(VS) was observed when people made moral decision. VS was originally known as the core area of reward process but recently VS was found to respond also to social reward and even feeling of prosocial emotion itself. However it is not clear why VS was activated when people experience prosocial moral sentiments. The aims of this review article were to find situations in which people are prosocially and morally motivated and to understand more about the role of emotion as a moral motivator by examining evidence regarding the neural network, including VS, of prosocial moral motivation and moral decision-making.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.1-12
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• 2012

This study examined the influences of age, offenders' intention, victims' emotional reactions on the moral emotional understanding of preschool children. Eighty eight children aged 4, 5, and 6 participated in this study, and were interviewed using four moral transgression stories. The responses of the children were then analyzed in terms of the levels of moral emotional understanding, from error through to the understanding of secondary emotions. The results indicated that older children showed higher levels of moral emotional understanding than younger children. Additionally, children's moral emotional understanding was higher in situations in which offenders' behaviors were intentional, and in which the victims expressed sadness. The attribution of moral emotions was influenced by victims' emotional reactions only in 6-year-old children. Discussion of these results also included the development of intervention programs for children with aggressive behaviors, as well as a number of suggestions for future study.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.51-65
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• 2006

This study is to evaluate the morality of teenagers with regard to features of justice. On the basis of the findings, an online morality level test system is designed and implemented to help students understand themselves better and to increase moral maturity through this self-test method based on Kohlberg's Morality Development Level. The main purpose of this study is to help students test and evaluate their morality, and it will be contributed to slough off egocentrism and to orient a relationship based on a mutual respect by using the embodied system. If this system can be applied successfully, an effective improvement on students' further education guidance may be gained because the test and its results are made in the system simultaneously. Also this easy and fast test system can attain much more economical effects than a written test.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.21-42
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• 2016

Purpose: Social influence has a decisive role in shaping a person's cognition and behavior. Chinese face consciousness, including moral component, is an important part of Chinese traditional culture, which influences people to implement moral behavior. With both eye-tracking technology and traditional questionnaire, this research aims to explore people's moral psychology and the psychological processing mechanisms of Chinese face consciousness, as well as the impact of Chinese face consciousness on the preference for the ecological product. Method and Data: 75 college and MBA students' eye movement data were collected when they read different kinds of moral materials, as well as data from the subsequent questionnaires. To test the hypothesis, ANOVA analysis and Heat Map analysis were performed. Besides, the PROCESS of bootstrap was used to test mediation effect. Findings: The results reveal that: 1. Compared to the moral-situation reading, when subjects read immoral situations, they need more processing time due to the moral dissonance and cognitive load. 2. Compared to the control condition, when threatened moral self is primed, subjects prefer to choose ecological product. 3. Protective face orientation is the mediator between threatened moral self and preference to ecological product. Key Contributions: First, this study broadens the use of eye-tracking technology in marketing and demonstrates a better understanding of the relationship between morality and consumer behavior in a more scientific way. Second, this study not only distinguishes the meanings between "protective face orientation" and "acquisitive face orientation", but also innovatively validates that when moral self is threatened, consumers tend to choose ecological product as moral compensation in order to protect their face. It can shed light on the promotion of ecological product in practical applications.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.85-104
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• 2019

Past research showed that presence of others induces morally desirable behavior and stricter judgments. That is, presence of others makes people become a moral being. On the other hand, little research has been conducted to test what effects facial expression of others have on moral judgments. In this research, we tested the effects of emotion exposed by facial expression on moral judgments. To this end, we presented descriptions of immoral or prosocial behavior along with facial expression of various emotions (in particular, disgust and happiness), and asked participants to make moral judgments on the behavior in the descriptions. In Experiment 1, facial expression did not affect moral judgments, but variability of judgments was increased when descriptions and facial expression were incongruent. In experiment 2, we modified potential reasons of the null effect and conducted the experiment using the same procedure. Subjects in Experiment 2 made stricter judgments with disgust faces than with happy faces for immoral behavior, but the effect did not occur for prosocial behavior. In Experiment 3, we repeated the same experiment after having subjects to consider themselves as the actor in the descriptions. The results replicated the effects of facial expression in Experiment 2 but there was no effect of the actor on moral judgments. This research showed that facial expression of others specifically affects moral judgments on immoral behavior but not on prosocial behavior. In general discussion, we provided further discussion on the results and the limitations of this research.