• Journal of Public Diplomacy
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.49-74
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• 2021

In this paper, I applied grounded theory in exploring how Twitter became the battlefield for China's public diplomacy campaign. China's new move to global social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, has been a controversial strategy in public diplomacy. This study analyzes Chinese Foreign Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Twitter posts and comments. It models China's recent diplomatic move to Twitter as a "war of words" model, with features including "leadership," "polarization," and "aggression," while exerting possible effects as "resistance," "hatred," and "sarcasm" to the global community. Our findings show that by failing to gage public opinion and promote the country's positive image, China's current digital diplomacy strategy reflected by Zhao Lijian's tweets has instead constructed a polarized political public sphere, contradictory to the country's promoted "shared human destiny." The "war of words" model extends our understanding of China's new digital diplomacy move as a hybrid of state propaganda and self-performance. Such a strategy could spread hate speech and accelerate political polarization in cyberspace, despite improvements to China's homogenous network building on Twitter.

• Current Optics and Photonics
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.367-374
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• 2022

A photodetector based on a reduced graphene oxide (RGO)/n-Si heterojunction with high responsivity, detectivity and fast response speed is presented. Here, we put forward a simple vacuum filtration method to prepare RGO film and transfer it onto an n-Si substrate to form an RGO/n-Si heterojunction. The experimental results show that the heterojunction has good rectification characteristics, and the response and recovery time are less than 0.31 s and 0.25 s, respectively. Under 470 nm light conditions at -2 V applied voltage, the responsivity and detectivity of the device are 65 mA/W and 4.02 × 10¹⁰ cmHz^1/2W^-1, respectively. The simple preparation process and good performance of the RGO/n-Si heterojunction make it a promising material for photoelectric detection, especially in the near-ultraviolet band.

• Journal of Public Diplomacy
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.43-68
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• 2022

Multiple modes of communication on social media can contribute to public diplomacy in informing, conversing, and networking with members of foreign publics. However, manipulative behaviours on social media, prevalent especially in high tension contexts, create disruptions to authentic communication in what could be grey/black propaganda or information warfare. This study reviews existing literature about models of public diplomacy to guide an empirical study of China's communication in the #SouthChinaSea conversation on Twitter. It uses computational methods to identify, record, and analyze one-way, two-way, and network communication of China's actors. It employs manual qualitative research to determine the nature of China's actors. On that basis, it assesses China's Twitter communication in the issue against various models of public diplomacy.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.95-140
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• 2024

This study empirically investigates the international transmission of China's uncertainty shocks. It estimates a time-varying parameter Bayesian global structural vector autoregressive model (TVP-BGVAR) using time series data for 33 countries to evaluate heterogeneous international linkage across countries and time. Uncertainty shocks are identified via sign restrictions. The empirical results reveal that an increase in uncertainty in China negatively affects the global economy, but those effects significantly vary over time. The effects of China's uncertainty shocks on the global economy have been significantly altered by China's WTO accession, the global financial crisis, and the recent US-China trade conflict. Furthermore, the effects of China's uncertainty shocks, typically on inflation, differ significantly across countries. Moreover, Trade openness appears crucial in explaining heterogeneous GDP responses across countries, whereas the international dimension of monetary policy appears to be important in explaining heterogeneous inflation responses across countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.179-203
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• 2011

Currently, the most common form of regional economic integration is FTA (Free Trade Area), which is formed by two countries or more as either a bilateral or multilateral agreement. A proposed FTA between Korea and China recently has been re-focused after China concluded its ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) with Taiwan in June 2010. By May 2010, China was the No.1 export partner to Korea (as a Chinese No.2 import partner). Also, Korea and Taiwan trade structure to China is similar and competitive at the same time. So, China-Taiwan ECFA has a significant effect on the trade between China and Korea. As a result, it will hurt Korean industrial production and trade with China. Therefore, the progress and expected issue of a FT A between Korea and China which is prompting will be analyzed. In this situation, the final purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact on a Korea-China FTA Negotiation from the China-Taiwan ECFA.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.69-90
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• 2020

The arbitration system has many advantages, including resilience, speed, ease of approval, and enforcement of foreign arbitration in international disputes, and it plays an important role in today's international business. As the world's economic activities increase, China's trade disputes are intensifying. In 2017, China emphasized the international cooperation and commercial expansion of foreign investment at "One Belt, One Road." Therefore, it is expected that international business will become more active, with the issue of how to recognize and enforce the foreign arbitration awards in China becoming highly important. In addition, South Korea and China maintained deep trade relations after establishing diplomatic relations in 1992 and concluding the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement, which will inevitably increase trade disputes. As far as South Korea is concerned, China is South Korea's largest trading partner, so it is important for South Korea to analyze how foreign arbitration awards are recognized and enforced in China. China's accession to the New York Convention in 1987 was the beginning of the enforcement of foreign arbitrators. However, since China has begun to recognize and enforce foreign arbitrators relatively late, there are many problems in terms of recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards in China. This study introduces the concept and scope of foreign arbitral awards, as well as the legal basis and procedures for recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards, and examines relevant cases and the denial of recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitration award. In the end, some issues and remedies for the recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral awards system in China were concluded.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.22
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• pp.255-285
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• 2004

After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO- plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports, It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner as the US Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. This paper indicates that the foregoing elements could lead to mort trade disputes between Korea China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the Garlic War. The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues again China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines Final, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.23
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• pp.341-372
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• 2004

Since China was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, China has sped up its active participation in the competition of the world economy by lifting its trade and investment restrictions and limits. Its trading system is getting more and more free and its huge market with a population of 1.3 billion has been getting more and more open. With Chinas WTO accession, China has been honoring its commitments to its WTO members by complying with international business practices and WTO rules. For example, it will cut down its import tariffs for automobiles from the present 80% to 25% by 2006. Its financial sector and service industries are open to foreign investors now. As Chinas biggest business partner, Japan has benefited tremendously from Chinas open policies and deepening economic reform. In order to reduce the costs of production, a large number of enterprises from Japan have set up production bases in China since a Chinese workers wages accounts for only one tenth of those of a Japanese worker on the average. Japan has become one of Chinas biggest investors on a par with the United States of America (USA). How are the Japanese enterprises in Japan and in China adjusting themselves to the rapid changes of the Chinese market? What characteristics do the Japanese enterprises in China have? What effects has Chinas WTO accession had on those Japanese enterprises that have invested in China? This paper finds answers to the above questions. It at first reviews the Sino-Japanese economic and trade relations since 1980s, then analyses the situation and characteristics of Japanese-invested enterprises in China, and explores their problems in China. Finally it puts forward some suggestions for the Japanese enterprises in China.