In order to survive the on-going natural resource war, Korea needs various efforts such as enhancing self-exploitation ratio, increasing the supply of new-reuse energy, strengthening cooperation with resource rich countries. Central Asian countries are geometrically far away from Korea. However, Korea should try to develop political, economic and ethnic relationship with those countries into much higher dimension to secure various natural resources. Major countries including U.S., EU. Japan and China are approaching Central Asian countries with long term perspective. Improving country-image through enlargement of ODA is the first concern of those countries. Korea should try to follow their practices. Government should try to improve Korea's image in the first place and lead economic cooperation with very detailed supportive measures to induce Korean firms' investment into the Central Asian countries. In the due process, a lot of information about those countries' political climate, social situation, ethnical composition, major religions, educational system, current state and structure of economies and industries, etc should be made available to Korean firms.
The purpose of this study is to investigate reunification perception among groups with different cognitive bias(anchoring bias) through empirical studies. This study assumes that cognitive bias occurs according to the content of N. Korea provided in school education, and that the cognitive bias formed in youth creates a difference in perception of N. Korea and reunification. For empirical study, a survey of reunification awareness conducted by the Institute for Peace an Unification Studies-Seoul National University was used, and the two groups are divided into A-group that chose "anti-communism or security" and B-group that did "reunification interests, multi-culturalism and understanding North Korea" according to N. Korea content which was encountered in school education during adolescence. A-group recognized N. Korea as a hostile target even after becoming an adult, while B-group regarded N. Korea as a one of dialogue and cooperation. This analysis illustrates the existence of cognitive bias between the two groups because of N. Korea content which was given in school education. A-group had a lower percentage than B-group in terms of the benefits of reunification to S. Korea and the need for more dialogue and compromise with N. Korea. However, there was no difference between two groups in terms of acceptance of N. Korean defectors. This research result could be a reference to the direction of school education policies relating to reunification in that early school education affects reunification awareness and perception related with N. Korea even in adulthood.
Controversy continues over the offensive nature of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power by using the three elements of strategy and predict China's military actions in the future. For this purpose, research was conducted by considering the three elements of strategy and the distinct characteristics of naval strategy, and it was found that China's naval strategy was overall aggressive, but there was an imbalance in the pursuit of aggression between each strategic element. Offensive nature was prominent in terms of the methods, but there were limitations in the goals and means, such as the need to cooperate with neighboring countries to become a maritime power and the lack of military technology and operational continuity. The prospects for China's future military actions derived from the imbalance between these strategic elements are as follows. ① The risk of all-out military conflict with the US is low for now. ② China may use its naval power to force or cause limited military clashes against neighboring countries within the first island chain. ③ Accidental military conflicts with the US and neighboring countries may occur over naval confrontation over territorial disputes.
This paper examines middle powers' ODA policy in the post cold war era and discusses its implication for Korean aid strategy. Middle powers' ODA has been more successful than that of super powers in promoting donors' positive images and in stimulating recipient countries' development. Middle powers tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems often by taking a mediator role, and their ODA policies set them apart from the great players in international politics. Middle powers' ODA is primarily aimed at reducing poverty and protecting human rights in least developed countries where humanitarian aid needs the most rather than promoting donors' interests. Also, middle powers have provided bilateral untied aid in the sectors of food aid and emergency relief and steadily devoted about 0.7% of their gross national income to ODA. Meanwhile, Korea as an emerging middle power and a new donor has been implementing its own aid strategy under the name of the Korean development model since the post cold war period. The Korean ODA was not successful in building donors' positive images by simply following the short term strategies of US and Japan. Yet, its ODA policy has been quite effective in sustaining local development by creating specific niches in which the country can specialize in. In specific, Korea has focused on developing the sectors of information and communication technology and industry energy in recipients' countries by maximizing its comparative advantage.
Amid global geopolitical crises that are heightening tensions worldwide, the importance of national security is being reevaluated. Consequently, South Korea is gaining attention in the global defense market due to its superior technology, competitive pricing, and rapid delivery capabilities. The increasing international demand for defense materials offers opportunities for the development of the domestic defense industry and has the potential to lead to long-term defense strategies and an expansion of exports. In particular, the development of future advanced weapons systems and the expansion of defense exports are likely to be possible through a deep understanding of the international political and economic situation and proactive defense diplomacy. This study analyzes the impact of current global geopolitical crises on Korea's defense industry and presents effective strategies based on these findings, including innovative improvements to defense acquisition systems and the discovery of overseas defense cooperation partners to strengthen defense exports. This strategic approach aims to balance domestic consumption with exports, enhance military strength, and improve the country's standing in the international community. Therefore, efforts are needed to ensure the sustainable growth of the defense industry, enabling South Korea to achieve economies of scale and play a pivotal role in the global defense industry.
Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.
The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.
Despite international cooperation, piracy has not yet been eradicated in major waters around the world. From the perspective of South Korea, which is absolutely dependent on exporting and importing, it's a lifeline for us to secure safe maritime traffic so it is a situation we have to be vigilant about maritime safety and security. However, criminal law on punishment of piracy is still insufficient and legislative consideration is needed. Since pirates are regarded as enemies of humankind, all nations can punish pirates regardless of their damage. The international community has done its best in cooperation from hundreds of years ago to secure maritime trade through this universal jurisdiction and marine transportation in international waters which is an essential space for military activities, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, the advanced nations have dispatched fleets to combat maritime security threats through joint operations to crack down on Somali pirates. Even if universal jurisdiction is allowed for piracy in accordance with the International Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is difficult to effectively deal with piracy if it not fully complied with a domestic legal system for this purpose or is stipulated as different from international regulations. In other words, universal jurisdiction corresponding to international norms and constitution of piracy should be defined in criminal law in accordance with criminal statutory law. If the punishment of pirates by unreasonably applying our criminal law without prejudice to such work can lead to diplomatic disputes in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other international norms. In South Korea, there is no provision to explicitly prescribe piracy as a crime, but punish similar acts like piracy in criminal law and maritime safety law. However, there is a limit to effective piracy punishment because we are not fully involved in internationally accepted piracy. In this study, we critically examine the proposals of the constitutional elements of piracy, propose the legislative direction, and insist on the introduction of globalism to pirate sins.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not have direct legislation on natural environmental conservation until the early 1970s when the regime was still in the early stage. The Law on Land was enacted in 1977 to provide the legal basis for protecting the natural environment, including land protection, protection zones, and forest formation and protection. The enactment of the Law on Environmental Protection in 1986 made progress on environmental conservation in the DPRK. The constitutional amendment in 1992 stipulated "the preservation and creation of the natural environment as the responsibility of the state." Based on the Framework Law on Environmental Protection, subordinate statutes in various fields were enacted after the1990s. While the committee designated and managed the protected zones in the early days, the Framework Law on Environmental Protection established the ground for the designation of legally protected areas, and the Law on Protection of Scenic Spots and Natural Monuments enacted in 1995, and the Law on Environmental Protection enacted in 2009 provided the details. Furthermore, the types of nature reserves include biosphere reserves, primeval forest reserves, animal reserves, plant reserves, and scenic reserves. The 2nd National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan established in 2007 based on the Convention on Biological Diversity(CBD) stated 326 protected zones in the DPRK. However, the 2018 United Nations list of Protected Areas shows only 31 registered zones, indicating the need to establish basic information on protected areas in DPRK. This study can provide basic information for a better understanding of the nature conservation system in the DPRK. Considering that environmental protection activities such as protection of endangered species and recovery of environmental pollution are subject to exceptions under the current sanctions against North Korea (UN Security Council, the United States), it will be possible to contribute to identifying possible inter-Korean cooperation projects in the field of the natural environment.
The Journal of Korean Society for School & Community Health Education
/
v.25
no.2
/
pp.59-70
/
2024
Objectives: The purpose of this study is to analyze each country's infectious disease response capacities and, based on this, find areas for improvement in Korea's infectious disease management response. Methods: First, the capacity to respond to the COVID-19 infectious disease was analyzed by country using the SPAR scores of 96 countries around the world released by WHO in 2022. Second, we analyzed each country's specific COVID-19 quarantine performance using Our World in Data and the Global Health Security Index (GHSI). Results: First, the quarantine intensity index on January 24, 2021 was the highest in the Southeast Asia branch at 67.6, which had strong quarantine measures, and the lowest at 44.5 in the Africa branch. As of December 31, 2022, the quarantine intensity index in Europe was significantly lowered to 11.6. Second, the factor that influenced the SPAR indicator on the total number of patients per million population was national laboratory (C4), p=.027, and the factor that influenced the total number of deaths per million population was infection prevention and control (C9), p=.005., Risk Communication and Community Participation (C10) p=.040. The influential factor on GDP per capita was infection prevention and control (C9) p=.009, and the influential factor on GHSI was infection prevention and control (C9) p=.002. Conclusion: The research findings indicate that it was difficult to find a correlation between the SPAR, which is each country's self-assessment of their infectious disease capacities, and the number of COVID-19 cases or the intensity of pandemic responses. However, mortality rates, as well as factors such as the Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and national income, appear to be somewhat influenced. For future improvements in infectious disease management and response in our country, it is necessary to develop pandemic strategies that can reduce socio-economic costs based on more scientific and reliable data like JEE or GHSI, especially in preparation for potential unknown emerging infectious diseases. Based on this, proactive decision-making led by a control tower of experts and effective health communication are also required to respond to public health crises at a national level.
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