• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.141-166
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• 2014

Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory of Mencius combined xìng(性) that means physical characteristic of human together $sh{\grave{a}}n$(善) that means moral value or moral behavior. Therefore in other to verify the meaning of xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) we need to analysis human nature in Psychology and moral norm in Ethics simultaneously. And that necessity justified Moral Psychological approach to xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). Mencius combined a priori morality and a priori moral norm and asserted xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). And than he presented an example for a basis or a clue of mora norm and explained grounds of moral behavior. But various theory Moral Psychology considered morality as an attachment or derivation of human nature. So another new Moral Psychology is needed to investigate Mencius Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory in a viewpoint of Moral Psychology. And than that must managed morality and moral norm as essential problems firstly. That because Mencius considered human as a moral subjectivity and seek the clue or basis morality and moral norm in human nature. And secondly that must managed moral intelligence as a emotional intelligence, because of $li{\acute{a}}ng$ $n{\acute{e}}ng$(良能) $li{\acute{a}}ng$ zhī(良知) of Mencius meaned moral intelligence which was derived from blood tied and moral emotion.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.86-113
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• 2000

본 연구는 환경지향제품구매와 재활용행동을 설명하기 위한 것으로 Schwartz 가 제기한 규범이론에 관한 이론고찰과 실증분석을 병행하고 있다. 규범이론의 핵심은 사회규범을 개인의 행동으로 전환시키는 과정을 설명하는 것이다. 규범이론에 따르면 환경지향제품구매와 재활용과 같은 이타적 행동은 사람들이 일종의 추상적이고 객관적인 방식으로 동의하는 도덕적 행동에 관한 사회규범으로 시작된다. 그러나 사회규범은 행동을 지배하기에는 너무 일반적이고 소원하다. 따라서 이러한 사회규범은 개인적 차원에서 우리들 각 개인에게 적응되어 개인규범이 된다. 사회규범은 사회적 구조의 차원에서 존재하는 반면 개인규범은 강력하게 내면화 된 도덕적 태도가 된다. 개인이 규범을 내면화 했지만 이에 따라 행동하지 않을 수도 있는 데 상황에 적절하도록 개인규범이 정의되어야 한다. 규범이론은 주어진 상황에 적절하도록 사회규범을 개인규범으로 정의하도록 유도하기 위해서는 바로 행동결과지각과 책임귀인지각이 개입되어야 한다고 제기하고 있다. 본 연구는 이상의 규범이론에 근거하여 소비자의 환경지향제품구매행동과 재활용행동을 설명하고자 다음 세 가지 연구목적을 설정하였다. 첫째, 사회규범이 개인규범의 형성에 어떠한 영향을 미치는가? 둘째, 사회규범이 내면화 된 개인규범은 환경지향제품구매행동과 재활용행동에 직접적인 영향을 미치는가? 셋째, 규범이론은 조절변수가 개입되는 경우 개인규범이 행동으로 전환되는 것이 더욱 용이해진다고 제기한 바, 조절변수의 하나인 환경지향행동결과의 중요성지각의 영향을 검증하고자 한다. 연구결과, 환경문제가 개입된 상황에서 사회규범은 개인규범의 형성에 강한 영향을 미치며 개인규범은 다시 환경지향제품구매와 재활용행동에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 환경지향행동결과의 중요성지각 역시 개인규범이 환경지향제품구매행동으로 전환되는 과정에서 조절적 역할을 함으로서 양변수간 관계를 더욱 강화하는 변수임을 연구결과는 제시하고 있다. 그러나 개인규범-재활용행동사이에서의 조절적 역할은 없는 것으로 나타났다.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.82
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• pp.73-125
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• 2011

This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.

• Korean Architects
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• s.558
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• pp.150-157
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• 2015

대한건축사협회 50년 동안 제도의 생성과 흐름을 이해하는데 먼저 제도란 무엇인지에 대한 이해가 필요하다. 제도는 규범의 복합체라고 한다. 규범의 내용이 형식화되고 정리되어 공권력을 수반하는 법률에서부터 형식화되지 않은 채 일상생활에서의 막연한 약속과 같은 집단의 도덕적 기준이나 관습에 이르기까지 그 범위는 광범하다. 즉 정치 경제 교육 제도 등에서부터 도덕이나 언어와 같은 것까지 포함한다. 이 제도가 존재함으로써 사회를 구성하는 모든 개인의 행동은 얼마간 틀에 박히고 방향이 부여되기 때문에 사람들을 시행착오의 낭비를 절약하여 큰 불편 없이 어느 정도 자동적으로 행동할 수 있다. 이런 점에서 제도는 사회질서 유지를 그 중요한 기능으로 하는 한편 모든 개인의 자유를 다소나마 규제하고 부자연스럽게 하는 측면도 있다. 모든 개인에 대한 제한이나 속박이 심해져 정상적인 대다수의 개인의 생활요구가 자해되고 억제되는 정도가 지나치게 되면 그 사회의 가치체계나 규범이 흔들리기 시작하며, 마침내는 기존의 제도가 바뀌고 새로운 제도가 생기게 된다고 한다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.116
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• pp.1-28
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• 2017

Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical conception of morality is most often characterized as a teleological or ethical foundation of morality and understood in simple consequentialist sense. Besides teleological or consequentialist components, however, there are obviously Kantian deontological ones too in his moral conception of Recognition. This study is intended to provide a consistent and coherent interpreta-tion of it, which is largely adopting main features of the moral philosophy of Kant. This interpretation makes a deontological restructuring of Honneth's moral conception of recognition necessary. It is in this way that the moral aspect of recognition will be able to satisfy the intention and whole project of Honneth's theory of recognition.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.38
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• pp.234-254
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• 1999

Volunteering has been defined as a form of altruistic helping behavior directed at improving other's welfare. Volunteering is, however, also identified as a type of collective action for community welfare. In this regard, this study tests whether neighborhood member's network and collective identity are more important determinants to explain participation in volunteer work than altruistic or normative motivation. This study estimates a model in which volunteering is determined by empathy, normative beliefs, neighborhood networks(friendship, contacts, and integration), and identity as a neighborhood member. This study shows that empathy, normative beliefs, and collective identity as a neighborhood member have significant impacts on participation in volunteer work. In addition, this study reveals that neighborhood member's network has an indirect impact on volunteering through identity as a neighborhood member. These results suggest that neighbor-hood community member's ties and collective identity are important sources for community welfare and collective volunteer work.

• Journal of the HCI Society of Korea
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.55-63
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• 2018

Most people today search for information on the Internet about the goods or services they want to purchase and then assess the replies posted by other people who have experience with those goods or services. These replies serve as an important reference point that can affect purchase decisions. Replies are divided broadly into two types: first, market normative replies about whether a person experiences satisfaction with (or more than) the price paid for goods or services (positive) or not (negative); and the second is non-market normative replies about whether the goods or service provider morally deserves the profits gained from providing them (positive) or not (negative). Previous studies on replies have focused on market normative replies (whether the food is delicious), and there have only been some studies on the effect of non-market normative replies (the owner is morally good). This research was undertaken to re-examine the effect of market normative replies identified by previous studies in a restaurant visit intention evaluation (Experiment 1), to examine the effect of non-market normative replies not investigated in previous studies (Experiment 2), and to compare the effect of market normative replies and non-market normative replies (the meta-analysis) In conclusion, restaurant visit intention was stronger when market normative replies were positive (delicious) than when they were negative (not delicious) (Experiment 1). Furthermore, restaurant visit intention was stronger when non-market normative replies were positive (the owner is moral) than when they were negative (the owner is immoral) (Experiment 2). On the other hand, it was found that restaurant visit intention was stronger when non-market normative replies were positive than when market normative replies were positive, and restaurant visit intention was weaker when non-market normative replies were negative than when market normative replies were negative. This implies that people are more likely to be affected by non-market normative replies than market normative replies. In addition, this study suggested that the mood changed more before and after checking non-market normative replies than before and after checking market normative replies, and due to this difference, people could be affected more by non-market normative replies than market normative replies.