This paper presents a hardware accelerator for the maze routing problem. This accelerator consists of three 3 stage pipelines. Banked memory is used to avoid memory read/write conflicts and obtain maximum efficiency.

In Multiple Objective Linear Programming (MOLP), it is well known that efficient solution and weight are correspondent to each other. The purpose of this paper is to study relationships between efficient face and the region of weight in MOLP. It is shown that the regions of weights corresponding to two efficient extreme points are also neighbor if two efficient extreme points are neighbor each other, and that the set of the efficient solutions corresponding to the common part of weight regions is efficient face. Using the above, we present a method to find the efficient solutions corresponding to a given weight and vice versa.

Many programmers start debugging by reading the faulty program from start to bottom without investigating carefully the erroneous program. Expert programmers, however, trace backward from a particular variable in a specific statement to identify all possible sources of influence on the value of variable (program slice). Weiser proposed a slicing algorithm (method) that is complex, iterative and still in modification [3,4]. This paper presents a method to generate a program slice by use of matrix computation which represents all possible slices of the program. The matrix representation of a program is soundly based on the graph theory of data dependency.

A patroller is to protect a patrol area with a certain length front D by proceeding at constant speed on courses parallel to the patrol front, traveling back and forth between area boundaries and reversing course at each area boundary. Transitors enter the area uniformly distributed across the patrol front on a course perpendicular to the patrol front. Any transitor that closes the patroller to within his sweep radius R is detected. This paper use plane trigonometry to derive the theoretical probailities of detection and develop a Monte Carlo computer simulation Model.

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.