Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper analyzes a clash of standards in Korea's Electric Vehicle(EV) market, particularly between an EV charging standard and a smart grid communication standard in 2012~2013. For charging, EV is connected with the electric power grid and simultaneously exchanges data regarding the charging status. When EV is connected with the power grid, a clash between two standards may arise. It actually happened when BMW entered into the Korean EV market with the DC Combo charging system. In that course, the frequency interference occurred between the EV data communication technology adopted by BMW and the AMI(Advanced Metering Infrastructure) for the smart grid system in Korea. Standardization of Korea's EV charging systems was required to solve this problem. However, it had been delayed due to the confrontation between various stakeholders involved in the process of standardization. It lasted until the DC combo was accepted as one of the Korea EV charging standards(KSAE SAE 1772-2040, 2014.1) by KSAE(The Korea Society of Automotive Engineers) in January 2014. This is an interesting case in the age of convergence. As it deals with the standard competition not among EV standards, but a clash between the EV industry and the smart grid, i.e. electric power industry, it addresses the necessity to consider standardization processes between different industries. This study draws on the stakeholder theory to analyse the dynamics of the standard clash between EV charging systems and the smart grid system, which is a unique example of standard clash between different industries. We expect such clashes to increase in the age of convergence.
RPS(Renewable Portfolio Standard) recently with the introduction of a new solar power development as the market expands, land shortage of solar power as an alternative site for installing solar water development has emerged. Solar water dams, reservoirs and water by taking advantage of available solar power development a new concept of private forest land in a way does not involve destruction of the forest land and water resources through efficient use of environmentally friendly energy production and water quality improvement There are a variety of benefits. This paper won the nation's first solar power to enforce the selection of the optimal location for solar power's award for planning theory and research techniques are intended to establish. Award of the solar system through the analysis of a few research-related materials and renewable energy systems project implementation process to establish an initial investigation techniques as well as the existing dam located about fitness will be assessed. In this study, solar water conducting business in the current analysis with considerable planning and installation of solar installation for the economic and environmental cost of the evaluation period and is expected to be able to give you one.
Purpose - This paper examines the explanatory power of the agency theory in the determination of cash holdings for Korean retail firms. If the agency theory holds, a firm with strong corporate governance structure tends to have low cash holdings. A strong governance structure makes the CEO of this firm to behave in the interests of shareholders and thus the CEO has low incentive to stockpile cash holdings, which can be easily diverted for the CEO's own managerial purposes. We investigate this relationship between corporate governance structure and cash holdings, by using corporate governance scores as a proxy variable that captures the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Research design, data, and methodology - We adopt the sample of publicly listed retail firms in KOSPI market from 2005 to 2013. Financial and accounting statements are gathered from the WISEfn database. We also use the corporate governance scores published by Korean Corporate Governance Service. The relationship between the corporate governance scores and cash holdings is cross-sectionally estimated based on the ordinary least square method. This estimation method is widely accepted in the existing literature. The sample of large conglomerates, Chebol, and the remainder firms are separately examined as well, to account for the distinctive internal financing environment in these large conglomerates. Results - We mainly contribute to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence against the agency theory of cash policy. Unlike the prediction of agency theory, we confirm statistically insignificant or even positive correlations between the set of corporate governance scores and cash-asset ratios. Almost all the major corporate governance attributes including total score, shareholder rights, board structure, and the quality of information disclosure do not show negative correlations with cash holdings, which poses a strong challenge to the validity of the agency theory in the determination of retail firms' cash holdings. Conclusions - This study presents interesting empirical results with respect to the cash policy in Korean retail firms. Consistent to prior studies, I verify that the agency theory only limitedly explains the level of cash holdings. Future studies may obtain more robust results by examining a longer sample period.
The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
/
v.54
no.10
/
pp.496-499
/
2005
In many parts of the world, the electric power industry is undergoing unprecedented changes. Therefore, in order to reform the electric power industry efficiently and minimize the confusion of this restructuring, the systematic studies related to transmission pricing and transmission cost allocation issues are required essentially. However, even now, the basis of transmission cost allocation rate is not equipped so that the regulation body has determined the allocating rate under the common practice. In this paper, we demonstrate that the decision of transmission cost allocation rate is the regulation body's own right. For this analysis, we apply game theory to the procedure determining this rate and the competition to determine this rate between gencos and distcos is modeled as the arbitration game.
This study examines the normalization of Korean GM management between the Korean government and GM in terms of external negotiation game and internal negotiation game using Putnam's Two-Level Games. In addition, GM's Win-set change and negotiation strategy were analyzed. This analysis suggested implications for the optimal negotiation strategy for mutual cooperation between multinational corporations and local governments in the global business environment. First, the negotiation strategy for Korea's normalization of GM management in Korea can be shifted to both the concession theory and the opposition theory depending on the situation change and the government policy centered on the cautious theory. Second, GM will maximize its bargaining power through 'brink-end tactics' by utilizing the fact that the labor market is stabilized, which is the biggest weakness of the Korean government, while maintaining a typical Win-set reduction strategy. GM will be able to restructure at any time in terms of global management strategy, and if the financial support of the Korean government is provided, it will maintain the local factory but withdraw the local plant at the moment of stopping the support. In negotiations on the normalization of GM management in Korea, it is necessary to prepare a problem and countermeasures for various scenarios and to maintain a balance so that the policy does not deviate to any one side.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel (${\delta}_{N_i}$).
shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities.
(a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in
(c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like (b). Countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria, or the market for "experience goods" such as shoes, could be examples of this market condition.
summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (${\delta}_{N_i}$) is held constant, while the range of consumer distribution (${\chi}_i$) varies from -25 to 25, from -50 to 50, from -100 to 100, from -150 to 150, and from -200 to 200.
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers. illustrates how this happens. When mangers consider the overall impact of the Internet channel, however, they should consider not only channel power, but also sales volume. When both are considered, the introduction of the Internet channel is revealed as more harmful to a physical retailer in Russia than one in Hong Kong, because the sales volume decrease for a physical store due to Internet channel competition is much greater in Russia than in Hong Kong. The results show that manufacturer is always better off with any type of Internet store introduction. The independent physical store benefits from opening its own Internet store when the average travel cost is higher relative to the disutility of using the Internet. Under an opposite market condition, however, the independent physical retailer could be worse off when it opens its own Internet outlet and coordinates both outlets (RI). This is because the low average travel cost significantly reduces the channel power of the independent physical retailer, further aggravating the already weak channel power caused by myopic inter-channel price coordination. The results implies that channel members and policy makers should explicitly consider the factors determining the relative distributions of both kinds of consumer disutility, when they make a channel decision involving an Internet channel. These factors include the suitability of a product for Internet shopping, the level of E-Commerce readiness of a market, and the degree of geographic dispersion of consumers in a market. Despite the academic contributions and managerial implications, this study is limited in the following ways. First, a series of numerical analyses were conducted to derive equilibrium solutions due to the complex forms of demand functions. In the process, we set up V=100, ${\lambda}$=1, and ${\beta}$=0.01. Future research may change this parameter value set to check the generalizability of this study. Second, the five different scenarios for market conditions were analyzed. Future research could try different sets of parameter ranges. Finally, the model setting allows only one monopoly manufacturer in the market. Accommodating competing multiple manufacturers (brands) would generate more realistic results.
This paper analyzes the impact of import liberalization of petroleum product market in 1997 on the behavior of a domestic industry, regarded as a typical oligopoly. Based on the theory of implicit cartel, two regression equations were formulated and estimated for domestic production and refinery margin using monthly data for the period from Jan. 1994 to June 2003. Estimation results show that not only did domestic production rise sharply but also the refining cost fell substantially throughout 1996 before the actual liberalization of imports, Such a response is clearly consistent with the implicit cartel theory, which suggests that once the difficulty of maintaining a cartel in the future is recognized, the cartel immediately collapses and anticipation of import liberalization can cause immediately lowering market price as well as an immediate expansion of the supply by a domestic industry. However, the significant reduction of refinery cost accompanied by a large contraction in domestic output after the actual implementation of import liberalization can be explained by the collapse of implicit cartel caused by the anticipated liberalization of imports. Thus, import liberalization in the sense of allowing entry of foreign producers into domestic market has seemed to be an effective means to weaken market power and induce more competitive conduct of domestic firms.
This study was motivated by a recent channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset between a service provider and a handset manufacturer in the mobile communication market. In this study, we have developed a two-person non-zero sum game for the channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset, and derived its optimal strategic game solution. As a result, we have found that, between the service operator and the handset manufacturer, one who has high level of market leadership in his own market has a power to affect the optimal strategic game solution. We have also found that, when the service operator and the handset manufacturer have relatively high level of market leadership in their own market, there exist both of potential channel conflict and cooperation. The result of this study may provide an effective reference for a solution of similar channel conflicts.
Journal of the Korean Institute of Illuminating and Electrical Installation Engineers
/
v.22
no.9
/
pp.82-87
/
2008
Faster, safer and cheaper mailing of the postal matter is essential for surviving in the competitive market of home-delivery service. In the past, the domestic delivery business has been nu by only a few number of companies. But more and more number of companies including medium size ones are participating in the business, and the competition is getting severe. This paper proposes a method to select the optimal location of mail distribution centers that minimally connect the local mail centers of some major cities in Korea using the Steiner Tree theory, which is about connecting a finite number of points with a minimal length of paths and has been used in the distribution system optimization and optimal routing of the transmission lines of the electric power system. By using Steiner Tree theory in finding the best location of the postal delivery hub, we may expect the reduction of transportation cost and the increase of profit, resulting in acquiring the superior position in the competitive delivery business. It is expected that we may use the Steiner Tree theory in finding the best location of the electric power substation for the nott higher EHV(extreme high voltage) transmission network.
This study explores the locomotives of the growth in the Korean online shopping industry upon the theoretical basis based on the last 10 years' rapid changing environment. This attempt reveals the counter-arguments against preemtive effects based on the observation of reintermediation process in the online industry. We reviewed the NEBIC model proposed by Wheeler(2002) and propose the growth model, double helix framework based on the dynamic capability view. Furthermore the relevance of the proposed framework was validated with the review of last 10 years' sales and market share data in the online shopping industry. Meanwhile we found the limits of online market growth with the open market domination. So future of the online shopping retailers is depending on the development of the channel functions and merchandising on the basis of self-capability. Based on the tentative conclusion, we also suggest implications for the policy makers. Firstly policy facilitating the specialization of the power sellers incubased in the open market is necessary for the sustainable online market growth. And the establishment of the control tower is suggested to coordinate the consistency of the policies and regulations. And the device of the incentive is also proposed to strengthen the open markets' function to facilitate the small and medium online merchants.
본 웹사이트에 게시된 이메일 주소가 전자우편 수집 프로그램이나
그 밖의 기술적 장치를 이용하여 무단으로 수집되는 것을 거부하며,
이를 위반시 정보통신망법에 의해 형사 처벌됨을 유념하시기 바랍니다.
[게시일 2004년 10월 1일]
이용약관
제 1 장 총칙
제 1 조 (목적)
이 이용약관은 KoreaScience 홈페이지(이하 “당 사이트”)에서 제공하는 인터넷 서비스(이하 '서비스')의 가입조건 및 이용에 관한 제반 사항과 기타 필요한 사항을 구체적으로 규정함을 목적으로 합니다.
제 2 조 (용어의 정의)
① "이용자"라 함은 당 사이트에 접속하여 이 약관에 따라 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스를 받는 회원 및 비회원을
말합니다.
② "회원"이라 함은 서비스를 이용하기 위하여 당 사이트에 개인정보를 제공하여 아이디(ID)와 비밀번호를 부여
받은 자를 말합니다.
③ "회원 아이디(ID)"라 함은 회원의 식별 및 서비스 이용을 위하여 자신이 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을
말합니다.
④ "비밀번호(패스워드)"라 함은 회원이 자신의 비밀보호를 위하여 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을 말합니다.
제 3 조 (이용약관의 효력 및 변경)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트에 게시하거나 기타의 방법으로 회원에게 공지함으로써 효력이 발생합니다.
② 당 사이트는 이 약관을 개정할 경우에 적용일자 및 개정사유를 명시하여 현행 약관과 함께 당 사이트의
초기화면에 그 적용일자 7일 이전부터 적용일자 전일까지 공지합니다. 다만, 회원에게 불리하게 약관내용을
변경하는 경우에는 최소한 30일 이상의 사전 유예기간을 두고 공지합니다. 이 경우 당 사이트는 개정 전
내용과 개정 후 내용을 명확하게 비교하여 이용자가 알기 쉽도록 표시합니다.
제 4 조(약관 외 준칙)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스에 관한 이용안내와 함께 적용됩니다.
② 이 약관에 명시되지 아니한 사항은 관계법령의 규정이 적용됩니다.
제 2 장 이용계약의 체결
제 5 조 (이용계약의 성립 등)
① 이용계약은 이용고객이 당 사이트가 정한 약관에 「동의합니다」를 선택하고, 당 사이트가 정한
온라인신청양식을 작성하여 서비스 이용을 신청한 후, 당 사이트가 이를 승낙함으로써 성립합니다.
② 제1항의 승낙은 당 사이트가 제공하는 과학기술정보검색, 맞춤정보, 서지정보 등 다른 서비스의 이용승낙을
포함합니다.
제 6 조 (회원가입)
서비스를 이용하고자 하는 고객은 당 사이트에서 정한 회원가입양식에 개인정보를 기재하여 가입을 하여야 합니다.
제 7 조 (개인정보의 보호 및 사용)
당 사이트는 관계법령이 정하는 바에 따라 회원 등록정보를 포함한 회원의 개인정보를 보호하기 위해 노력합니다. 회원 개인정보의 보호 및 사용에 대해서는 관련법령 및 당 사이트의 개인정보 보호정책이 적용됩니다.
제 8 조 (이용 신청의 승낙과 제한)
① 당 사이트는 제6조의 규정에 의한 이용신청고객에 대하여 서비스 이용을 승낙합니다.
② 당 사이트는 아래사항에 해당하는 경우에 대해서 승낙하지 아니 합니다.
- 이용계약 신청서의 내용을 허위로 기재한 경우
- 기타 규정한 제반사항을 위반하며 신청하는 경우
제 9 조 (회원 ID 부여 및 변경 등)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객에 대하여 약관에 정하는 바에 따라 자신이 선정한 회원 ID를 부여합니다.
② 회원 ID는 원칙적으로 변경이 불가하며 부득이한 사유로 인하여 변경 하고자 하는 경우에는 해당 ID를
해지하고 재가입해야 합니다.
③ 기타 회원 개인정보 관리 및 변경 등에 관한 사항은 서비스별 안내에 정하는 바에 의합니다.
제 3 장 계약 당사자의 의무
제 10 조 (KISTI의 의무)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객이 희망한 서비스 제공 개시일에 특별한 사정이 없는 한 서비스를 이용할 수 있도록
하여야 합니다.
② 당 사이트는 개인정보 보호를 위해 보안시스템을 구축하며 개인정보 보호정책을 공시하고 준수합니다.
③ 당 사이트는 회원으로부터 제기되는 의견이나 불만이 정당하다고 객관적으로 인정될 경우에는 적절한 절차를
거쳐 즉시 처리하여야 합니다. 다만, 즉시 처리가 곤란한 경우는 회원에게 그 사유와 처리일정을 통보하여야
합니다.
제 11 조 (회원의 의무)
① 이용자는 회원가입 신청 또는 회원정보 변경 시 실명으로 모든 사항을 사실에 근거하여 작성하여야 하며,
허위 또는 타인의 정보를 등록할 경우 일체의 권리를 주장할 수 없습니다.
② 당 사이트가 관계법령 및 개인정보 보호정책에 의거하여 그 책임을 지는 경우를 제외하고 회원에게 부여된
ID의 비밀번호 관리소홀, 부정사용에 의하여 발생하는 모든 결과에 대한 책임은 회원에게 있습니다.
③ 회원은 당 사이트 및 제 3자의 지적 재산권을 침해해서는 안 됩니다.
제 4 장 서비스의 이용
제 12 조 (서비스 이용 시간)
① 서비스 이용은 당 사이트의 업무상 또는 기술상 특별한 지장이 없는 한 연중무휴, 1일 24시간 운영을
원칙으로 합니다. 단, 당 사이트는 시스템 정기점검, 증설 및 교체를 위해 당 사이트가 정한 날이나 시간에
서비스를 일시 중단할 수 있으며, 예정되어 있는 작업으로 인한 서비스 일시중단은 당 사이트 홈페이지를
통해 사전에 공지합니다.
② 당 사이트는 서비스를 특정범위로 분할하여 각 범위별로 이용가능시간을 별도로 지정할 수 있습니다. 다만
이 경우 그 내용을 공지합니다.
제 13 조 (홈페이지 저작권)
① NDSL에서 제공하는 모든 저작물의 저작권은 원저작자에게 있으며, KISTI는 복제/배포/전송권을 확보하고
있습니다.
② NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 상업적 및 기타 영리목적으로 복제/배포/전송할 경우 사전에 KISTI의 허락을
받아야 합니다.
③ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 보도, 비평, 교육, 연구 등을 위하여 정당한 범위 안에서 공정한 관행에
합치되게 인용할 수 있습니다.
④ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 무단 복제, 전송, 배포 기타 저작권법에 위반되는 방법으로 이용할 경우
저작권법 제136조에 따라 5년 이하의 징역 또는 5천만 원 이하의 벌금에 처해질 수 있습니다.
제 14 조 (유료서비스)
① 당 사이트 및 협력기관이 정한 유료서비스(원문복사 등)는 별도로 정해진 바에 따르며, 변경사항은 시행 전에
당 사이트 홈페이지를 통하여 회원에게 공지합니다.
② 유료서비스를 이용하려는 회원은 정해진 요금체계에 따라 요금을 납부해야 합니다.
제 5 장 계약 해지 및 이용 제한
제 15 조 (계약 해지)
회원이 이용계약을 해지하고자 하는 때에는 [가입해지] 메뉴를 이용해 직접 해지해야 합니다.
제 16 조 (서비스 이용제한)
① 당 사이트는 회원이 서비스 이용내용에 있어서 본 약관 제 11조 내용을 위반하거나, 다음 각 호에 해당하는
경우 서비스 이용을 제한할 수 있습니다.
- 2년 이상 서비스를 이용한 적이 없는 경우
- 기타 정상적인 서비스 운영에 방해가 될 경우
② 상기 이용제한 규정에 따라 서비스를 이용하는 회원에게 서비스 이용에 대하여 별도 공지 없이 서비스 이용의
일시정지, 이용계약 해지 할 수 있습니다.
제 17 조 (전자우편주소 수집 금지)
회원은 전자우편주소 추출기 등을 이용하여 전자우편주소를 수집 또는 제3자에게 제공할 수 없습니다.
제 6 장 손해배상 및 기타사항
제 18 조 (손해배상)
당 사이트는 무료로 제공되는 서비스와 관련하여 회원에게 어떠한 손해가 발생하더라도 당 사이트가 고의 또는 과실로 인한 손해발생을 제외하고는 이에 대하여 책임을 부담하지 아니합니다.
제 19 조 (관할 법원)
서비스 이용으로 발생한 분쟁에 대해 소송이 제기되는 경우 민사 소송법상의 관할 법원에 제기합니다.
[부 칙]
1. (시행일) 이 약관은 2016년 9월 5일부터 적용되며, 종전 약관은 본 약관으로 대체되며, 개정된 약관의 적용일 이전 가입자도 개정된 약관의 적용을 받습니다.