• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.179-196
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• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.9-16
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• 2023

This study analyzed the effect of manager's ability on compensation policy (compensation level and performance-reward sensitivity). To this end, the final 14,150 company-year data were used for KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies excluding the financial industry from 2012 to 2019. As a result of the empirical analysis, the higher the manager's ability, the higher the next reward level (the manager's ability hypothesis), but the performance-reward sensitivity decreased. This confirms the manager ability hypothesis through a positive (+) relationship between manager ability and compensation, and means that high compensation for manager ability may be additional compensation for manager ability other than performance, rather than due to performance. This study differs from previous studies and has contributions in that it examines the more complex effects of managerial ability and compensation system.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.125-132
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.107-114
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• 2019

This study analyzes the effect of the accuracy of future management performance, which managers voluntarily announce in the previous year's disclosure, on managers compensation. In the case of a company that disclosed the bad news in the previous year, the ability to predict uncertain future will be more important, and expects executives with better predictability to receive more compensation. The results of this study show that there is a significant negative(-) relationship between the accuracy of the manager's earnings forecast and the performance - compensation of the firms that disclosed the bad news in the previous year. The accuracy of the manager's disclosure is important, and it is confirmed that the manager's compensation increases as the incentive of the manager's effort to reduce future uncertainty. The results of this study are as follows: there is a positive relationship between the managerial performance and the managerial competence of managers. It is important to note that there is a difference and that we have identified additional determinants of the manager compensation contract.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.321-329
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• 2021

A measure of managerial ability was derived using DEA, a measure of management efficiency, and the correlation coefficient between discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual, net income and operating cash flow standard deviation was used as a proxy for income smoothing. verified. In addition, the manager's compensation was used by taking the natural logarithm of the cash compensation per manager. The analysis results are summarized as follows. The analysis period for hypothesis testing is from 2004 to 2017, as a result of the hypothesis analysis of the correlation with the level of manager's compensation, it was suggested that the income smoothing behavior decreased the performance-based compensation and increased the performance-controlled compensation. This can be said to be the result of indirectly confirming that additional compensation is differentially paid for income smoothing. This study has a contribution to the study by empirically analyzing whether income smoothing affects the relationship between managerial ability and managerial compensation. However, although a number of previous studies empirically analyzed that there are upper and lower bounds for manager compensation, there is limitations that could not be analyzed for asymmetric compensation due to income smoothing is expected to expand.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.105-112
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.393-400
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• 2022

In a situation where the company handles accounting conservatively, the management's earnings forecasting information will be more conservative, and the conservativeness of this earnings forecasting information will have a differential effect in evaluating the performance of managers and paying compensation. This study aims to examine how the level of corporate accounting conservatism affects the forecast information of managers and how this affects the compensation of managers. This study establishes a hypothesis on the effect of the level of accounting conservatism on the earnings forecasting information and compensation of managers, and examines the relationship between managerial profit forecasting information & manager compensation according of conservatism in corporate accounting that can vary depending on the manager's disposition. As a result of the analysis, conservative managers are also conservative in earnings forecasting disclosure, and when corporate managers are highly conservative, they show their ability by making earnings forecasts disclosures more frequently and more accurately than corporate managers with low conservatism. It will help reduce the forecasting errors of stakeholders. Therefore, it is expected that this will play an important role in judging the manager's ability and determining compensation. Therefore, when a company handles accounting conservatively, management's earnings forecasts are also measured conservatively, which is expected to provide useful information on the basis and form of management's compensation to stakeholders.

• Journal of Korean Society of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.64-77
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• 2022

Objectives: The purpose of this study is to objectify the level of case management performance and the factors influencing performance, to improve the case management performance at the Korea Worker's Compensation & Welfare Service (KWCWS) on the basis of the recognition of the objective realities of case management by job coordinators at the KWCWS, to develop a model of case management fit for the KWCWS, and to provide a basis for establishing guidelines for standardized case management. Methods: A total of 156 questionnaires were distributed to job coordinators at the KWCWS's headquarters, six regional headquarters, and 55 branches. One hundred forty-one questionnaires were collected and 126 were analyzed statistically using SPSS 21.0. Factor analysis and reliability analysis were conducted to verify the validity and reliability of the main measurement items in the research model. Frequency analysis was conducted for general characteristics of survey subjects. Frequency analysis or descriptive statistics were conducted to identify the level of independent variables (case manager's individual variables, job variables, institutional and organizational variables). Dependent variables (case management performance) and the degree of correlation were analyzed through correlation analysis between research variables. Multiple regression analysis and hierarchical regression analysis were conducted to examine the effect of independent variables on case management performance. Results: The results of the study showed that the level of overall performance in the five stages of case management was ordinary, with an average level of 3.45 on a 5-point scale. Levels of performance by step were institutional approach and intake (3.69), assessment (3.63), goal setting and intervention planning (3.46), implementation of intervention plan (3.32), and evaluation and termination (3.20), in that order. The explanatory power of case management performance (overall) by case managers with the KWCWS was case manager's institutional and organizational variables, job variables, and individual variables, in that order. At each stage of case management, the explanatory power of a case manager's institutional and organizational variables was found to be the greatest. The model changes at each stage of case management assume similar aspects statistically. In hierarchical regression analysis, it was institutional support that had a significant effect on case management performance (overall), and institutional support had the greatest effect. The results of multiple regression analysis in which all variables are input simultaneously showed that institutional support and expertise as well as self-efficacy had a positive effect. However, case management work experience, expertise (technology), and autonomy were found to have a negative effect during the stage of case management performance. Conclusions: As a result of the study, it was confirmed that raising the case manager's expertise and support from the institution and organization are important factors to improve the level of case management performance. The research also derived practical ways of reinforcement of case manager capacity, institutional and organizational support, operation of rehabilitation-case management teams, and occupational health-related aspects.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.36-43
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• 2012

When the construction management method was introduced, there were arguments regarding the contractual responsibility of the construction manager. Accordingly, the provisions on damage compensation in the Construction Technology Management Act were revised in 2002, and the obligatory duty of care of a good manager is now required by the Framework Act on the Construction Industry. Even though the construction manager has a responsibility of a consultant in the CM-for-fee contract, however, the Korean construction environment does not clearly specify the consultant's scope of responsibility. In this study, the theory about the duty of care, which is a consultant's responsibility among the expert's responsibilities, was arranged. Based on the responsibilities of experts such as lawyers, the duties of care of a good manager of the construction manager were presented to provide the foundation for establishing the construction manager's responsibilities. To verify the resulting items, interviews with experts were performed to assess their importance levels.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.39-47
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• 2020

Purpose: This study investigated the effects of valuation errors on the capital market through the earnings forecasting errors of financial analysts. As a follow-up to Jensen (2005)'s study, which argued of agency cost of overvaluation, it was intended to analyze the effect of valuation errors on the earnings forecasting behavior of financial analysts. We hypothesized that if the manager tried to explain to the market that their firms are overvalued, the analysts' earnings forecasting errors would decrease. Research design, data and methodology: To this end, the analysis period was set from 2011 to 2018 of KOSPI and KOSDAQ-listed markets. For overvaluation, the study methodology of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) was measured. The earnings forecasting errors of the financial analyst was measured by the accuracy and bias. Results: Empirical analysis shows that the accuracy and bias of analysts' forecasting errors decrease as overvaluation increase. Second, the negative relationship showed no difference, depending on the size of the auditor. Third, the results have not changed sensitively according to the listed market. Conclusions: Our results indicated that the valuation error lowered the financial analyst earnings forecasting errors. Considering that the greater overvaluation, the higher the compensation and reputation of the manager, it can be interpreted that an active explanation of the market can promote the accuracy of the financial analyst's earnings forecasts. This study has the following contributions when compared to prior research. First, the impact of valuation errors on the capital market was analyzed for the domestic capital market. Second, while there has been no research between valuation error and earnings forecasting by financial analysts, the results of the study suggested that valuation errors reduce financial analyst's earnings forecasting errors. Third, valuation error induced lower the earnings forecasting error of the financial analyst. The greater the valuation error, the greater the management's effort to explain the market more actively. Considering that the greater the error in valuation, the higher the compensation and reputation of the manager, it can be interpreted that an active explanation of the market can promote the accuracy of the financial analyst's earnings forecasts.