한국경영과학회지 (Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society)

  • 제38권2호
  • /
  • Pages.179-196
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  • 2013
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  • 1225-1119(pISSN)
  • /
  • 2733-4759(eISSN)
한국경영과학회 (The Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society)
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가족기업과 비가족기업의 경영자 보상 구조의 차이에 관한 연구

How is the Compensation Structure of Family Firms Different from that of Non-Family Firms? : Evidence from Korea

  • 유정민 (연세대학교 경영대학 경영연구소) ;
  • 윤대희 (연세대학교 경영대학)
  • 투고 : 2013.03.18
  • 심사 : 2013.05.14
  • 발행 : 2013.06.30
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초록

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.

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참고문헌

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