Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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The Impacts of Managers' Earning Forecast Information on Manager Compensation. -Focused on Accounting Conservatism-

경영자의 이익예측정보가 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향 -회계보수주의를 중심으로-

  • Jeon, MiJin (Business Administration, Pusan National University) ;
  • Sim, Weon-Mi (Department of Real Estate Distribution Management, Busan Institute Of Science And Technology)
  • 전미진 (부산대학교 경영학과) ;
  • 심원미 (부산과학기술대학교 부동산유통경영학과)
  • Received : 2021.07.20
  • Accepted : 2022.05.20
  • Published : 2022.05.28
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Abstract

In a situation where the company handles accounting conservatively, the management's earnings forecasting information will be more conservative, and the conservativeness of this earnings forecasting information will have a differential effect in evaluating the performance of managers and paying compensation. This study aims to examine how the level of corporate accounting conservatism affects the forecast information of managers and how this affects the compensation of managers. This study establishes a hypothesis on the effect of the level of accounting conservatism on the earnings forecasting information and compensation of managers, and examines the relationship between managerial profit forecasting information & manager compensation according of conservatism in corporate accounting that can vary depending on the manager's disposition. As a result of the analysis, conservative managers are also conservative in earnings forecasting disclosure, and when corporate managers are highly conservative, they show their ability by making earnings forecasts disclosures more frequently and more accurately than corporate managers with low conservatism. It will help reduce the forecasting errors of stakeholders. Therefore, it is expected that this will play an important role in judging the manager's ability and determining compensation. Therefore, when a company handles accounting conservatively, management's earnings forecasts are also measured conservatively, which is expected to provide useful information on the basis and form of management's compensation to stakeholders.

본 연구는 기업 회계의 보수주의 수준이 경영자 예측정보에 영향을 미치며, 이것이 경영자의 보상에는 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 살펴보고자 한다. 본 연구 목적을 분석하기 위한 연구방법으로, 보수주의를 측정하기 위한 여러 국외 선행연구를 참고하였으며, 이익예측정보를 이익예측치 공시여부와 이익예측정확성으로 나누어 살펴보았다. 따라서, 경영자의 성향에 따라 달라질 수 있는 회계보수주의 정도가 경영자의 이익예측정보와 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향에 대한 가설을 설정하였다. 분석 결과, 보수적 성향의 경영자는 이익 예측 공시에 있어서도 보수적이며, 기업의 경영자가 보수성이 높은 경우에는, 보수성이 낮은 기업 경영자보다 이익 예측 공시를 함에 있어 더 자주, 더 정확하게 함으로써 그들의 능력을 보여주며, 이해관계자들의 예측 오류가 줄어들 수 있게 할 것이다. 따라서 기업이 보수적으로 회계처리를 할 때 경영자의 이익예측 또한 보수적으로 측정되며 이것은 경영자의 핵심적인 능력으로, 예측능력이 보상을 결정하는데 있어 중요한 역할을 할 것이라 기대된다. 또한 이해관계자들이 경영자 보상의 지급 근거와 형태를 파악하는데 유용한 정보를 제공할 것으로 기대해본다.

Keywords

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