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http://dx.doi.org/10.14400/JDC.2018.16.10.125

The Effect of Management Forecast Precision on CEO Compensation-Accounting Performance  

Lee, Eun-Ju (Business School, Pusan National University)
Sim, Won-Mi (Business School, BUSAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)
Kim, Jeong-Kyo (Business School, Pusan Natiional University)
Publication Information
Journal of Digital Convergence / v.16, no.10, 2018 , pp. 125-132 More about this Journal
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.
Keywords
CEO Compensation; Future Performance; Earning Forecast; Forecast Precision; Performance-Compensaion;
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Times Cited By KSCI : 4  (Citation Analysis)
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