• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.932-944
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• 1998

In this paper we first prove a new minimum theorem using the upper semicontinuity of minimizing functions, which is comparable to Berge's theorem. Next, as applications, we shall prove the existence of equilibrium in generalized games and the existence theorem of zeros.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 1992.10b
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• pp.203-207
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• 1992

In this paper, a new GPC(Generalized Predictive Control) algorithm which is robust to disturbances isproposed. This controller minimizes the LQ cost function when the disturbance maximizes this cost function. The solution is obtained from the min-max problem which can be solved by differential game theory and has the non-recursive form which does not use the Riccati equation. Its another solution for state space models is investigated.

• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.1297-1310
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• 2008

Main purpose of this paper is to combine the optimal form of Fan's best approximation theorem and Nash's equilibrium existence theorem into a single existence theorem simultaneously. For this, we first prove a general best proximity pair theorem which includes a number of known best proximity theorems. Next, we will introduce a new equilibrium concept for a generalized Nash game with normal form, and as applications, we will prove new existence theorems of Nash equilibrium pairs for generalized Nash games with normal form.

• Journal of the Chungcheong Mathematical Society
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.109-117
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• 2021

In this paper, as an application of a multivalued generalization of the Németh fixed point theorem, we will prove a new existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for a generalized game 𝓖 = (X_i; A_i, P_i)_i∈I with geodesic convex values in Hadamard manifolds.

• Nonlinear Functional Analysis and Applications
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.83-97
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• 2022

In this paper, we introduce and study generalized mixed operator quasi-equilibrium problems(GMQOEP) in Hausdorff topological vector spaces and prove the existence results for the solution of (GMQOEP) in compact and noncompact settings by employing 1-person game theorems. Moreover, using coercive condition, hemicontinuity of the functions and KKM theorem, we prove new results on the existence of solution for the particular case of (GMQOEP), that is, generalized mixed operator equilibrium problem (GMOEP).

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.61-89
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• 2000

The purpose of this study is first, to find out what factors affect the cooperation and trust within the functions in the policy implementation network and in what mechanism these factors interact, second to investigate the whys to manage trust and cooperation successfully in the dynamic situation such as the network setting. For these purpose, this study reviews the concept and characteristics of policy implementation organizations, second, extracts the various factors affecting trust and cooperation in the network situation, third applies and analyzes the relationship among factors to system dynamics model based on the game theory. The results of this study could be summarized as follows: It was found that the utility change within the participants by persuasion ＆ mutual understanding and change of rule would be leading to success in policy implementation network. Also bureaucratic management such as power enforcement does not have any good impact in the managing network. In this study, system simulation method tried to analyze the hypothesis. Quantitative and case analyses were not accompanied and analysis was limited to two-person game theory. So there is some doubt this results could be generalized to actual situation which is N-person game.

• Journal of the Chungcheong Mathematical Society
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.691-698
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• 2010

In this paper, we first introduce a new model of strategic Nash game with insatiability, and next give two social equilibrium existence theorems for general strategic games which are comparable with the previous results due to Arrow and Debreu, Debreu, and Chang in several aspects.