• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.25-36
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• 2006

Consider a supply chain in which a vendor supplies a product to a buyer. We assume that the buyer's and vendor's inventory cost structures are different, resulting in differences in inventory order/delivery cycle times. Here, if one party insists on its individually optimal order/delivery quantity, the other party will suffer from mismatches in cycle times. Under this scenario, coordination contracts that make use of either a Net Term/Two parts Term Trade Credit or a Quantity Discount are designed to align individually optimal order Quantities. We compare and analyze the perform ances of these contracts. The focus of the comparison is the ability of contracts to generate a lower cost for the supply chain. We show that a Trade Credit policy can be effectively used to coordinate a supply chain. In many cases it will result in a lower supply chain cost compared to that achieved by using a Quantitative Discount policy.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.157-172
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• 2003

Despite the continual growth of IT outsourcing market, the outsourcing contracts are mostly short-term contracts. Because these short-term contracts need continual recontracts, the research on the factors that influence the outsourcing recontracts is needed. This research has been done to find out the factors of making the outsourcing recontracts successfully by stating the relationship between outsourcing recontract and the outsourcing performance factors. As a result of this research, customer factors and innovation factors are found to be influential factors on whether you make a recontract or not. And also the research have showed customer factors are major decision criteria on outsourcing recontracts.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.699-704
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• 2005

Normally, monetary penalties for breach of agreement will be stipulated in the contract. The contractor parties, who fail to fulfill the agreement, are required to pay the other parties a certain amount or proportion of money as a fine. However, it is worth our study - whether or not the scope of monetary penalty implementation and bases for determination of a fine will cover the losses of social and administrative costs incurred by the interruption of the contract. This research is about the best timing for government to cancel the freeway repair work contracts. Under the goal of the maximum social welfare, the limitation of government spending for the social and administrative costs invoked by interruption of contracts will have to be considered to attain the best timing of contracts' suspension or deferment. According to the factors of social and administrative costs, the best time point is calculated to reduce the loss of the aforesaid costs, which can also be used as theoretical basis for the future road-widening construction at home.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.629-630
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• 2015

'Sabine Pass Liquefaction Project (SPL Project)', a case study in this report, is the first construction project of a U.S. liquefaction facility for shale gas export overseas. This study analyzes the SPL Project to give understanding and a guideline to Korean EPC companies by benchmarking about effective risk-sharing strategies on EPC contracts. This study consists of three parts. The first summarizes the liquefaction process adopted on the SPL Project, named the 'ConocoPhillips Optimized Cascade Process', and compares it with other competitive liquefaction processes. The second introduces the unique features of the SPL EPC contract by comparing it with two other EPC forms of contracts: a FIDIC Silver Book for onshore plant projects and a contract of an offshore oil production (FPSO) project. The third focuses on the complexity of project financing (PF), especially lenders control and impact on the EPC contract such as covenant provisions to constrain variations and changes on the EPC Contract. From these conclusions, it is anticipated that this case study can provide a guideline for successful performance of Korean EPC contractors overseas.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.527-542
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• 2021

The government-driven open data policies are on the rise to protect consumers from misunderstandings and monitor the companies. However, in contract-based industries such as insurance, the contract-inherent characteristics make information asymmetry between consumers and companies. Our paper focuses on insurance contracts where the contingency has high uncertainty of occurrence, and the clauses may incur high costs of reading. Given those contracts, we hypothesized that the contract's clear statement decreases customer dissatisfaction and lowers the number of complaints. To empirically support the claim, we collected customers' complaint documents of insurance companies and insurance contracts from 2005 until 2017. Our econometric models showed that clearer statements and words significantly reduce the complaints after controlling for firm-specific heterogeneity and time-specific heterogeneity. We identify that insurance companies' complaint ratio significantly differ depending on the insurance contract, including specific clauses and words.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.29-37
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• 2024

Resorting to electronic arbitration to resolve disputes in international trade contracts is the most important reflection of technological progress on the reality of international commercial arbitration. Electronic is a modern image of traditional arbitration, and this type of arbitration provides many advantages that are not provided by any legal system for resolving disputes, including speed, effectiveness and lower costs. What will this development produce? Through technical progress in the means of communication, it has become conceivable that international trade dealers agree to arbitration via electronic means of communication, followed by the completion of the arbitration process via the Internet, leading to the issuance of the electronic arbitration award in an electronic manner as well.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.49-81
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• 2007

Research in the IS (Information Systems) outsourcing has focused on the importance of legal contracts and partnerships between vendors and clients. Without detailed legal contracts, there is no guarantee that an outsourcing vendor would not indulge in self-serving behavior. In addition, partnerships can supplement legal contracts in managing the relationship between clients and vendors legal contracts by itself cannot deal with all the complexity and ambiguity involved with IS outsourcing relationships. In this paper, we introduce a psychological contract (between client and vendor) as an important variable for IS outsourcing success. A psychological contract refers to individual's mental beliefs about his or her mutual obligations in a contractual relationship (Rousseau, 1995). A psychological contract emerges when one party believes that a promise of future returns has been made, a contribution has been given, and thus, an obligation has been created to provide future benefits (Rousseau, 1989). An employmentpsychological contract, which is a widespread concept in psychology, refers to employer and employee expectations of the employment relationship, i.e. mutual obligations, values, expectations and aspirations that operate over and above the formal contract of employment (Smithson and Lewis, 2003). Similar to the psychological contract between an employer and employee, IS outsourcing involves a contract and a set of mutual obligations between client and vendor (Ho et al., 2003). Given the lack of prior research on psychological contracts in the IS outsourcing context, we extend such studies and give insights through investigating the role of psychological contracts between client and vendor. Psychological contract theory offers highly relevant and sound theoretical lens for studying IS outsourcing management because of its six distinctive principles: (1) it focuses on mutual (rather than one-sided) obligations between contractual parties, (2) it's more comprehensive than the concept of legal contract, (3) it's an individual-level construct, (4) it changes over time, (5) it affects organizational behaviors, and (6) it's susceptible to organizational factors (Koh et al., 2004; Rousseau, 1996; Coyle-Shapiro, 2000). The aim of this paper is to put the concept, psychological contract commitment (PCC), under the spotlight, by finding out its mediating effects between legal contracts/partnerships and IS outsourcing success. Our interest is in the psychological contract commitment (PCC) or commitment to psychological contracts, which is the extent to which a partner consistently and deeply concerns with what the counter-party believes as obligations during the IS project. The basic premise for the hypothesized relationship between PCC and success is that for outsourcing success, client and vendor should continually commit to mutual obligations in which both parties believe, rather than to only explicit obligations. The psychological contract commitment playsa pivotal role in evaluating a counter-party because it reflects what one party really expects from the other. If one party consistently shows high commitment to psychological contracts, the other party would evaluate it positively. This will increase positive reciprocation efforts of the other party, thus leading to successful outsourcing outcomes (McNeeley and Meglino, 1994). We have used matched sample data for this research. We have collected three responses from each set of a client and a vendor firm: a project manager of the client firm, a project member from the vendor firm with whom the project manager cooperated, and an end-user of the client company who actually used the outsourced information systems. Special caution was given to the data collection process to avoid any bias in responses. We first sent three types of questionnaires (A, Band C) to each project manager of the client firm, asking him/her to answer the first type of questionnaires (A).

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1998.10a
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• pp.253-256
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• 1998

This paper presents a valuation methodology for optional calling plan contracts on free-phone calls in the telephone industry. Utilization of the model is not limited to valuation and consequent decision making for the subscribers; it provides a useful guideline for telephone companies in designing calling plans and assessing subscribers' behavior.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10a
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• pp.421-423
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• 2001

분산 웹 애플리케이션에 대한 관심도의 증가에 따라 서버측 컴포넌트 모델인 엔터프라이즈 빈즈가 많이 사용되고는 있지만 소프트웨어의 정확성과 견고성의 향상을 위한 노력은 미비한 실정이다. 본 논문에서는 소프트웨어의 정확성과 견고성을 높여줄 수 있는 Design By Contracts 접근법을 이용하여 엔터프라이즈 빈즈를 명세하는 방법을 제안하고자 한다. 이와 같이 엔터프라이즈 빈즈 개발에 Design By Contrails 접근법을 적용한다면 소프트웨어의 정확성과 견고성면에서 보다 진보적인 효과를 기대할 수 있다.

• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.56 no.5
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• pp.1355-1376
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• 2019

We investigate the valuation of participating life insurance policies with default risk under a geometric regime-switching jump-diffusion process. We derive explicit formula for the Laplace transform of the price of participating contracts by solving integro-differential system and then price them by inverting Laplace transforms.