• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.7 no.2
• /
• pp.25-47
• /
• 2005

This study wishes to analyze that affect in purchasing decision in Telecommunication operation company's international competitive bidding. When submit a tender laying stress on international competitive bidding of the Telecommunication operation companies among specially various international competitive bidding, I wish to investigate game theory enemy by bid method through access method about bid form affecting in buyer's purchasing decision.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.9 no.2
• /
• pp.9-14
• /
• 1984

The competitive bidding model with the reserve price has been studied by Riley and Samuelson. We extend their studies to the competitive model with the reserve price and the entry fee. First we present the bidder's optimal strategy, the winner's expected profit, the auctioner's expected revenue in the first-price sealed bidding model, and next those in the second-price sealed bidding model.

• Architectural research
• /
• v.13 no.3
• /
• pp.49-56
• /
• 2011

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 1995.07b
• /
• pp.535-539
• /
• 1995

In recent years, electric industries in many countries confront with a structural change in business and socio-economic environments. Since 1984, PUC and utilities in U.S.A. have adopted or developing competitive bidding systems, and this new procurement programs prevailing and restructuring the power markets. In Korea, government and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) invited the private sector to build and operate two 500 MW coal plants and two 400 MW LNG plants during 2001 - 2004. The plan also specifies basic concepts and conditions for the IPP projects such that new IPPs are selected through competitive bidding system with the purchased power price based on the avoided cost. In this study, the direction, guideline and scoring methods to Korean IPP bidding system are presented. Also, as a benchmark price and rates for purchased power, the avoided cost calculation models are developed, this study may contribute for the development of private power in Korea, and improve overall economic efficiencies of whole electric power sector.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.3A no.1
• /
• pp.47-52
• /
• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.53 no.1
• /
• pp.67-72
• /
• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.58 no.4
• /
• pp.694-699
• /
• 2009

Combined cycle plants which feature distinct advantages for power generation such as fast response, high efficiency, environmental friendliness, fuel flexiblity represent the majority of new generating plant installations across the globe. Combined cycle plants have different operating modes where the operating parameters can differ greatly depending which mode is operating at the time. This paper addresses the bidding strategy model of combined cycle plants in a competitive electricity market by using a characteristic of multiple operating modes of combined cycle plants. Simulation results of case studies show that an operating mode among multiple ones is selected strategically in generation bidding for more profit of generation company.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.55 no.9
• /
• pp.392-398
• /
• 2006

Maintenance scheduling of generating units (MSU) has strategic dimension in an oligopolistic market. Strategic MSU of gencos can affect a market power through capacity withdrawal which is related to bidding strategy in an generation wholesale market. This paper presents a combined framework that models the interrelation between competitive bidding and strategic MSU. The combined game model is represented as some sub-optimization problems of a market operator (MO) and gencos, that should be solved through bi-level optimization scheme. The gradient method with dual variables is also adopted to calculate a Nash Equilibrium (NE) by an iterative update technique in this paper. Illustrative numerical example shows that NE of a supply function equilibrium is obtained properly by using proposed solution technique. The MSU made by MO is compared with that by each genco and that under perfect competition market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 1999.07c
• /
• pp.1344-1346
• /
• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2002.11b
• /
• pp.369-371
• /
• 2002

In a competitive electricity market, the transactions of the electric power can be accomplished through the bidding which is submitted by suppliers and consumers. It is essential that the optimal decision for the bidding is required to take a dominant position in the competition. Therefore, in this paper we presents bidding variables from bidding curves of suppliers and consumers and proposes the algorithm of an optimal bidding strategy using optimal power flow. Furthermore, the variation of the optimal bidding is investigated through numerical studies.