• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 추계학술대회 논문집 전력기술부문
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• pp.63-66
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• 2001

In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating to the bidding game accumulates the information of others' strategies and payoffs through the repeated process. Thereby, he is able to map out how he gets his maximum profit, and proceed to the optimal strategy region. This paper shows the algorithm for a player to determine his strategy in t period based the information of the game results of t-1, t-2 period. And this algorithm can be formulated by using Dynamic game theory.

• 한국전자거래학회지
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.69-81
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• 2002

The problem of the previous proprietary e-business systems is that they are not built upon well defined standards, which causes difficulties in extension of the system and interoperation among them. Therefore, a new e-business standard, ebXML, and related XML standards such as SOAP and XML Signature have been recommended for e-business systems. In this paper, as an application of the new XML standards, we design and implement a new internet bidding system. We use XML Schema for defining the document structure of the bidding system. DOM is used for structure search and XSL is used to represent styles. We use SOAP to handle distributed objects and XML Signature to provide data integrity. Due to the adoption of e-business standards, the developed system has advantages in interoperability and extensibility compared to previous systems.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권2호
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• pp.193-198
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• 2005

This paper proposes a new method to handle transmission line losses using loss distribution factors (LDF) rather than marginal loss factors (MLF) in electricity market operation. Under a competitive electricity market, the bidding data are adjusted to reflect transmission line losses. To date the most proposed approach is using MLFs. The MLFs are reflected to bidding prices and market clearing price during the trading and settlement of the electricity market. In the proposed algorithm, the LDFs are reflected to bidding quantities and actual generations/ loads. Computer simulations on a 9-bus sample system will verify the effectiveness of the algorithm proposed. Moreover, the proposed approach using LDFs does not make any payments residual while the approach using MLFs induces payments residual.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.615-617
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• 2003

In electricity market with a imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are determined by bidding systems and market demands. Practically the characteristics of power demand have rather two forms; elastic region and inelastic region, than constant slope elasticity. Furthermore the price cap in the market can be modelled as a region of perfect elasticity in the demand function. This paper analyses supplier's bidding strategies which are reflected the characteristics of practical demand. Equilibrium strategies are solved by using the Bertrand model and payoff matrices.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.142-144
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• 2003

Recently, the bidding between generating company and transmission company have been accomplished according to restructure of power system industry. And the bidding will develop to TWBP (Two-Way Bidding Pool)type. In this way, it will be important issue on optimum reliability maintenance of the power supply. Thus, in this paper illustrate to customer survey result for the interruption cost analysis. Actually the domestic customer survey is performed on 300 samples. Then the points at customer survey and direction are presented in this paper. Customer is divided into 5 types, total response of customer survey was 22 percent. Furthermore domestic customer survey result characteristics will be use for the basis data of the large scale customer survey.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제4A권4호
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권4호
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제33권3호
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• pp.322-328
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• 2007

Highly standardized products are suitable for automated purchasing using electronic commerce technology, where the price becomes the most important factor. Suppliers can change the prices dynamically based on the inventory level and market situation in order to maximize the sales and profit. In the virtual marketplace where multiple customers purchase multiple standardized products from multiple suppliers repetitively, customers can purchase the required amount of each item as a dynamic bidding by allocating purchase orders to the suppliers based on the current price. Customers need a method to quickly determine the optimal allocation of orders to the suppliers using the dynamically changing data to minimize the total cost. We present a LP model which minimizes the sum of the total price plus transportation cost for this problem. Simulation results using random data show meaningful reduction of the total cost.

• 국제학술발표논문집
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• The 2th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• pp.106-118
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• 2007

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and also help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.

• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제36권2호
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• pp.19-36
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• 2020

물류아웃소싱 서비스 입찰단계는 화주기업과 물류기업 모두에게 매우 중요하다. 왜냐하면 물류 입찰단계를 통하여 화주기업은 불확실성 해소를 위하여 자사의 물류운영 정보를 물류기업들에게 제공해야 하고, 물류기업은 자사가 가지고 있는 화주기업 물류에 대한 경험 및 노하우를 피력하고 화주기업의 위험과 물류운영으로 인한 이익을 공유하겠다는 제안을 함으로써 입찰에 나온 계약물량을 수주할 수 있기 때문이다. 따라서 물류아웃소싱 입찰단계에서 확인할 수 있는 요인들과 그 요인들이 물류아웃소싱 서비스 만족도에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 대하여 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 본 연구에서는 물류 아웃소싱 파트너십 요인에 관한 선행연구와 물류아웃소싱 결정요인에 관한 선행연구에서 확인한 요인들을 토대로하여 물류아웃소싱 서비스의 입찰단계에 대한 측정요인들을 도출하여 각각의 측정요인에 대한 설문을 작성한 후, 국내 화주기업을 대상으로 물류를 수행하고 있는 물류기업에서 종사하는 전문가들에게 설문을 진행하였으며 Smart- PLS 방법론을 활용하여 연구모형을 검증하였다. 본 연구의 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 물류입찰단계에서 화주기업은 불확실성의 해소를 위하여 물류기업들에게 자사의 물류운영정보를 제공해야 한다. 입찰 설명회 통하여 운영 특이사항에 대하여 상세히 설명해야 하며, 필요하다면 제조공장 및 물류센터 현장 Tour도 진행해야 한다. 둘째, 물류기업은 입찰단계에서 화주기업의 물류에 대한 경험 및 지식 등 자사의 경쟁력을 제안을 통해 어필해야 하며, 자사의 부족한 물류서비스 보완을 위하여 타 물류회사와의 연합도 고려해야 한다. 셋째, 물류기업은 입찰단계에서 물류 아웃소싱을 통한 이익 및 위험을 공유하겠다는 제안을 해야 한다. 화주기업의 환경 불확실성으로 인한 위험을 자사의 역량으로 포용 가능한 범위 내에서 수용하겠다는 제안을 해야 하며, 화주기업 물류를 수행함으로써 발생되는 이익을 공유하겠다는 자세를 보여야 한다.