The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."
As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.
This study is to protect peoples' life, minimize the property damage by coping with threats quickly and take more preventive measures in advance against nuclear bomb, CBR, and potential explosive. For this, CBRNE(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive) program research was used. Thanks to advance in technology, terrorist groups and even individuals make or keep nuclear and CBR weapons. And also it's likely that disaster and threats from a toxic gas, acute pathogens, accidents in the nuclear power plants and a high explosive could be happened a lot. Recently more organized terrorist groups maintain random attacks for unspecified individuals and also it's highly likely that a large-scale terrorist attack by WMD and CBRNEwill be done. To take strict measures against CBRNE attacks by terrorists is on the rise as an urgent national task. Moreover biological weapons are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain or produce and cause mass casualties with a small amount. For this reason, more than 25 countries have already possessed them. In the 21 st century, the international safety environment marks the age of complicated threats : transnational threats such as comprehensive security and terror, organized crime, drug smuggling, illegal trade of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental disruption along with traditional security threats. These cause military threats, terror threats, and CBRNE threats in our daily life to grow. Therefore it needs to come up with measures in such areas as research development, policy, training program. Major industrial nations on CBRNE like USA, Canada, Switzerland, and Israel have implemented various educational programs. These researches could be utilized as basic materials for drawing up plans for civil defense, emergency services and worldwide countermeasures against CBRNE.
Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.
KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
/
v.40
no.4
/
pp.429-435
/
2020
North Korea declared itself complete with nuclear force after its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Despite efforts at home and abroad to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for the denuclearization are not bright. Along with political and diplomatic efforts to deter NK's WMD threats, the government is required to strengthen its consequence management capabilities against 'catastrophic situations' expected in case of emergency. Accordingly, this study was conducted to present measures to strengthen follow-up management against CBRN threats. The research model was partially supplemented and utilized by the THIRA process adopted and utilized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security among national-level disaster management plan development models. Korea's consequence management (CM) system encompasses risk and crisis management on disaster condition. The system has been carried out in the form of a civil, government and military integrated defense operations for the purpose of curbing the spread or use of CBRNs, responding to threats, and minimizing expected damages. The preventive stage call for the incorporation of CBRN concept and CM procedures into the national management system, supplementing the integrated alarm systems, preparation of evacuation facilities, and establishment of the integrated training systems. In the preparation phase, readjustment of relevant laws and manuals, maintenance of government organizations, developing performance procedures, establishing the on-site support systems, and regular training are essential. In the response phase, normal operations of the medical support system for first aid and relief, installation and operation of facilities for decontamination, and development of regional damage assessment and control guidelines are important. In the recovery phase, development of stabilization evaluation criteria and procedures, securing and operation of resources needed for damage recovery, and strengthening of regional damage recovery capabilities linked to local defense forces, reserve forces and civil defense committees are required.
Major countries, such as the U.S., UK and Germany have reformed their national intelligence systems in the face of transnational, asymmetric and comprehensive threats since September 11, 2001 and have strengthened the intelligence capacity involved in countering terrorism and WMD proliferation, right/left extremism threats. The Korean Moon Jae-in government is preparing a reform plan to eliminate illegal political intervention and abuse of power by the National Intelligence Service(NIS) and to rebuild it as an efficient national intelligence agency for national security. In discussing the reform direction of the NIS, it is necessary to discuss in detail whether adopting a separate model of intelligence agencies to restrict domestic intelligence activities of the NIS and concentrate on foreign intelligence activities or establish new domestic intelligence agencies. Second, as for the issue of transferring anti-Communism investigation authority of the NIS to the police, it needs to be carefully considered in terms of balancing the efficiency and professionalism of intelligence agency activity in the context of North Korea's continuous military provocation, covert operations and cyber threats. Third, it should strive to strengthen the control and supervision functions of the administration and the National Assembly to ensure the political neutrality of the NIS in accordance with the democratization era, to guarantee citizens' basic rights and to improve the transparency of budget execution.
Journal of Korean Society of Disaster and Security
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v.16
no.2
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pp.1-13
/
2023
As interest in urban safety has increased since COVID-19, various institutions have developed and used indicators that evaluate the safety city model. Yongsan-gu was ranked No. 1 in 2021 by Social Safety Index evaluation and was selected as the safest city in Korea. However, the Itaewon disaster in Yongsan-gu in 2022 caused many casualties. The study of indicators for evaluating cities' safety was necessary. This study aims to examine domestic and foreign safe city models and review the differences between each model and the indicators used to evaluate safe cities. As a result of collecting 11 safe city models and analyzing each evaluation index, safe city models can be classified into program-based safe city models, such as the World Health Organization's International safe community and the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction's International Safe city. Considering the diversification of threats to safety, it is reasonable to comprehensively consider digital security, health safety, infrastructure safety, personal safety, environmental safety, traffic safety, fire safety, crime safety, life safety, suicide, and infectious diseases when evaluating safe cities as evaluation parameters.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.
This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.
The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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v.8
no.6
/
pp.435-439
/
2022
ROK has a lot to benchmark from how Ukraine is fighting Russia back with its tactical wins. They have taken a targeted strategy to strike Russia's top generals with high precision. To carry out this strategy, Ukraine is operating a Special Operations Force, which utilizes US/NATO forces, civilian and own resources for maximum impact. Of note, they utilize Starlink for seamless connection from detection, decision-making to strike to maximize operational efficiency. As ROK faces security threat of weapons of mass destruction, Ukraine's military intelligence organization set-up, weapons system and operations can provide some guidance on how to leverage its various SOF as well.
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