• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Korean Journal of Applied Biomechanics
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.141-147
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• 2015

Objective : This study aimed to understand how increased heart rates at the time of drop landing during a step test would affect biomechanical variables of the lower extremity limbs. Background : Ballet performers do more than 200 landings in a daily training. This training raises the heart rate and the fatigability of the lower extremity limbs. Ballet performance high heart rate can trigger lower extremity limb injury. Method : We instructed eight female ballet dancers with no instability in their ankle joints(mean ${\pm}$ SD: age, $20.7{\pm}0.7yr$; body mass index, $19.5{\pm}1.2kg/m^2$, career duration, $8.7{\pm}2.0yr$) to perform the drop landing under the following conditions: rest, 60% heart rate reserve (HRR) and 80% HRR. Results : First, the study confirmed that the increased heart rates of the female ballet dancers did not affect the working ranges of the knee joints during drop landing but only increased angular speeds, which was considered a negative shock-absorption strategy. Second, 80% HRR, which was increased through the step tests, led to severe fatigue among the female ballet dancers, which made them unable to perform a lower extremity limb-neutral position. Hence, their drop landing was unstable, with increased introversion and extroversion moments. Third, we observed that the increasing 80% HRR failed to help the dancers effectively control ground reaction forces but improved the muscular activities of the rectus femoris and vastus medialis oblique muscles. Fourth, the increasing heart rates were positively related to the muscular activities of the vastus medialis oblique and rectus femoris muscles, and the extroversion and introversion moments. Conclusion/Application : Our results prove that increased HRR during a step test negatively affects the biomechanical variables of the lower extremity limbs at the time of drop landing.

• Journal of the Korean housing association
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.65-72
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• 2005

With the changing consciousness of community people and the rising standard of living, there has recently been an emphasis on the creation of public facilities' new functions and their role as local community facilities. This changing trends are accordingly requiring a change in spatial structure of the public facilities. In this study, an analysis was conducted with 24 public facilities situated in the Buk-gu district of Daegu to identify the adequacy of their space scale after functional variation. The results of this study are summarized as follows. 1) The site area of public facilities has been being widened after functional variation since more spaces are needed to provide an outdoor resting space with community people, expand a parking space, and operate a community center. 2) The factors that had a direct effect on the change in the use of space are the reduced space for administrative work and the expanded scope of the community center's function. Specifically, the areas of activities for civil service and administrative work and for reserve forces have been reduced due to reduction of function, and floor division by each function group has been becoming stricter due to addition of a community center's function. 3) It was shown that in terms of the space for functions of public facilities, spaces for civil service and waiting have increased mostly after function variation. After functional variation, the scale of spaces for civil service and administrative work has been being planned within the range of $200\~300 m^2$, regardless of the number of population to be covered by public facilities. 4) The space for public use is showing the greatest increase in public facilities which have been built after functional variation. The major factors seem to be the increased moving passages, the expanded convenient facilities for community people, and the increased convenient facilities for disabled. Facilities scale plans have been being made more systematically, compared to the conventional facilities.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.44 no.6
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• pp.501-508
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• 2020

His paper looks more closely at the Republic of Korea's (ROK) Navy submarine berth-allocation strategies, with the study's results ultimately resulting in the proposition of an integer programming model. Current submarine berth-allocation planning problems include the need for more minimal berth-shifting and general support service failures, as a lack of efficient submarine berth-allocation often leads to submarines unable to receive the support service they need due to the inadequacy of their assigned berths. Currently, the ROK Navy allocates berths by only taking available reserve resources and the full-capacity limits of support services into account. This paper expands upon this strategy, and proposes a model which would allow for submarine berth allocation planning to also take submarine support service scheduling into account, allowing for more efficient and timely submarine servicing. This proposed model in turn minimizes berth shifting, support service failures, and allows for full coordination with the submarine support service request schedule. The construction of this model was carried out through data gathered on the ROK Navy's fleets and forces, allowing for a more nuanced analysis of existing issues with submarine berth-allocation planning.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.40 no.4
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• pp.429-435
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• 2020

North Korea declared itself complete with nuclear force after its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Despite efforts at home and abroad to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for the denuclearization are not bright. Along with political and diplomatic efforts to deter NK's WMD threats, the government is required to strengthen its consequence management capabilities against 'catastrophic situations' expected in case of emergency. Accordingly, this study was conducted to present measures to strengthen follow-up management against CBRN threats. The research model was partially supplemented and utilized by the THIRA process adopted and utilized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security among national-level disaster management plan development models. Korea's consequence management (CM) system encompasses risk and crisis management on disaster condition. The system has been carried out in the form of a civil, government and military integrated defense operations for the purpose of curbing the spread or use of CBRNs, responding to threats, and minimizing expected damages. The preventive stage call for the incorporation of CBRN concept and CM procedures into the national management system, supplementing the integrated alarm systems, preparation of evacuation facilities, and establishment of the integrated training systems. In the preparation phase, readjustment of relevant laws and manuals, maintenance of government organizations, developing performance procedures, establishing the on-site support systems, and regular training are essential. In the response phase, normal operations of the medical support system for first aid and relief, installation and operation of facilities for decontamination, and development of regional damage assessment and control guidelines are important. In the recovery phase, development of stabilization evaluation criteria and procedures, securing and operation of resources needed for damage recovery, and strengthening of regional damage recovery capabilities linked to local defense forces, reserve forces and civil defense committees are required.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.70-78
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• 1979

This study was carried out for the evaluation on the sociomedical characteristics of 1,580 cases who had recieved vasectomy and laparoscopic sterilization at the Busan Family Planning Clinic from January 1975 to December 1973. The results obtained were as follows: 1. In age distribution, the most predominant age group consited of 30.34 years as 44.7%. In regional distribution, the most predominant region was Youngdo Ku in the vasectomy group and Dong Ku in the laparoscopic sterilization group. 2. The educational level showed that the high school graduates(49.2%) in the vasectomy group and the primary school graduates(47.0%) in the laparoscopic sterilization group were the highest each other. 3. The most predominant experienced contraceptive method before accepted permanant sterilization operation was oral pills and non-experienced contraceptive method group was 54.1% of the total. 4. By the span of marital life before accepted permanant sterilization operation, the 5-9 years group was the highest. 5. The average number of living children per family was 2.54 in the vasectomy group and 3.0 in the laparoscopic sterilization group. 6. The average frequency of pregnancy per case was 2 in the vasectomy group and 3 in the laparoscopic sterilization group and the most predominant frequency of induces abortion was 1 per case. 7. The most predominant motive of accepting the sterilization operation were family planning education at the reserve forces training in the vasectomy group and at the mother's club in the laparoscopic sterilization group. 8. By the residing status of the cases, rented room was the highest as 69.4%.

• Survey Research
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.29-53
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• 2006

This paper analyzes which of the military sub-fields has an effect on a soldier's evaluation of South and North Korean military power. There are three objectives of this paper. First, it is to analyze whether the South is superior to the North in the overall military power and military sub -fields, without the presence of the US armed forces in South Korea. Second, it is to assess which of the military sub-fields influences the overall evaluation of military power through a regression analysis. Finally, it is to look at whether the professional soldiers have a motivational bias, due to an argument that the military personnel tend to exaggerate the inferiority of their own military power to get more budget for defense construction. Research in 2002 and 2003 tell us that South Korean military power is slightly inferior to North Korea's. However, research in 2005 shows that military power of South and North Korea is almost equal. The sub-fields in which South Korea is superior are in the order of War Sustainability, Information Warfare, Air Force, and Navy. North Korea is regarded to be superior in the fields of Atomic Biological Chemical Warfare Capability, Special Force, Reserve Mobilization, and Army. The higher ranked soldiers tend to evaluate that the North is superior to the South.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.9
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• pp.313-340
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• 2011

The National Defense Reformation bill of "National Defense Reformation 2020" which have been constantly disputed and reformed by the government went through various levels of complementary measures after the North Korean sinking on the Republic of Korea (ROK) Naval Vessel "Cheonan". The final outcome of this reform is also known as the 307 Plan and this was announced on the 8th March. The reformed National Defense Reformation is to reduce the number of units and military personnel under the military structure reformation. However, in order for us to undertake successful National Defense Reformation, the use of privatized civilian resources are essential. Therefore according to this theory, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) have selected the usage of privatized resources as one of the main core agenda for the National Defense Reformation management procedures, and under this agenda the MND plans to further expand the usage of private Especially the MND plans to minimize the personnel resources applied in non-combat areas and in turn use these supplemented personnel with optimization. In order to do this, the MND have initiated necessary appropriate analysis over the whole national defense section by understanding various projects and acquisition requests required by each militaries and civilian research institutions. However for efficient management of privatized civilian resources, first of all, those possible efficient private resources which can achieve optimization will need to be identified, and secondly continuous systematic reinforcements will need to be made in private resource usage legislations. Furthermore, we would need to consider the possibility of labor disputes because of privatization expansion. Therefore, full legal and systematic complementary measures are required in all possible issue arising areas which can affect the combat readiness posture. There is another problem of huge increase in operational expenses as reduction of standby forces are only reducing the number of soldiers and filling these numbers with more cost expensive commissioned officers. However, to overcome this problem, we would need to reduce the number of positions available for active officers and fill these positions with military reserve personnel who previously had working experiences with the related positions (thereby guaranteeing active officers re-employment after completing active service). This would in tum maintain the standards of combat readiness posture and reduce necessary financial budgets which may newly arise. The area of maintenance, supply, transportation, training & education duties which are highly efficient when using privatized resources, will need to be transformed from military management based to civilian management based system. For maintenance, this can be processed by integrating National Maintenance Support System. In order for us to undertake this procedure, we would need to develop maintenance units which are possible to be privatized and this will in turn reduce the military personnel executing job duties, improve service quality and prevent duplicate investments etc. For supply area, we will need to establish Integrated Military Logistics Center in-connection with national and civilian logistics system. This will in turn reduce the logistics time frame as well as required personnel and equipments. In terms of transportation, we will need to further expand the renting and leasing system. This will need to be executed by integrating the National Defense Transportation Information System which will in turn reduce the required personnel and financial budgets. Finally for training and education, retired military personnel can be employed as training instructors and at the military academy, further expansion in the number of civilian professors can be employed in-connection with National Defense Reformation. In other words, more active privatized civilian resources will need to be managed and used for National Defense Reformation.