• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.352-376
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• 2018

Through this research, the current state of naval coordination and guidance of shipping is reviewed whereupon which a suggestion is made for a novel role which satisfies the needs of the people and the country asked of the Navy. Taking into consideration the dynamic security environment, the developing relationship between the two nations on the Korean peninsula, and the influence that the Republic of Korea has on maritime security, it is made more urgent that the Navy takes a proactive course of action in terms of naval coordination and guidance of shipping. The current form of Korean naval coordination and guidance of shipping is adapted from the logical and flexible concepts of NCAPS and NCAGS and is one of many tasks that the Republic of Korea Navy must perform. However, when the Republic of Korea Navy develops blue-water capabilities with the ambitions of protecting its people and their way of life, naval coordination and guidance of shipping could potentially become one of the primary functions of the Republic of Korea Navy that the it must champion. Already, there are indications that foreign navies are, through many developments and commitment towards naval coordination and guidance of shipping, protecting its people and states' interests wherever is necessary. In the case of Chile, its Navy has taken the helm of naval coordination and guidance of shipping and has integrated various maritime organizations including the coast guard and the National Customs Service for the sake of maintaining regional maritime security, showing immediate force if necessary. Presently, as the Republic of Korea Navy looks to be a global naval power, it is important that a reprioritization of the Navy's mission is undertaken, all the while sustaining military readiness posture on the Northern Limit Line. It cannot be any more emphasized how crucial thorough military readiness posture is as a natural stance against the enemy. That being said, contributing towards international maritime security is consistent with the nation's standing. It is a fact that maritime security has been conceptualized and developed merely as a study within the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Republic of Korea Navy, and other governmental organizations, forces, and academia. Naval cooperation and guidance of shipping suggested by this research as a practical operational field is a concrete solution to what once was an abstract concept. To stand firm on its status as a maritime nation, the Republic of Korea must establish a Maritime Security Organization within its Navy and develop the appropriate doctrines. Attaining experts, developing doctrines, and cultivating the capability to deploy maritime forces will allow for the Republic of Korea to execute a primary role in keeping international maritime security and naval coordination and guidance of shipping. To fully achieve its latent potential necessitates the Republic of Korea Navy to expedite the introduction of naval coordination and guidance of shipping concepts and to establish the appropriate doctrines, operation plans, and organizations.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.5-31
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• 2015

The Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) started from scratch. However, ROKN demonstrated its Blue Navy capabilities successfully to the entire world by conducting "Operation Early Dawn" at the Aden Bay, Yemen in Jan 2011. On the event of the 70th anniversary of the ROKN, I would like to retrospect past gleaning from voyages and challenges we had in the past. At the very inception of the ROKN, Korean government as well as senior military leaders recognized that it had no time to spare to clean up military those were insinuated deeply by communist agents. It was the top priority of the government. The Mongumpo Operation which was not well known, conducted by ROKN was one of the clean-up drive. The Korean War sometimes called as "a fire from land put-off at the sea". The world famous "Incheon Landing" which reversed war situation from the Nakdong Perimeter also done by Sea Power. ROKN conducted various maritime operations including not only Incheon Landing, but amphibious operation at Hungnam, mine sweeping, sea convoy, Wonsan Withdrawal. On the same day of the Korean War started, 25th June 1950, unless the victory of the ROKNS Baekdusan (PC 701) at the Korean Strait, the waning lamp light of Korea could not be rekindled by the participation of the U.N. The ROKN rescued the 17th regiment of Korean Army from the isolation at the Ongjin Peninsular and transported gold and silver bars stored at the Bank of Korea to the Navy supply deposit in Jinhae safely. ROKN special intelligence unit conducted critical HUMINT which led Incheon Landing success. One of important mission ROKN conducted successfully was not only transporting war fighting materials but also U.S. provided grains to starving Koreans. ROKN participated Vietnam campaign from 1960s and conducted numerous maritime transportation operations supplying materials to Vietnam military forces along the long coastal lines. Experienced Naval Officers and enlisted men who discharged and acquired as merchant marine certificate supported most of the U.S. sea lift operations throughout the Vietnam campaign. ROK-US Combined Forces which had been honed and improved its war fighting capabilities through the Korean War and out of Vietnam jungle playing key deterrent against threat from north Korea. However, those threat level will be completely different when north Korea finish its nuclear weapon ambition. In order to stand firm against north Korean nuclear threat, I would like to expect strong political leadership supporting nuclear submarine for ROKN.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.254-290
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• 2018

Why did Kim Jong Un turn his foreign policy upside down in a sudden? US naval blockade became one of candidates for the reason since it had been threatened by Trump administration for the first time in December 2017. Has the blockades worked well like that in the international politic history? This paper reveals the effectiveness of naval blockade on sanctioning in the peacetime. This research analyzes three hypothetical arguments about the naval blockade based on the result of empirical tests with TIES Dataset. First, sanctions by blockading are more effective in gaining political benefits than the other economic sanctions. It was ranked the 4th effective way of sanction out of 9. And 56.3% of pacific naval blockades without packaged economic sanctions were succeeded, whereas the possibility of success increase up to 61.2% when blockade has been imposed in accordance with the other type of economic sanctions. Second, blockades deter military collisions, even war. When it comes to military provocation issue, blockading sanctions gain political interest far more than the other type of economic sanctions. The possibility of the success reaches up to 74%. Also, there wasn't any historical cases of war incurred by blockading sanctions within 5 years after the blockade end. Third, policy makers just need 1.2 years on average to see the end of sanctions when they choose the naval blockade as the method of imposing sanction on the adversary. It is impressively short span of time in achieving political goal compared to the other types of sanctions which are need 9 years on average. North East Asia sea could be the next stage for a naval blockade sooner or later. Because China and Japan not only possess capabilities of blockade but also have will to impose blockades to the others if conditions are set. And even the North Korea with lots of submerging forces could be a blockading threat in the specific area. So, the Republic of Korea has to pay more attention and be prepared for naval blockading sanction.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.44-51
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• 2016

This paper describes the operational concept of the Aegis ship's missile defense. Recently, North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear-weapon test that involved the launch of a long-range missile and the underwater launch of an SLBM. The ground-based BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) system is very limited for the SLBM of a miniaturized nuclear warhead; therefore, it is necessary to build a reliable sea-based missile-defense system. The ROK Navy has, however, only utilized the Aegis ship that is designed with a search-and-tracking sensor but is without a ballistic-missile interception capability. Given this information, this work focuses on the operational concept of the Aegis BMD by comparing the BMD capabilities of the ROK with those of the U.S.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.57-88
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• 2018

Security situations are fundamentally and rapidly changing on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, as North Korea(NK) is heightening its nuclear and missile capabilities, Republic of Korea(ROK) is facing an existential threat. At the same time, as China's economic, diplomatic and military power is quickly rising, the balance of power is shifting and strategic competition between the Unite States(US) and China is accelerating in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the pressure of development of these situations, ROK seems to face allegedly the most serious crisis in its national security since the end of the Korean War. In the current grim geopolitical situation, maritime security may become the most difficult security challenge for ROK in the years to come. The purpose of this paper is to compare major changes in maritime security affairs of the ROK during last twenty years from 1998 until now(2018). 1998 was when this journal 『Strategy 21』 was published for the first time by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. Then, this paper tries to identify challenges and risks with which this country has to deal for its survival and prosperity, and to propose some recommendations for the government, the Navy, and the Coast Guard as they are responsible for the maritime security of the country. The recommendations of this paper are as follows: strengthen ROK-US alliance and expand security cooperation with regional powers in support of the maintenance of the current security order in the region; building-up of maritime security capacity in preparation for crisis on the maritime domain with the navy targeting to acquire 'a non-nuclear, balance-of-terror capability, to improve interoperability with the Coast Guard based on 'a national fleet,' and to actively pursue innovation in naval science and technology. Finally, this paper proposes that naval capability the country needs in another twenty years depends on how effectively and rigorously the navy put its utmost efforts towards building 'a strongest navy' today.

• 해양안보
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

중러 관계 강화는 강대국 경쟁이 재개되고 있음을 보여주는 한 가지 징후라고 볼 수 있다. 공식적인 방위동맹을 체결하지 않았음에도 불구하고 양국의 군사관계가 강화되고 있다는 사실을 눈여겨 볼 필요가 있다. 특히, 중국과 러시아가 세계 최강의 해군력을 보유하고 있다는 점에 비추어 본다면, 양국간 해양안보협력 강화는 최근 수년 간 나타난 국제안보 전개상황 중 가장 중요한 양상으로 꼽을 수 있다. 여러 플랫폼과 장소에서 펼쳐진 중러 해상합동훈련은 고위급 인사교류와 중국의 대규모 러시아 무기 구매, 중러 우호조약 체결 및 다양한 협력형태로 수년간 지속되었다. 양국간 해상합동훈련은 냉전기의 대치국면이 종식된 직후 시작되었으나, 그 중요성은 최근 십년의 기간 동안 더욱 부각되고 있다고 볼 수 있다. 해상합동훈련이 양국 국방동맹의 핵심으로 부상하고 있기 때문이다. 양국은 그 어느 때보다도 다양한 장소에서 다양한 무기체계를 활용해 해상훈련에 임하고 있다. 앞으로 양국의 합동군사훈련은 북극, 초음속 운반수단, 아프리카, 아시아, 중동의 신규 파트너를 비롯해 새로운 위치와 전력을 동원해 펼쳐질 가능성이 크다. 또한, 경비함정 및 제병 연합부대를 동원한 해상합동 훈련을 수행하는 등 최근에 보여준 획기적인 전개를 지속할 것으로 보인다. 중국과 러시아는 양자간 해군협력을 토대로 일련의 목표를 추구하고 있다. 중화인민공화국과 러시아 연방 사이에 체결된 선린우호협력조약 (Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation)은 공동방어 조항을 포함하고 있지는 않지만, 공동의 위협에 대해 상호 논의하도록 언급하고 있다. 전통적/비전통적 군사작전 (예: 대해적 작전, 인도적 구호 및 최고수준의 전투수행)을 모의하는 해상훈련은 합동군사활동을 통해 공동의 도전과제에 대한 양국의 대응력을 강화하는 수단이 된다. 이러한 합동훈련이 전투력 측면에서 높은 수준의 상호운용성을 구현하지 못하더라도, 이를 통해 중러 양국이 단합된 해군력을 동원할 수 있는 역량을 갖추고 있다는 사실을 국제사회에 알릴 수 있다. 양국의 해상무역의존도나 영해를 둘러싼 국가간 갈등을 감안하면 이는 중요한 메시지라고 할 수 있다. 한편으로는 해상합동훈련을 통해 자국의 전투력을 향상시키고, 동시에 서로의 전략, 전술, 전투기술 및 절차에 대한 이해를 강화할 수 있다. 점차 부상하고 있는 중국 해군은 특히 러시아군으로 부터 많은 혜택을 얻을 수 있다. 러시아군은 복수의 제병협동작전을 중심으로 중국인민해방군 (People's Liberation Army, PLA) 보다 훨씬 많은 해상임무수행 경험을 보유하고 있기 때문이다. 그러나 한편으로는 전투력 강화를 통해 양국 정치지도자들이 군사력을 동원하거나 다른 국가와 대치할 경우, 긴장을 더 고조시키는 방향을 선택할 가능성이 더욱 커졌다는 부정적인 측면이 지적된다. 이러한 모든 영향은 양국 해군이 대부분의 해상합동훈련을 수행하는 동북아시아 지역에 더욱 큰 파급력을 미친다. 동북아시아 지역은 중국과 러시아가 미국 및 일본과 벌이는 그리고 불편한 상태로 한국을 사이에 둔 해상에서의 대치상황이 펼쳐지는 격전지가 되고 있다. 중러 해군 협력 강화가 공고해지면서 한미 군사계획이 더욱 복잡해지고, 북한에 집중되어야 할 자원이 전환되어 결국 지역 안보환경을 악화시키는 결과로 이어지고 있다. 한미일 해군 실무자의 입장에서는 중러 해군이 모두 포함된 시나리오를 수립해야 할 필요성이 더욱 커지고 있다. 가령, 한미 정책 결정가들은 중러 군사력의 공동 무력대응에 대비하기 위해 미 국방부가 과도한 지출을 하게 만들고, 한반도에서 한미안보 부재가 발생하지 않도록 대한민국 해군을 신속하게 보충해야 하는 상황이 발생하게 되었다. 북한이 한국 및 동맹국과 해상에서 대치할 경우 이를 중러 해군이 지원할 수 있다는 가능성은 또다른 심각한 도전을 제기한다. 이 같은 긴급사태 발생 가능성을 고려해 안보결속을 강화하겠다는 한일 간의 약속을 토대로, 한미일 3국 공동군사훈련을 더욱 확대할 필요가 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.