• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.369-373
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• 2014

In view of the problem of the invalidity of the incentive mechanism of the ecological subsidies, which is due to the information asymmetry between the government's supervision and the enterprise endeavor to fulfill their ecological responsibilities, this paper attempts to analyze the supervision of ecological subsidies based on the Principal-agent Model. Two conclusions are drawn: firstly, the government's supervision regarding the effect of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities can significantly reduce the information asymmetry; secondly, the government's incentive strength and the enterprises' endeavor level of fulfilling the ecological responsibilities are both improving the surveillance dynamics. Here is the suggestion: with the increasing of the surveillance dynamics of the government and the transparency of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities, the government should meanwhile increase the subsidies incentive strength, therefore, to promote the effort level of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities to approach to the Pareto optimal value.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.57-70
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• 1999

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.493-499
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• 2015

In Korea mobile phone subscribers exceeded 1 million people in 1995, and ten million people in 1998. Prevalence of the mobile phone increased dramatically over 110% compared to the population. Almost every family members including children uses more than one mobile terminal. Mobile phone is obviously more necessary good than washer, vacuum cleaner and passenger car. Our daily life are conveniently positioned with mobile communication, but communication related costs including the price of the device and service charges become a big burden on the household. But the government does not seem to do the right role at the right time to prevent the market failure to maximize consumer welfare and social welfare through supporting fair competition. This principal-agent problem issues of mobile communication policies will be understood in perspective of public choice against joint use of the mobile communication network, number portability, separation of phone distribution and phone service, network neutrality, mobile phone subsidy since the early 1990s when mobile phone service was introduced in Korea.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.1345-1365
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• 2018

Following principal-agent relationship between government and funding agency effects on efficiency and management of project, this paper suppose that project management cost rate variable on outsourcing and administration of institution, applies multiple regression analysis and logit analysis by using factors that procurement status of institutional operating expenses and each subordinates scale (Budget, subject number) and method (Top-down/Bottom-up), not a total amount, for examining factors following project efficiency analysis and way of commission. The major variables which effect on efficiency of institution are management cost scale (0.36), institutional operating expenses ratio (-0.47), way of outsourcing, the factors that affect way of outsourcing are portion of project management cost (-38.5) and institutional operating expenses rate (-11.7). This means both legal and financial stability are necessary and it is avoidable moral hazard and adverse selection on principal-agent problem.

• Cartoon and Animation Studies
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• s.36
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• pp.121-145
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• 2014

Operating under the principle of user-benefit maximization and democratic user-control, cooperatives are being spot-lighted as a business model satisfying the various social, financial needs. In Korea, the Law of Cooperative was enacted as of December 2012, which has enabled the establishment of cooperatives in variety of industry fields. This study is to discuss the expected effect and validity of marketing cooperative as a solution for insufficient sales revenue in international distribution of Korean animation. The interviews with Korean animation studios found out the key problems of overseas distribution, which are; 1) lack of marketing expertise and weak organization, 2) lack of ancillary rights exploitation due to the deals based upon all rights package with the broadcasters who are not interested in ancillary business, 3) lack of localized marketing support in each territory. The solution for these problems takes large and long-term marketing investment and it is far beyond the capabilities of small Korean animation studios. Marketing cooperative can provide services not available otherwise such as in-depth market research which will help the improvement of international marketing expertise. Also. as the cooperative carries enough volume of animation catalogue, it can increase negotiation power satisfying the various needs of buyers. Also, it can provide the precise marketing support for each territory by integrating every process of value chain, from TV broadcasting, merchandising, and digital media platform. Above all, a clear benefit of marketing cooperative is that, because of its user-benefit and user-control principle, the principal-agent problem can be minimized while it maximizes the profit for member studios.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• International Journal of Quality Innovation
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.20-31
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• 2007

Moral hazard and adverse selection often exist in asymmetric information environment. In this paper, quality investment decision problem is studied under moral hazard. A basic model for quality investment level decision is developed with the supplier as a principal and the buyer as an agent. And then we regard the supplier and the buyer's rational limitations to set up a model when the buyer's quality evaluation and processing activities are hidden. The model is optimized and the results under different backgrounds are discussed and compared. Results show that the buyer's quality evaluation level and processing level are mostly influenced by the supplier's quality assurance payment. Both the supplier and the buyer choose different quality investment levels under moral hazard because of the supplier's payment to the buyer in case of internal failure and external failure.

• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.93-98
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• 2017

To recover the capital market's confidence, interest in accounting ethics education has increased recently. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a simple classroom games for moral hazard problem and to analyze the results. This case study introduces the classroom games in which well-known experiment of principal-agent dilemma in experimental economics implemented accounting ethics education. This paper suggests that game lesson is effective and efficient way to understanding moral hazard problem. During the games, cause and effect of players' decision making react upon each other. This paper contributes to generating further discussion on accounting ethics education and providing practical implication.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.20
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• pp.123-138
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• 1989

The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea CI
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.95-101
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• 2008

Modeling of stock prices forecast has been considered as one of the most difficult problem to develop accurately since stock prices are highly correlated with various environmental conditions including economics and political situation. In this paper, we propose a agent system approach to predict Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) using neural network and statistical methods. To minimize mean of prediction error and variation of prediction error, agent system includes sub-agent modules for feature extraction, variables selection, forecast engine selection, and forecasting results analysis. As a first step to develop agent system for KOSPI forecasting, twelve economic indices are selected from twenty two basic standard economic indices using principal component analysis. From selected twelve economic indices, prediction model input variables are chosen again using best-subsets regression method. Two different types data are tested for KOSPI forecasting and the Prediction results showed 11.92 points of root mean squared error for consecutive thirty days of prediction. Also, it is shown that proposed agent system approach for KOSPI forecast is effective since required types and numbers of prediction variables are time-varying, so adaptable selection of modeling inputs and prediction engine are essential for reliable and accurate forecast model.