Decision on Quality Investment Level Under Moral Hazard Environment

  • Zhang, Cui-Hua (School of Business Administration Northeastern University) ;
  • Yu, Hai-Bin (Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Science)
  • 발행 : 2007.08.30

초록

Moral hazard and adverse selection often exist in asymmetric information environment. In this paper, quality investment decision problem is studied under moral hazard. A basic model for quality investment level decision is developed with the supplier as a principal and the buyer as an agent. And then we regard the supplier and the buyer's rational limitations to set up a model when the buyer's quality evaluation and processing activities are hidden. The model is optimized and the results under different backgrounds are discussed and compared. Results show that the buyer's quality evaluation level and processing level are mostly influenced by the supplier's quality assurance payment. Both the supplier and the buyer choose different quality investment levels under moral hazard because of the supplier's payment to the buyer in case of internal failure and external failure.

키워드

참고문헌

  1. Ann, V. A.(1993), 'The principal/agent paradigm: its relevance to various functional fields,' European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 70, No.1, pp. 83-103 https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-E
  2. Barucci, E., Gozz F., and Swiech A.(2000), 'Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time,' Journal of mathematical economics, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 471-508 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00054-9
  3. Bhattacharyya, F., Lafontaine, F.(1995), 'Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts,' RAND J. Econom, Vol. 4, pp. 761-781
  4. Gauder G., Pierre L., and Long I. V.(1998), 'Real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information,' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 23, No.1, pp. 71-95 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00107-3
  5. Gorbet, C. and Groote A.(2000), 'A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information,' Management Science, Vol. 46, No.3, pp. 445-450
  6. Hansell, S.(1998), 'Is this the factory of the future?' The New York Times, July 26
  7. Kashi, R. B. and Suresh, R.(2005), 'Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain,' Management Science, Vol. 51, No.8, pp. 1266-1277 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0408
  8. Reyniers, D. and Tapiero, C.(1995), 'The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer contracts,' Management Science, Vol. 41, No.1, pp. 1581-1589 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1581
  9. Stanley, B., Paul, E. F., and Madhav, V. J.(2000), 'Information, contracting, and quality costs,' Management Science, Vol. 46, No.6, pp. 776-789 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.6.776.11939
  10. Stanley, B., Paul, E. F., and Madhav, V. J.(2001), 'Performance measurement and design in supply chains,' Management Science, Vol. 47, No.1, pp. 173-188 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.1.173.10673
  11. Starbird, S. A.(1994), 'The effect of acceptance sampling and risk aversion on the quality delivered by suppliers,' Journal of Operational Research Society, Vol. 45, No.2, pp. 309-320 https://doi.org/10.2307/2584165
  12. Starbird, S. A.(1997), 'Acceptance sampling, imperfect production, and the optimality of zero defects,' Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 44, No.1, pp. 515-530 https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6750(199709)44:6<515::AID-NAV1>3.0.CO;2-6
  13. Starbird, S. A.(2001), 'Penalties, rewards, and inspection: provisions for quality in supply chain contracts,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 109-115 https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601048
  14. Wu, C. F.(2000), 'Optimal Control Theory and Method,' Defense Industry Publishing House, Beijing China
  15. Yu, X. D.(2002), 'Analysis of career-created capital operating under asymmetric information,' China management science, 2002, Vol. 10, No.5, pp. 82-86
  16. Zhang, W. Y.(2000), 'Information Economics,' Shanghai People's Press, Shanghai China