• Korean Security Journal
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• no.5
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• pp.41-69
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• 2002

This work analyze the hitec-based arms systems which might raise the tentions by terrorism. Apparently they are largely dependent on the biochemicals, electronics, laser, and cybernetics. Also they draw an attention to us of a probability of various threats from the terrorists, or ill intending regimes to deter the 2002's World Cup, under the heading of 'New Centennial, Meeting, and Start Movement.' What follows is that this research strongly proposes that we should take prior safety actions for hosting the successful World Cup Match in Korea-Japan as well as maintain the national security for peace.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.123-132
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• 2018

North Korea's cyber warfare capability is becoming a serious security threat to Korea because most of the operational systems of social infrastructure and advanced weapons system are all networked. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine what the Korean government should do to strengthen cyber security capabilities toward North Korea. For this purpose, this article analyzed North Korea's cyber attack cases against Korea by categorizing according to threat type and purpose. The research findings are as follows. It is necessary first, to have aggressive cyber protection and attack capabilities; second, to establish an integrated cyber security control tower that can be overseen by the national government; third, to need to legislate domestic cyber- related laws; fourth, to build a multilateral & regional cyber cooperation system. The implication of these findings are that it needs to be strengthened the cyber security capability from the cyber threats of North Korea by minimizing the damage during the peacetime period and for the complete warfare in case of emergency.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.10a
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• pp.358-361
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• 2016

The North and South Korea for the peaceful reunification of the Republic of Korea, to lead the transformation and reform, and to complement the policy making and negotiations, there is a need for cyber security policy to practice. This paper explores the definition and overseas cyber terrorism and cyber warfare correspondence, correspondence between the versions of the technology between versions. Analysis of cyber security activities in the North and South confrontation, and research the cyber security policy against the unification. In this study, we compared the unification to build and operate a secure cyberspace from cyber threats and cyber security policy suggestions for ways of rational and legal.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.327-332
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• 2023

On December 26, 2022, North Korea's drone provocation resumed for the first time in eight years. The threat covered not only the Seoul metropolitan area but also the no-fly zone for the presidential office's security, and the South Korean military's response to it is not appropriate, which is a major controversy. In the midst of this, problems caused by the prohibition of small drones' flight and illegal intrusion into restricted areas are increasing in Korea, and the threat is becoming a reality, such as being used for terrorist attacks abroad. In this paper, the concept of "Counter-Drone" and related technologies were considered for these drone threats, and implications were derived through domestic and overseas small drone threats, and the direction of development of the Counter-Drone system was presented. North Korea's drone threat is expected to be more diversified, massified, and advanced, resulting in bolder attacks and provocations. Therefore, the South Korean military should push for early powering of the integrated control system and the conter drone system, joint and military cooperation in response to the threat of small drones, and the ability to carry out joint operations between South Korea and the U.S.

• Proceedings of the Plant Resources Society of Korea Conference
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• 2018.04a
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• pp.38-38
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• 2018

The genus Carduus (Asteraceae), containing ca. 90 species, is mainly distributed in Eurasia and Africa. Carduus species are one of the most hazardous invasive species, which causes serious environmental threats and biodiversity damages in North America. Thus, the member of Carduus are targeted for classical biological control in this region. Here, we provide the complete cp genome of Carduus crispus using next-generation sequencing technology. The size of cp genomes of C. crispus is 152,342 bp. It shows a typical quadripartite structure, consisting of the large single copy (LSC; 83,254 bp), small single copy (SSC; 18,706 bp), separated by a pair of inverted repeats (IRs; 25,191 bp). It contains 115 unique genes of which 21 genes duplicated in the IR regions. The cpSSR regions of Carduus species were searched through the complete chloroplast genome sequence using a tandem repeat search tool in Geneious with the parameters set to ${\geq}7$ mononucleotide repeats, ${\geq}4$ di- and trinucleotide repeats, and ${\geq}3$ tetra-, penta-, and hexanucleotide repeats. A total of 22 repeat motifs were identified, which may be useful for molecular identification of Korean Carduus species (C. cripus), and providing a guideline for its conservation.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.87-130
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• 2019

This paper aims to analyze the recent progress(current situation) and tasks of arms control in North and South Korea. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; recent progress(current situation) of arms control in South and North Korea; constraints and tasks of arms control on the Korean peninsula; and conclusion. One of the most important tasks for the establishment of a peace structure for the coexistence of the Korean people in the 21st century is the realization of military control in order to resolve the acute military confrontation situation and mutual threats. With the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the North-South summit and the subsequent talks for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the North Korea-US summit, and subsequent talks are creating conditions for trust building and arms control between the two Koreas. The military trust between the two Koreas and operational arms control are being achieved through the declaration of the April 27 Panmunjom and the 'Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.' However, since there are constraints on the control of arms control, such as the persistence of hostility and distrust of the two Koreas, the defense treaty between the two Koreas and neighboring countries, the competition of neighboring countries and the complex interests of the Korean peninsula, Trust Building is important. We should resolve the issue of arms control between the two Koreas, taking into account the trend of international arms control over the internal and external dynamics of the Korean peninsula gradually and carefully, with a vision of long-term unification security.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.40 no.4
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• pp.429-435
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• 2020

North Korea declared itself complete with nuclear force after its sixth nuclear test in 2017. Despite efforts at home and abroad to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for the denuclearization are not bright. Along with political and diplomatic efforts to deter NK's WMD threats, the government is required to strengthen its consequence management capabilities against 'catastrophic situations' expected in case of emergency. Accordingly, this study was conducted to present measures to strengthen follow-up management against CBRN threats. The research model was partially supplemented and utilized by the THIRA process adopted and utilized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security among national-level disaster management plan development models. Korea's consequence management (CM) system encompasses risk and crisis management on disaster condition. The system has been carried out in the form of a civil, government and military integrated defense operations for the purpose of curbing the spread or use of CBRNs, responding to threats, and minimizing expected damages. The preventive stage call for the incorporation of CBRN concept and CM procedures into the national management system, supplementing the integrated alarm systems, preparation of evacuation facilities, and establishment of the integrated training systems. In the preparation phase, readjustment of relevant laws and manuals, maintenance of government organizations, developing performance procedures, establishing the on-site support systems, and regular training are essential. In the response phase, normal operations of the medical support system for first aid and relief, installation and operation of facilities for decontamination, and development of regional damage assessment and control guidelines are important. In the recovery phase, development of stabilization evaluation criteria and procedures, securing and operation of resources needed for damage recovery, and strengthening of regional damage recovery capabilities linked to local defense forces, reserve forces and civil defense committees are required.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.177-192
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• 2015

The Chinese government portrays the One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) and South Korea President Park Geun-hae's Eurasia Initiative as a win-win opportunity which will hurt nobody's interests, but some South Korean commentators have interpreted it as much more than just a trade and development deal: they focus on the geopolitical implications and the possibility that the balance of power in Asia will be disturbed. South Korea depends upon its maritime-oriented Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in focusing on its alliance with the US to deter North Korean threats and explore its export-based economic growth and development, and yet cannot afford to be left out of these initiatives which could transform the economic and logistical linkage between South Korea and Europe. Given its negative reception by the some pundits, however, South Korea should be more precautious for expressing only full-fledged supports for the BRI and Eurasia Initiative. Opponents of these two initiatives doubt that its putative benefits can be realized, at least in the short term, arguing that creating the necessary rail interconnections may be too costly.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.5-31
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• 2015

The Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) started from scratch. However, ROKN demonstrated its Blue Navy capabilities successfully to the entire world by conducting "Operation Early Dawn" at the Aden Bay, Yemen in Jan 2011. On the event of the 70th anniversary of the ROKN, I would like to retrospect past gleaning from voyages and challenges we had in the past. At the very inception of the ROKN, Korean government as well as senior military leaders recognized that it had no time to spare to clean up military those were insinuated deeply by communist agents. It was the top priority of the government. The Mongumpo Operation which was not well known, conducted by ROKN was one of the clean-up drive. The Korean War sometimes called as "a fire from land put-off at the sea". The world famous "Incheon Landing" which reversed war situation from the Nakdong Perimeter also done by Sea Power. ROKN conducted various maritime operations including not only Incheon Landing, but amphibious operation at Hungnam, mine sweeping, sea convoy, Wonsan Withdrawal. On the same day of the Korean War started, 25th June 1950, unless the victory of the ROKNS Baekdusan (PC 701) at the Korean Strait, the waning lamp light of Korea could not be rekindled by the participation of the U.N. The ROKN rescued the 17th regiment of Korean Army from the isolation at the Ongjin Peninsular and transported gold and silver bars stored at the Bank of Korea to the Navy supply deposit in Jinhae safely. ROKN special intelligence unit conducted critical HUMINT which led Incheon Landing success. One of important mission ROKN conducted successfully was not only transporting war fighting materials but also U.S. provided grains to starving Koreans. ROKN participated Vietnam campaign from 1960s and conducted numerous maritime transportation operations supplying materials to Vietnam military forces along the long coastal lines. Experienced Naval Officers and enlisted men who discharged and acquired as merchant marine certificate supported most of the U.S. sea lift operations throughout the Vietnam campaign. ROK-US Combined Forces which had been honed and improved its war fighting capabilities through the Korean War and out of Vietnam jungle playing key deterrent against threat from north Korea. However, those threat level will be completely different when north Korea finish its nuclear weapon ambition. In order to stand firm against north Korean nuclear threat, I would like to expect strong political leadership supporting nuclear submarine for ROKN.