• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.313-322
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• 2013

The concept of effective control is a crucial element for the acquisition as well as maintenance of territorial title. The general meaning of the concept has been described as 'an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and State functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis'. The concept has been developed through some significant international cases such as the Island of Palmas case (1928), Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933), Minquiers and Ecrehos case (1953), Burkina Faso/Mali case (1986) and Nicaragua/Colombia case (2012). In relation to Dokdo, the concept has an important bearing in regard to Korea's claims of territorial sovereignty over the island. This paper reviews the definition, components and ramifications of the effective control with regard to the acquisition and maintenance of territorial title through analyzing the relevant judgements of international courts and tribunals. Furthermore, it exams the legal ramifications of the current effective control on Dokdo and makes some suggestions for the strengthening of Korea's position on the island.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.28 no.6
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• pp.1549-1560
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• 2016

Today, all the countries of the world newly recognize importance of sea, which are focused on efforts for security of marine territory and fishes resources. Many of the coastal state, to strengthen the rights of their own country EEZ, marine survey and continental shelf development, travels through such maritime jurisdiction in the territorial sovereignty and the EEZ overlaps, deepening complex interests between neighboring countries cooperation activities of the fierce competition, the domestic and foreign been has been carried out. Under such circumstances, is devastated coastal of China, our territorial waters and EEZ has been violated more and more, in spite of the powerful crackdown maritime public power, illegal fishing more resistance intensified. They tend to be gradually organization, collectivization and atrocities. Currently, illegal fishing of Chinese fishing boats in the West Sea of Korea, including the waters near Yeonpyeong Island is prevalent as operating in the coast of the country. Furthermore regrettable one is illegal on a scale and the situation where South Korea of scale of damage caused by it have not been accurately grasp of the operation, but that there is damage of Korea official duty enforcement to crack down the increase to illegal operations year after year have occurred. Violent, illegal fishing of Chinese fishing boats, in order to eradicate the operations of insane at our sea, we investigated to the infringement situations of fisheries resources by multiple fields. each of problems presenting a specific preservation plan in accordance with the function and role of the maritime enforcement organization and other government organization the point. at the same time we will try to seek measures such as a scheme that it is possible to increase the capacity.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.769-788
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• 2014

Today, all the countries of the world newly recognize importance of sea on 70% area of the earth, which are focused on efforts for security of marine territory and fishes resources. On the security concerns of the ocean & fishes resources, Sea are very important on the ground of the importance of the ocean, thus international community has been trying to combat a maritime security threat and illegal fisheries. Coastal states need to have proper state's jurisdiction and exercise it's jurisdiction to response effectively to a maritime security threat and illegal fisheries. Here, many of the coastal states strengthened the rights in Exclusive Economic Zone(;EEZ) naturally, there are made cooperation activities and keen competition in the sea because deepening of complex understanding of the relationship between the surrounding countries with marine surveys & continental shelf development, island territorial sovereignty & marine jurisdiction in overlap of sea area on EEZ. In these circumstances, foreign fishing boats invaded to our territorial waters and EEZ many times. in addition, Chinese fishing boats are going to illegal fisheries naturally. On this point, a powerful crackdown of maritime enforcement organization had no effect on them. Also more and more their resistance gathered strength and tendency of a illegal activities became systematization, group action and atrocity little by little. So this thesis includes a study on the regal regulation, the system and formalities on the control of illegal fishing. And the author analyzed the details of the activities of illegal fishing and boats controlled by Korea Coast Guard(KCG), fishing patrol vessels of Ministry of Maritime Affaires and Fisheries(MOMAF) and Navy etc. from in adjacent sea area of Korea. In relation to this, the policy and activity plan were devised to crackdown to illegal fisheries of foreign fishing boats and then it was enforced every year. According to this, analyze the present conditions of illegal fisheries of a foreign fishing boats on this study, also analyze the present conditions of maritime enforcement organization & found out problems to compared it. protect the territorial waters, at the same time protection of marine mineral resources & fishes resources of EEZ including continental shelf, which has want to study for the role & response of maritime enforcement organization for the protection of fisheries resources and a proper, a realistic confrontation plan of maritime enforcement organization against illegal fisheries of foreign fishing boats.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.119-134
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• 2013

Korea has established the MOMAF (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries) in 1996 while only a few countries have adopted the unified management system for the area of maritime, oceans and fisheries affairs. The Ministry has been broken up to three parts of maritime affairs, oceans and fisheries and allocated to each related ministries in 2008, and reorganized as the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries including maritime affairs in 2013. However, the newly established MOF (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries) has been evaluated as simply duplicated the former organization so as not to meet the oceanic environmental changes. This paper aims to suggest the appropriated organizational reinforcements measures on the basis of analysis of questionnaire survey which has been conducted targeting experts such as academic researchers and industry field players in the area of oceans, maritime and fisheries. The survey pointed out mainly five scopes such as (1) transferring the administrative task of shipbuilding and plant industries from the existing Ministry to the MOF, (2) reinforcing the structural functions of maritime, port construction and logistics affairs, (3) collaboration system with related Ministries for the ocean sovereignty, (4) securing the financial support system for the maritime industries, (5) transferring the management authority of maritime and ocean universities from the existing Ministry to the MOF. Looking back on the interministerial interest conflicts, it is very difficult to agree on the transfer of the existing task of above first and fifth suggestions. But the remain three suggestions could be done with interior abilities of the MOF by means of structural changes and professional manpower supplement.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.65-103
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• 2015

This study is an attempt to look into the future role of the ROKN and to provide a strategic way forward with a special focus on naval strategic concept and force planning. To accomplish this goal, this research takes four sequential steps for analysis: 1) assessing the role and utility of naval power of ROKN since its foundation back in 1945; 2) forecasting features of various maritime threats to influence the security of Korea in the future directly or indirectly; 3) identifying the roles to be undertaken by future ROKN; and 4) recommending Korean way of naval force planning and the operational concept of naval power. This study seeks to show that ROKN needs comprehensive role to better serve the nation with respect to national security, national prosperity and development, and future battle-space management. To safeguard the national security of Korea, it suggests three roles: 1) national guard for the peaceful unification; 2) protector of the maritime sovereignty; and 3) suppressor to maritime threats. Three more roles are highlighted for national prosperity: 1) escort of the national economy; 2) guardian for national maritime activities; and 3) contributor to the world peace. These roles need to be closely connected with the role for the battle-space management. This paper addresses the need for a dramatic shift of the central operational domain from land to maritime in the future. This will eventually offer future ROKN a leading role for developing strategic concept and force planning rather than merely a supporting one. This study finally suggests 'balanced' strategy both in concept development and force planning. A balanced force planning is a 'must' rather than an 'option' when considering a division of function between Task Fleets and Area Fleets, constructing cutting-edge conventional forces such as Aegis destroyer, CVs, or submarines, and the mix of high-profile platform and low-profile when composing future fleets. A 'balance' is also needed in operational concept. The fleet should be prepared to fulfill its missions based on two different types of force operation i.e., coercive or cooperative application of the utility of naval force. The findings and recommendations of the study are relevant today, and will be increasingly important in the future to achieve various political goals required by enhancing the utility of naval power.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.75-93
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• 2007

It is recent trend that every countries are opening their border in the name of liberalization of contemporary era. Shipping is not exceptional and it used to be said as international business. Therefore, co-operation and openness of maritime sectors between regional countries is required to utilize resources that each countries can manage. It can be done by employing their vessels in other countries' short sea area. However, there are some problems to implement this practices, here cabotage is centre of issue. Each countries do not open their sea in order to protect their national interests in sovereignty. But, it should be opened if co-operation between each countries work well and properly. To achieve true maritime co-operation, countries as Korea, China and Japan in Northeast Asia region should have understanding for the opening of cabotage. In order to make things work well, it can be done by the lessons from EU and American cases. Therefore, it should be clarified such as market scale to provide cabotage trade, employment as well as interested parties, and technical safety matters as well as environmental standards. Then cabotage matters can be smoothly resolved between three countries in Northeast Asia region.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

Even 10 years after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan has yet to solve the problems emerging from generating contaminated water every day. Japan has unilaterally decided to release nuclear wastewater in the sea despite Korea's concerns about safety as their radioactive water storage tanks reach the limits. Despite Korea's response, Japan is still preparing to discharge nuclear wastewater without fulfilling its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. There are concerns about marine pollution caused by the radioactive materials from nuclear wastewater and invading Korea's maritime sovereignty. In particular, it is impossible to reverse the effects of environmental pollution, so plans to discharge radioactive water must be prevented unless immediate safety is guaranteed. This study proposes Korea's response strategy to resolve the conflict between the two countries due to plans to release contaminated water. Korea should respond to Japan's release of nuclear wastewater in the sea in various ways through cooperation with Japan, provisional measures, and cooperation with neighboring countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.140-162
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• 2016

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.