• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.67-83
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• 2004

The purpose of this paper is to defend Kripke's theory of truth from Simmons' objection. First after introducing various sorts of the liar paradox, briefly I explain Tarski's attempt to solve the puzzle. Then, I outline Kripke's solution by using the concept of 'fixed point'. Simmons offers an interesting objection against Kripke's solution. He uses a diagonal argument in his attack to Kripke's idea. I claim that Simmons seem to use 'exclusion negation' in refuting Kripke. I think, however, there is an alternative interpretation, which is 'choice negation'. With using choice negation, I maintain that Kripke's theory of ruth can be defended from Simmons' objection.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.59-96
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• 2018

${\bot}$It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (${\perp}$). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ${\perp}$. It is, however, not the problem of the intuitionistic approaches to the liar-type paradoxes but the lack of expressive power of the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system. We introduce a meta-level negation, ⊬$_s$, for a given system S and a meta-level absurdity, ⋏, to the intuitionistic system. We shall show that in the system, the inference to ${\perp}$ is not given without the assumption that the system is complete. Moreover, we consider the Double Meta-Level Negation Elimination rules (DMNE) which implicitly assume the completeness of the system. Then, the restriction of DMNE can rule out the inference to ${\perp}$.

• Publications of The Korean Astronomical Society
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.1-7
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• 1992

We may consider the following three fundamental epistemological questions concerning cosmology. Can cosmology at last understand the origin of the universe? Can computers at last create? Can life be formed at last synthetically? These questions are in some sense related to the liar paradox containing the self-reference and, therefore. may not be answered by recursive processes in finite time. There are, however. various implications such that the chaos may break the trap of the self-reference paradox. In other words, Goedel's incompleteness theorem would not apply to chaos, even if the chaos can be generated by recursive processes. Internal relations among cosmology, epistemology and chaos must be investigated in greater detail.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.233-253
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• 2014

The Pinocchio paradox that Eldridge-Smith suggested is a version of the semantic paradox. But it is unique in the sense that this paradox does not contain a semantic predicate. Tarski's solution which appeals to the hierarchy of language and Kripke's para-completeness which accepts the third truth value cannot solve the Pinocchio paradox. This paper argues that Eldridge-Smith's trial to criticize semantical dialetheism is not successful and that the paradox implies the rule of the truth predicate is inconsistent. That is, the proper diagnosis to this paradox is that the Pinocchio principle should be considered to be potentially inconsistent, which suggests that semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise because the rule of the truth-predicate is inconsistent. The Pinocchio paradox teaches us that consistent view of truth cannot be successful to solve the semantic paradoxes and that we should accept the inconsistent view of truth.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.381-406
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• 2013

This paper deals with the question whether the para-completeness theory of Kripkian style can avoid the revenge problem. According to the para-completeness theory, there are some sentences that are neither true nor false. And the liar sentence is the exemplar of such sentences. But the para-completeness theory has been criticised to give rise to the revenge problem, since Kripke suggested his theory. Maudlin argues that he can construct the para-completeness theory which avoids the problem by appealing to his foundationalist semantics. The aim of this paper shows that the para-completeness theory, including Maudlin's, cannot avoid the problem. Furthermore, it is argued that Maudlin's view is ad hoc suggestion just to avoid the problem.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.20
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• pp.95-123
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• 2009

This paper is designed to show the relationship between the Daesoon Principle and the recent theories like transpersonal psychology(TP) and predicate logic. According to TP there are 3 categories and 8 elements inside of not only human consciousness but civilization; three are pre-ego, ego, trans-ego, and eight are Uroboros, Typhon, Greater Mother, solarization, and repetition of the previous fours. The former is called, for Ken Wilber, the Average mode and the latter, the Advanced mode. I think that Daesoon thought including general Korean National religions belongs to the Advanced mode. I applied the predicate logic or paradoxical logic to understand of the Harmony of God and Man as well as Correspondence of Yin with Yang. The paradoxical logic has been not acceptable through two thousands years in the western tradition. I call the paradoxical logic the E type logic in this paper. The E type logic is most suitable logic for apprehending the Daesoon philosophy to a large extent. Finally my paper may contribute to the globalization of Daesoon mind system.