Browse > Article

Liar-Type Paradoxes and Intuitionistic Natural Deduction Systems  

Choi, Seungrak (Department of Philosophy, Korea University)
Publication Information
Korean Journal of Logic / v.21, no.1, 2018 , pp. 59-96 More about this Journal
Abstract
${\bot}$It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (${\perp}$). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ${\perp}$. It is, however, not the problem of the intuitionistic approaches to the liar-type paradoxes but the lack of expressive power of the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system. We introduce a meta-level negation, ⊬$_s$, for a given system S and a meta-level absurdity, ⋏, to the intuitionistic system. We shall show that in the system, the inference to ${\perp}$ is not given without the assumption that the system is complete. Moreover, we consider the Double Meta-Level Negation Elimination rules (DMNE) which implicitly assume the completeness of the system. Then, the restriction of DMNE can rule out the inference to ${\perp}$.
Keywords
Liar paradox; Strengthened liar paradox; Revenge liar; Natural deduction; Double negation elimination; Intuitionistic logic;
Citations & Related Records
Times Cited By KSCI : 1  (Citation Analysis)
연도 인용수 순위
1 Brady, R. T. (1984), "Reply to Priest on Berry's Paradox", The Philosophical Quarterly. 34(135), pp. 157-163.   DOI
2 Choi, S. (2017), "Can Godel's Incompleteness Theorem be a Ground for Dialetheism?", Korean Journal of Logic. 20(2), pp. 241-271.
3 Dummett, M. (1973), "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic", In M. Dummett (Ed.), Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 215-247.
4 Dummett, M. (1991), Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Havard University Press.
5 Dummett, M. (1993), The Seas of Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6 Field, H. (2008), Saving Truth from Paradox, New York: Oxford University Press.
7 Gentzen, G. (1935), "Investigations concerning logical deduction", In M. E. Szabo (Eds.), The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, Amsterdam and London:North-Holland, pp. 68-131.
8 Prawitz, D. (1965), Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study, Dover Publications.
9 Prawitz, D. (2007), "Pragmatist and verificationist theories of meaning", In Randall E. Auxier, Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, Open Court, pp. 455-481.
10 Prawitz, D. (2016), "On the relation between Heyting's and Gentzen's approaches to meaning", In T. Piecha and P. Schroeder-Heister (Eds.), Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Springer International Publishing, pp. 5-25.
11 Priest, G. (1983), "The logical paradoxes and the law of excluded middle", The Philosophical Quarterly, 33(131), pp. 160-165.   DOI
12 Priest, G. (2006), In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, (expanded ed.) Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
13 Sainsbury, R. M. (2009), Paradoxes, (3rd ed.) Cambridge University Press.
14 Stalmarck, G. (1991), "Normalization Theorems for Full First Order Classical Natural Deduction", The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 56(1), pp. 129-149.   DOI
15 Tennant, N. (1982), "Proof and Paradox", Dialectica, 36, pp. 265-296.   DOI
16 Tennant, N. (1999), "Negation, absurdity, and contrariety", In Gabbay and H.Wansing (eds.), What is Negation?, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, pp. 199-222.
17 Tennant, N. (1995), "On Paradox without Self-Reference", Analysis, 55, pp. 199-207.   DOI
18 Tennant, N. (1997), The Taming of the True, Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
19 Tennant, N. (2017), Core Logic, Oxford University Press.
20 Williamson, T. (1998), "Indefinitely Extensible", Grazer Philosophische Studien. 55, pp. 1-24.