• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.37
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• pp.133-158
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• 2008

The purpose of this article is to examine the "Annulment" of ICSID Arbitration Award. Most of the international conventions provide for arbitration as the preferred method of dispute settlement. In general they either provide for ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules or under the rules of an acceptable arbitration institution, e.g. ICC, AAA, LCIA and in particular ICSID. The most distinctive feature of ICSID arbitration is the self-contained and exhaustive nature of its review procedures. Unlike other arbitration regimes, control is exercised by internal procedures rather than by the courts. Remedies against the award are limited to those provided for in the Convention and do not include court involvement. Especially, the annulment of the ICSID award by an ad hoc committee must be considered as jeopardizing ICSID Arbitration because it clearly depart from the current trends of international commercial arbitration which limits any kinds of judicial review and excludes any kinds of review on the merits. I wish that the future decisions of the ad hoc committees will restore a narrow scope to the ICSID procedure of annulment in order not to endanger the ICSID Arbitration mechanism.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.3-26
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• 2018

This article examines whether parties may agree to contractually waive the right to bring annulment proceedings. Alternately it looks at whether certain grounds of annulment may be waived. The ability for parties to resolve this issue contractually by waiving this element of Article 52(1)(b) ICSID offers a potentially powerful solution. For parties to agree beforehand to the circumstances where tribunals have not 'manifestly exceeded their power' could allow them to remove the unpredictability of annulment on this foundation. Even in the event that an ad hoc committee is against the validity of waiver, it may be possible for a party to frame this restriction as an interpretative agreement by the parties rather than strictly as waiver of a ground of annulment. Ultimately, the wish to enter into such an agreement would likely only be driven by a few exceptional commercial need or prior negative experience with the remedy of annulment. In that cases, and depending on the nature of the specific concern with annulment, a limited waiver or interpretative agreement on certain Article 52(1) ICSID grounds may certainly be appropriate.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.68
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• pp.65-87
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• 2015

This article examines the Stay of Enforcement of ICSID Arbitration Award. The effect of the stay is that the award is not subject to enforcement proceedings under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention pending the outcome of the annulment application. The annulment committee must decide the stay, unless the applicant sought the stay with the request for annulment, in which case the ICSID Secretary -General must grant it automatically. This automatic stay -which can only relate to the entire award-remains in force until the committee is constituted and issues a decision on the request for stay. ICSID committees have taken different positions on whether a stay of enforcement is exceptional or not. Some committees have held that because the ICSID Convention explicitly recognizes that the rights of the award creditor could be subject to a stay, stays are not exceptional. ICSID practice shows that most committees have rejected the proposition that the merits and prospects of the application for annulment should influence the committee's decision whether to grant a stay. In addition, ICSID practice regarding the specific circumstances that will justify a stay of enforcement is unclear, and committees have focused on different factors to decide whether to grant a stay such as prospect of prompt compliance with the ward, hardship to one of the parties, risk of non-recovery and irreparable harm to the award debtor. Also, ICSID practice shows that even though the Convention is silent on this issue, committees have generally held that they are empowered to condition the stay of enforcement on the granting of security by the requesting party.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.69
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• pp.543-566
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• 2016

This article examines the Annulment Procedure of ICSID Arbitration Award. Although the ICSID annulment procedure is not substantially different from arbitration procedure, it does have certain unique features. Article 52 of the Convention provides that the application for annulment must be made within 120days after the date on which the award was rendered. ICSID Arbitration Rule 50, in turn, stipulates that a request for annulment of a award must: i)be addressed in writing to the Secretary-General; ii)identify the award to which it relates; iii)indicated the date of the application; and iv)state in detail the grounds for annulment on which it is based. The grounds for annulment are limited to those in Article 52(1) of the Convention. With respect to the possibility of waiving the right to annulment in advance, commentators are divided. Some authors admit the possibility of agreements eliminating the right to request annulment. Other authors, instead, have taken the position that parties cannot waive their right to annulment in advanced because no provision in the Convention allows the parties to do so, and thus the right to request annulment is inalienable. In accordance with Article 52(4), annulment decisions must comply with the requirements for awards stipulated in Article 48. Therefore; i)the committee decide questions by majority; ii)the decision must be in writing and must be signed by the members of the committee who voted for it; iii)any member of the committee may attach his individual opinion to the award; and iv)ICSID must not publish the decision without the consent of the parties. Finally, under Article 52(4), parties are not allowed to request the interpretation, revision, or annulment of a decision on annulment. Even if the committee allegedly manifestly exceeded its powers or engaged in any conduct sanctioned by Article 52(1), the parties cannot request the annulment of the decision on annulment.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.3-22
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• 2021

This article examines the Challenge through Annulment of ICSID Arbitral Awards. Either party may request annulment of the award by applying in writing addressed to the ICSID Secretary-General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The annulment proceedings must focus on the award itself. Because committees have no inherent supremacy over the arbitral tribunal, they should not review the tribunal's findings on evidence, damage, interest, and cost findings. Otherwise, the parties would have, in effect, two opportunities, and that will almost certainly weaken the reliability of the entire ICSID system. In short, because of the limited scope of review under ICSID annulment and because annulment is not an opportunity for the parties to re-try the case, committees should not allow new arguments or new evidence. Since an annulment committee is not a court of appeals, it cannot create a new res judicata. Committees can only decide not to annul an award, thus confirming the existing res judicata or annul the award, in which case the affected decision ceases to be res judicata. An obvious annulment decision stipulating which particular findings of the award remain res judicata should prevent any uncertainty in resubmission proceedings.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.3-28
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• 2014

This article examines the Annulment Mechanism of arbitral awards rendered under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The primary feature in the ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration regarding the review of awards involves the unified nature of the ICSID system, as compared to the scattered and multi-layered system of review existing under arbitration rules, national legislation, and international convention. This unity can be perceived at different levels. The ICSID annulment mechanism entails only a set of rules; thus, only one set of application standards of review will be implemented, as opposed to sometimes conflicting layers of application rules, laws, and convention, as in the case of non-ICSID arbitration. However, some of the recent annulment decisions have raised serious questions about the breadth of annulment in practice, as opposed to its original design. Nonetheless, implementing a new system under the ICSID awards to be reviewed by an appellate court appears to create more problems than it solves. The potential impact of introducing that mechanism could result in a longer and more complex proceeding, with uncertain benefits.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.37-57
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• 2017

On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.