• 통상정보연구
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.409-431
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• 2012

본 연구는 미국과의 FTA에서 이의 비준과 관련하여 찬반 양쪽으로 첨예한 의견이 대립되는 ISDS에 관한 연구를 통하여 우리나라가 취할 수 있는 입장에 대하여 분석하였다. 이를 위하여 특별히 ICSID에 서명은 하였으나 인준을 하지 않은 국가 중, 캐나다와 호주의 사례를 중심으로 분석하였다. NAFTA에 의하여 미국과 멕시코를 포함하는 자유무역협정을 체결하고 있음에도 ICSID 협정을 인준하지 않고 있으며, 호주 또한 ICSID 협정을 거부하고 있다. 이러한 두 국가가 ICSID를 거부하고 있는 사유를 우리나라 역시 ICSID를 거부하여야 하는 문제점으로 제시하고 있는 실정임으로 양국의 입장을 분석하고 우리나라의 실정에 적용해 봄은 학술적으로 의미가 있다고 할 수 있을 것이다. 이에 본 연구는 캐나다와 호주의 ICSID 비인준 입장을 분석하고 이와 ICSID를 바탕으로 한미 FTA에서의 ISDS 문제를 논의하며, 국가간 분쟁과 ISDS의 의미를 재고하여 결론을 제시하도록 한다.

• 무역학회지
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• 제42권4호
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• pp.139-157
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• 2017

투자협정상의 MFN 조항을 실체적인 규정 외에 절차적인 규정에까지 적용할 수 있는지에 대한 논의는 보호 범위를 결정하기 때문에 중요한 의의를 가진다. 그러나 투자협정마다 MFN 조항에서 대우의 범위를 조금씩 상이하게 규정하고 있어 이에 대한 해석의 차이가 존재한다. 그러므로 본 연구는 ICSID에서 판정한 중재사례에 초점을 맞추어 국제투자분쟁에서 외국인투자자가 원 투자협정상의 MFN 조항을 통하여 다른 투자협정상에 규정된 분쟁해결절차를 원용할 수 있는지를 분석함으로써 MFN 조항의 적용범위를 획정할 수 있는 기준들을 도출하여 유용한 시사점 및 실무적인 지침을 제시하고자 한다.

• 무역학회지
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• 제41권5호
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• pp.305-323
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• 2016

투자계약이 투자협정의 보호를 받을 수 있도록 규정하는 포괄적 보호조항은 투자계약상의 이행의무를 투자협정국간의 구체적인 합의로 명시하며 투자보호를 강화하는 역할을 한다. 그러나 대부분의 투자협정에 규정되어 있는 포괄적 보호조항은 그 적용범위와 관련하여 확립된 기준이 없어 논란한 여지가 많다. 포괄적 보호조항은 그 적용범위에 따라 투자의 보호 범위를 확장하거나 축소할 수 있기 때문에 중요한 의의를 가진다. 그러므로 본 연구는 포괄적 보호조항의 적용범위와 관련하여 ICSID 중재사례에 초점을 맞추어 이를 분석하고자 한다. 그리고 이러한 사례분석을 통하여 포괄적 보호조항의 적용범위를 획정할 수 있는 기준들을 유추하여 실무적인 지침을 마련하고자 한다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.29-53
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• 2013

Chinese ISD has been changed a lot since the reformation policy in 1978 and it is expected that China will present a changed attitude toward its advantage as its industrialization continues to advance. This study generally examines the ISD in BIT and also considers not only the attitude of China with regard to ISD but also the changes on the Chinese side. Moreover, this study determines the areas on which the Chinese government focuses. In order to conduct this study, the author attempts to classify the attitudes on ISD into chronical change and treaty powers based on the analysis of BIT. In addition, the paper examines the main contents of ISD in BIT which previously involved an agreement such as arbitral institution, arbitral range, counter-measures of local country, standard for admitting the nationality of corporate investors, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral award. Based on analysis, this paper mentions matters that require attention and caution in the Korea-China FTA as regards investment negotiation, and also suggests instructions for investors who may face dispute with the Chinese government.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권2호
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• pp.71-96
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• 2015

This paper deals with the annulment of the ICSID(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) arbitral award. The annulment of the ICSID is characterized by the fact that it can be made possible through the special committee of ICSID only. The annulment of the ICSID was constructed on the premise that it is not an appeal procedure. However in the initial period, it was strongly criticized as it allowed new trials or duplicated many of the functions of an appeal and it broke down the boundary between the two systems. Although the trend seemed to be corrected through its 2nd and 3rd generations, it was still criticized for functioning as a new trial. It is approaching its 4th generation. On the other hand, with the activation of investment agreement arbitration based on ICSID and FTA, a certain degree of consistency is required for the ICSID arbitralaward. Also, with the emphasis on the public features of the arbitration for the investment agreement, the necessity of an appeal system is presented. The ICSID Secretariat published the "Opinion on the Appeal Procedure" in 2004 but as the system was criticized as too early due to the cost allocation problem and others, its adoption of an appeal procedure has been delayed. This paper focuses on how the currently incomplete ICSID arbitration judgment annulment system shall be used. Although it is still hardto expect the quality and consistent arbitral award annulment in the ICSID, this paper suggests that the "annulment without the actual new trial" using the restricted authority of a special commission in a creative way shall be pursued rather than just the actual new trial with or without annulment, thus going back to the original concept of the ICSID arbitral award annulment.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제29권1호
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• pp.31-52
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• 2019

As international transactions have grown more numerous, situations of disputes related to the transactions are getting more complicated and more diverse. Cost-effective remedies to settle the disputes through traditional methods such as adjudications of a court will be insufficient. There fore, nations are attempting to more efficiently solve investor-state disputes through arbitration under organizations such as the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additionary Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by including the provisions on investor-state dispute settlement at the conclusion of an investment agreement. In case of an arbitration under the ICSID Convention, ICSID directly exercises the supervisorial function on arbitral proceedings, and there is no room for the intervention of national courts. In time of the arbitration where the ICSID Convention does not apply, however, the courts have to facilitate the arbitral proceedings. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention are guaranteed by the Convention, it should be considered that the New York Convention does not apply to them under the Convention Article 7 (1) fore-end. In exceptional cases in which an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention cannot be recognized or enforced by the Convention, the New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement because the award is not a domestic award of the country in which the recognition or enforcement is sought. It is up to an interpretation of the New York Convention whether the New York Convention applies to ISDS arbitral awards not based on the ICSID Convention or not. Although an act of the host country is about sovereign activities, a host country and the country an investor is in concurring to the investment agreement with the ISDS provisions is considered a surrender of sovereignty immunity, and it will not suffice to exclude the investment disputes from the scope of application of the New York Convention. If the party to the investment agreement has declared commercial reservation at its accession into the New York Convention, it should be viewed that the Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of the ISDS awards to settle the disputes over an investitive act, inasmuch as the act will be considered as a commercial transaction. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on investment disputes about a nation's sovereign act have been sought in Korea and Korea has been designated the place of the investment agreement arbitration as a third country, it should be reviewed whether the disputes receive arbitrability under the Korean Arbitration Act or not.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제34권2호
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• pp.27-44
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• 2024

The lack of consistency and predictability of arbitral awards in the Investor-State Dispute Settlement ("ISDS") mechanism has long been a subject of criticism. In international investment disputes, arbitral tribunals have frequently come up with different interpretations and results on similar investment agreement provisions. The arbitral tribunal's inconsistent decisions raised concerns not only among the parties to the investment dispute but also amongthe arbitral tribunals in other cases, which ultimately led to legal inconsistencies in international investment law. Arbitration awards may have some degree of disagreement in interpretation. However, the systemic inconsistencies that pervade ISDS risk undermining the purpose of the investment agreement system, which is to provide a predictable and stable framework to protect andpromote foreign investment while maintaining a balance with host state regulations. Therefore, this study proposes a plan to resolve this discrepancy and review standards for practical application. Reform of the ISDS mechanism could be a viable option to reduce, to some extent, the inconsistencies in interpretation, if not completely eliminate them. Reforms such as establishingguidelines, promoting cooperation between arbitral tribunals, and codifying the norms of the agreement can provide a means of reducing interpretive inconsistencies and strengthening the legitimacy of the ISDS mechanism. Reforming the ISDS mechanism will require all stakeholders to carefully consider the issues and the scope, nature, and feasibility of eachpotential reform.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.141-165
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• 2007

This study aims to make a contribution to the promotion of trade and economic development of South Korea, and, at the same time, call attention to the increasing trend of investment agreements concluded within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) by examining theoretically FTAs and dispute resolution and investigating systematically the conclusion procedure of agreements, and the system, institutions, and jurisdiction of dispute resolution, and presenting these findings to the government and investors involved. The most problematic aspect in the legal process of arbitration involving disputes over investment is that of arguments concerning the right of jurisdiction. When a dispute arises, even though an investor files for arbitration at an ICSID institution, the parties become involved in another energy-consuming argument even before proceeding to the hearing and decision of the original plan in cases in which the respondent of the dispute files an objection to the decision rights of the arbitral tribunal. As the main basis for this type of plea, the point of non-existence of jurisdiction is first raised where the applicable dispute does not fall under the range of investments defined in individual investment contracts or investment agreements such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). To avoid an open-ended definition of investment for the range of investments, articles concerning investments in the FTA and NAFTA between Canada and the USA adopt the limited closed-list method. Article 96 of the FTA between Japan and Mexico applied the same abovementioned method of limited form of definition regarding range of investments and concluded BITs between member countries of APEC applied a similar method as well. Instead of employing the previously used inclusive definition, the BITs concluded between countries of Latin America and the USA are equipped with limited characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, to correspond with this necessary condition the three following requirements are needed : 1) fixed investment funding; 2) expected profits resulting from such investments; 3) and the existence of fixed risk bearing.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권1호
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• pp.65-86
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• 2015

Under current international investment law clear criteria to determine standards of indirect expropriation are absent. Arbitral tribunals determine on a case-by-case whether an indirect expropriation has occurred by conducting a fact-based inquiry. However, three common determination standards can be inferred by analyzing prior arbitration cases. The appropriate analytical framework that can be applied to determine whether a state's measure constitutes an indirect expropriation is as follows. i) the degree of economic invasion of the state's action into the foreign investor's property rights and durability of the period, ii) interference with the foreign investor's distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and iii) the nature, purpose and character of the state's measure. Therefore, it is necessary to fully acknowledge and to utilize strategically this determination standard. However, derived standards cannot be applied to all disputes en masse. So, it is desirable to exclude ambiguity and to clearly define the determination standard of indirect expropriation in investment agreements, since arbitral tribunals can apply different determination standards on a case-by-case basis. And, based on the discussions until now, more developed standards and direction in response to demand should be established through consistent analysis and review of precedents related to indirect expropriation. Lastly, This study is expected to be a useful guideline to prepare a necessary countermeasure to prevent dispute related to indirect expropriation beforehand or in case of dispute occurrence.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제38권
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• pp.181-226
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.