• Title/Summary/Keyword: ICSID

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A Study on the Binding Power of Interim Measures and the Effect of Interim Measure Non-Compliance in ICSID Arbitration (ICSID 중재의 임시적 처분 구속력과 미준수 효과에 관한 연구)

  • Ha, Hyun-Soo
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.30 no.2
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    • pp.3-21
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    • 2020
  • This study focuses on the binding power of the interim measures of the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration and the effects of non-compliance. Upon consideration of the intentions of those who made these rules, given the interpretation of the provisions of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Article 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, it was found reasonable to consider that the interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration were not binding. However, in actual ICSID arbitration, most arbitral tribunals approve the binding power of the interim measures based on the purposes and the characteristics of the interim measures. As such, there is a certain distance between the legislative intention for interim measures in ICSID arbitration and the judicial practice, but considering the demand for maintaining the integrity of the arbitration procedure, it is reasonable to consider that the interim measures are binding. In addition, the fact that the interim measures have binding power can increase the possibility that the party will comply with the interim measures. Thus, the binding power of interim measures not only encourages voluntary compliance to the interim measures of the party, but can also cause negative consequences for the party if it is not met. In other words, the arbitral tribunal will be able to form negative inferences against the party who does not comply with it in a procedural side, and in the practical side, the party who does not comply with the interim measures will be compensated for the additional damages for non-compliance.

Comments on the ICSID Award Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China (안성주택과 중국의 ICSID 중재사건에 관한 사례연구)

  • Kang, Pyoung-Keun
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.27 no.2
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    • pp.37-57
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    • 2017
  • On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.

A Study on the Annulment Procedure of ICSID Arbitral Awards (ICSID 중재판정의 '취소절차'에 관한 고찰)

  • KIM, Yong-Il
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.69
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    • pp.543-566
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    • 2016
  • This article examines the Annulment Procedure of ICSID Arbitration Award. Although the ICSID annulment procedure is not substantially different from arbitration procedure, it does have certain unique features. Article 52 of the Convention provides that the application for annulment must be made within 120days after the date on which the award was rendered. ICSID Arbitration Rule 50, in turn, stipulates that a request for annulment of a award must: i)be addressed in writing to the Secretary-General; ii)identify the award to which it relates; iii)indicated the date of the application; and iv)state in detail the grounds for annulment on which it is based. The grounds for annulment are limited to those in Article 52(1) of the Convention. With respect to the possibility of waiving the right to annulment in advance, commentators are divided. Some authors admit the possibility of agreements eliminating the right to request annulment. Other authors, instead, have taken the position that parties cannot waive their right to annulment in advanced because no provision in the Convention allows the parties to do so, and thus the right to request annulment is inalienable. In accordance with Article 52(4), annulment decisions must comply with the requirements for awards stipulated in Article 48. Therefore; i)the committee decide questions by majority; ii)the decision must be in writing and must be signed by the members of the committee who voted for it; iii)any member of the committee may attach his individual opinion to the award; and iv)ICSID must not publish the decision without the consent of the parties. Finally, under Article 52(4), parties are not allowed to request the interpretation, revision, or annulment of a decision on annulment. Even if the committee allegedly manifestly exceeded its powers or engaged in any conduct sanctioned by Article 52(1), the parties cannot request the annulment of the decision on annulment.

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A Study on Settlement of Investment Disputes under ICSID Mechanism (ICSID의 투자분쟁 해결구조에 관한 고찰)

  • 김상호
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.13 no.2
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    • pp.123-156
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    • 2004
  • Settlement of investment disputes is quite different from that of commercial disputes arising from ordinary commercial transactions in view of disputing parties, applicable laws and rules, etc.. Therefore, it is very important to consider the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States(Washington Convention) of 1965. The creation of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID), which was established under the Washington Convention, was the belief that an institution specially designed to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors could help to promote increased flows of international investment. Pursuant to the Washington Convention, ICSID provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries. Recourse to ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once the parties have consented to arbitration under the Washington Convention, neither can unilaterally withdraw its consent. Moreover, all Contracting States of the Washington Convention are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards. Provisions on ICSID arbitration are commonly found in investment contracts between governments of member countries and investors from other member countries. Advance consents by governments to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration can also be found in many bilateral investment treaties including the Korea-China Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments(1992), the Korea-Japan Agreement for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment(2003) and the Korea-Chile FTA, the latter was signed as of February 15, 2003 and is still pending in the National Assembly for its ratification. Arbitration under the auspices of ICSID is similarly one of the main mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes under the bilateral treaties on investment. Therefore, it is a problem of vital importance that Korean parties interested in investment to foreign countries should understand and cope with the settlement mechanism of investment disputes under the Washington Convention and bilateral investment treaties.

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A Comparative Study on Certain Procedural Issues of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitrations (ICSID중재와 UNCITRAL중재의 중재절차에 관한 비교연구)

  • Seo, Kyeong
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.43
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    • pp.481-507
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    • 2009
  • Along with continuous increase in international investments encouraged by wide spread bilateral investment treaties (BIT) including free trade agreements (FTA), international investment disputes have been also increasing. This means that a host State, an importer of foreign investments, and a investor who exports its investment to foreign State, need to take measures to prevent international disputes arising from international investment or to prepare for the arbitration for resolving the disputes. Under these circumstances, this paper compares ICSID arbitration rules and UNCITRAL arbitration rules in respect of (i) the institution of arbitration, (ii) the appointment of arbitrators and the composition of arbitral tribunal, and (iii) the procedures for, and the form of, arbitral awards. On base of this comparison, this paper further suggests certain practical issues that the host State's government and the foreign investors should be aware of in order to be ready for the resolutions of disputes by ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitrations.

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Substantive and Procedural Issues of the Lone Star Case With a Focus on the ICSID Arbitral Award (론스타 사건에 대한 실체적 및 절차적 쟁점 분석 - ICSID 중재판정을 중심으로)

  • Sok Young CHANG
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.33 no.1
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    • pp.23-49
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    • 2023
  • An ICSID award on Lone Star case has been rendered finally on August 31st, 2022 after almost ten years since the Lone Star Funds submitted the request for arbitration against the Republic of Korea in 2012. The Lone Star case is the first investor-state dispute settlement(ISDS) case brought against Korea, and this case, also known as "eat and run" case, has given rise to heated debates for years. Moreover, as the ICSID tribunal has ordered Korea to pay the Lone Star Funds the sum of USD 216.5 million plus interest in the award, this case has become once again the subject of controversy. Any arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in dispute have not been disclosed until recently, however, as the memorials and the award are now open to the public, it has become possible to realize the assertions of each party and the decisions of the tribunal in detail. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the main issues of the Lone Star case with a focus on the ICSID award. By examining the substantive and procedural issues of the case one after the other, it might be able to understand the whole picture of the case and prepare for the remaining procedures of this case and other upcoming cases as well.

A Study on the Application of the New York Convention in the Recognition and Enforcement of ISDS Arbitral Awards (투자협정중재에 의한 중재판정의 승인·집행에 대한 뉴욕협약 적용에 관한 고찰)

  • Kang, Soo Mi
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.29 no.1
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    • pp.31-52
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    • 2019
  • As international transactions have grown more numerous, situations of disputes related to the transactions are getting more complicated and more diverse. Cost-effective remedies to settle the disputes through traditional methods such as adjudications of a court will be insufficient. There fore, nations are attempting to more efficiently solve investor-state disputes through arbitration under organizations such as the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additionary Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by including the provisions on investor-state dispute settlement at the conclusion of an investment agreement. In case of an arbitration under the ICSID Convention, ICSID directly exercises the supervisorial function on arbitral proceedings, and there is no room for the intervention of national courts. In time of the arbitration where the ICSID Convention does not apply, however, the courts have to facilitate the arbitral proceedings. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention are guaranteed by the Convention, it should be considered that the New York Convention does not apply to them under the Convention Article 7 (1) fore-end. In exceptional cases in which an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention cannot be recognized or enforced by the Convention, the New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement because the award is not a domestic award of the country in which the recognition or enforcement is sought. It is up to an interpretation of the New York Convention whether the New York Convention applies to ISDS arbitral awards not based on the ICSID Convention or not. Although an act of the host country is about sovereign activities, a host country and the country an investor is in concurring to the investment agreement with the ISDS provisions is considered a surrender of sovereignty immunity, and it will not suffice to exclude the investment disputes from the scope of application of the New York Convention. If the party to the investment agreement has declared commercial reservation at its accession into the New York Convention, it should be viewed that the Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of the ISDS awards to settle the disputes over an investitive act, inasmuch as the act will be considered as a commercial transaction. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on investment disputes about a nation's sovereign act have been sought in Korea and Korea has been designated the place of the investment agreement arbitration as a third country, it should be reviewed whether the disputes receive arbitrability under the Korean Arbitration Act or not.

The International Arbitration System for the Settlement of Investor-State Disputes in the FTA (FTA(자유무역협정)에서 투자자 대 국가간 분쟁해결을 위한 국제중재제도)

  • Lee, Kang-Bin
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.38
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    • pp.181-226
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    • 2008
  • The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.

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The Formation and Ratification of ISDS in International FTA and Its Characteristics -with a special emphasis on KORUS FTA, NAFTA & AUSFTA- (국제자유무역협약에서 ISDS의 생성과 비준에 관한 연구 -KORUS FTA, NAFTA 및 AUSFTA를 중심으로-)

  • Hahn, Jae-Phil
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.409-431
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    • 2012
  • This article deals with the nature of ISDS along with the admissibility thereof, for the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. ICSID as an organization of World Bank Group, has been established in 1966 and as of May in 2011, 157 nations ratified its convention. As for the Republic of Korea(ROK) it has been involved in the problematic situation with regard to ISDS of the KORUS FTA in negotiation with the United States. The ruling Grand National Party is pushing the FTA for ratification including ISDS. However, the opposition party, the Unified Democratic Party rejected the ISDS with a view to a toxin infringing on its judiciary sovereignty. The ROK has invested in the US 3.5 times more than the US did in Korea up to now. As a result, it seems that the ROK is more concerned about ISDS than the US is, considering that exhausting local remedy through the US local courts, applying even a municipal ordinance in their decisions which will be unsatisfactory toward the ROK side. The ROK is now struggling with the ISDS as a political issue between the ruling party and the opposition party mostly based on sovereignty with a reference on AUSFTA which excluded the ISDS. Australian model about ISDS has been impacted by the experience from the NAFTA which allowes direct claims against each other(the US against Canada and Canada against the US). It seems not to be much sympathy for developed countries because it has long been held to standards for pressing on developing countries. Australia is also struggling with ISDS from the political point of view likewise the ROK. And the ISDS is destined to the political situations established within the domestic countries among the political parties in relation with the acceptance or rejection of thereof.

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A Study on the Jurisdiction Ratione Personae of ICSID Arbitration (ICSID 중재의 인적 관할에 관한 연구)

  • Hwang, Ji-Hyeon;Jang, Eun-Hee
    • Korea Trade Review
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    • v.44 no.2
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    • pp.95-107
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    • 2019
  • The ICSID arbitral tribunal shall determine the suitability of investors in accordance with the Article 25 of the ICSID convention and the investment or investor's provisions under the BIT. The eligibility of investors has an important role in establishing jurisdiction under international investment disputes. Therefore, this study draws implications on issues related to investor qualification, focusing on ICSID arbitration. The investor's nationality shall be taken into consideration in determining whether the investor is eligible. The criteria for determining the nationality of a corporate investor include the place of incorporation, main business location, and substantial ownership or control. The criterion of the place of incorporation that is used in a number of BIT have the problem of protecting investors from third countries not involved in the BIT. So, in recent years it is stipulated that the actual economic activity or the main business location as well as the place of incorporation criteria. And this problem is complemented by the denial of benefit clause. When determining whether a local corporation is controlled by foreigner in the host state it considers the shareholding rate, voting rights, and the exercise of managerial rights. There is a tendency to recognize shareholder's right to petition. Thus the same damage should not cause problems such as duplicate repayment or double reimbursement between the shareholders and the company. Unexpected problems can arise if the scope of investments and investors is broadly specified in the BIT. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the scope of investment to be protected.