• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.105-113
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• 2010

It takes quite amount of time to study a board game because there are many game characters and different stages are exist for board games. Also, the opponent is not just a single character that means it is not one on one game, but group vs. group. That is why strategy is needed, and therefore applying optimum learning is a must. If there were equal result that both are considered to be best ones during the course of learning stage, Heuristic which utilizes learning of problem area of Jul-Gonu was used to improve the speed of learning. To compare a normal character to an improved one, a jul-gonu game was created, and then they fought against each other. Improved character considered distance and attacked other one. As a result, improved character's ability was improved on learning speed.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.69-80
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• 2009

In this research, we analyze change of directions and issues in future game industry. We start to analyze change of game contents and platform about impact of game industry under the digital convergence, and then we spread out a point of view about game user, game company, distribution of game industry over the length and breadth of game industry. In this paper, we analyze the future state of changing and the issues in online game industry under the digital convergence. For this research, we develop the on-line game industry's changing scenario. On the basis of the issue analysis about the future of the On-line game industry, we aim to provide some implications for business strategy of on-line game companies and policy of the government.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.97 no.6
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• pp.669-679
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• 2008

Jirisan National Park was designated on December 29, 1967 as the first national park in Korea and that caused continuous conflicts between the violation of the right to hold property in this area due to several regulations following the designation and the nature preservation for the value of heritage for descendants. Thus, the objective of this study is to find a proposal for making decision based on the rationality that is able to solve these conflicts. To achieve the objective of this study, this study applies a game theory that supports a reasonable decision making process for solving these conflicts between interest groups around Jirisan National Park in which the component of this game consists of Jirisan National Park, residents, and interest groups. The Nash equilibrium obtained by the analysis of the strategy of interest groups for the use and preservation of forests and its rewards from the strategy as an nonecooperative game showed a behavior that chases their own benefits and causes lots of troubles. However, in the case of the results obtained from a cooperative game based on the strategy that includes some public interests accepted by interest groups and its rewards, it represented an aspect that solves conflicts through achieving a strategical set, which shows a win-win outcome even though the results of this cooperative game may present less rewards than that of the Nash equilibrium. Whereas, if there exists the public interests accepted by interest groups and truth for protecting such public interests, it is considered that it becomes a way that solves present structural troubles in the National Parks in Korea due to the fact that there exist uncertainties caused by the human rationality.

• Cartoon and Animation Studies
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• s.48
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• pp.249-269
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• 2017

Promotion and marketing, which are essential to lower the investment risk and maximize commercial profit in the video game market. Game developers and publishers set up public relations strategies to encourage potential consumers' needs. Considering characteristics of video game, the trailer, which is the animated image advertisement material, could occupy a key position in its promotion and marketing plan. Cinematic spectacles and attractive narratives are essential ingredients for game trailers, which are usually produced in 3D animation. Dead Island is an open world first person shooters (FPS) game released in 2011. When launched, it grabbed a great attention with a trailer, awarded the Golden Lion Prize for the best internet film at the Cannes Lions International Festival of Creativity. The game was a commercial success and several spin-offs were producted. In 2014, its publisher, Deep Silver showed the official trailer of Dead Island 2 at Electronic Entertainment Expo, the world's largest game show. Dead Island 2 was scheduled to be released in 2016, but has been now delayed until 2018. This study compares and analyzes two trailers of Dead Island 1 and Dead Island 2. We examine the narrative structure of the trailer for the sequel promotion of a successful game. The differences between the two could be useful for building a promotion strategy of other game series.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1988.10a
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• pp.3-3
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• 1988

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.27-36
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• 2018

In this paper, we propose a win-win network operating platform for mobile games. The characteristics of the service structure suggested is to form a marketing network that can influence the mobile game market by linking with the mobile game industry, and the excellent game content of the game developer in the industrial complex may not disappear. We also would like to propose a network operating platform that would help it enter the market area steadily. The proposed platform technology is used to distribute rapidly through a win-win network between game companies and publishers. When new games are commercialized, they can support continuous target marketing through various data indicators and analytics by the developed platform. In particular, G-Cross marketing strategy is considered to be a low-cost, high-efficiency marketing method in that it can provide users with information about new games by utilizing the given game infrastructure and utilize the user group possessed by each game company.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.631-641
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• 2011

We consider a history-dependent Parrondo game in which the winning probability of the present trial depends on the results of the last two trials in the past. When a fraction of an infinite number of players are allowed to choose between two fair Parrondo games at each turn, we compare the blind strategy such as a random sequence of choices with the short-range optimization strategy. In this paper, we show that the random sequence of choices yields a steady increase of average profit. However, if we choose the game that gives the higher expected profit at each turn, surprisingly we are not supposed to get a long-run positive profit for some parameter values.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.49 no.3
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• pp.49-65
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• 2018

The main purpose of this study is to explain fishery relation in the seas surrounding Korea and how the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), within game theory is applied to the region and suggest possible co-operative approaches in the region. The seas surrounding Korea are very productive fishing grounds with abundant fisheries resources because of the favourable marine environment, including its geographical features and physical oceanography. Nevertheless, Fishery relations among the coastal states in the region have been historically characterized by conflict rather than co-operation. Based on the PD game where there is always an incentive to do better by not co-operating, in order to ensure a share of the short-run benefits, fishing countries in the region have so far pursued the non-co-operative strategy of 'don't fish responsibly' rather than the co-operative strategy of 'fish responsibly'. Considering rapidly deteriorating situations in terms of fishery resources, regional co-operation among coastal states is urgently required to eliminate overfishing and increase fish stocks to sustainable levels. The West Sea/East China Sea and the East Sea, semi-enclosed seas, have unitary ecosystems, and many migratory fish species are shared between coastal states. Therefore, one countries' efforts alone cannot effectively manage and conserve the fishery resources and close co-operation among coastal states is required. The 1982 UN Convention and other international instruments emphasize the role of RFOs in managing and conserving capture fisheries and encourage states to establish Regional Fishery organizations (RFOs) or strengthen existing RFOs to facilitate conservation and management for fish stocks. Therefore, an international regime is worthy of serious consideration in that it provides fundamental advantages for the conservation of fish stocks for the fishery characteristic of the region.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.549-557
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• 2014

Recently, analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issues in field of game theory. In this paper, we observe a bargaining game using co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. In oder to model two artificial agents, we use a particle swarm optimization and a differential evolution. We investigate algorithm parameters for the best performance and observe that which strategy is better in the bargaining game under the co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. Experimental simulation results show that particle swarm optimization outperforms differential evolution in the bargaining game.

• International journal of advanced smart convergence
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.41-47
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• 2024

In this paper, we deal with a game theoretic problem to explore interactions between evasive Artificial Intelligence (AI) malware and detectors in Internet of Things (IoT). Evasive AI malware is defined as malware having capability of eluding detection by exploiting artificial intelligence such as machine learning and deep leaning. Detectors are defined as IoT devices participating in detection of evasive AI malware in IoT. They can be separated into two groups such that one group of detectors can be armed with detection capability powered by AI, the other group cannot be armed with it. Evasive AI malware can take three strategies of Non-attack, Non-AI attack, AI attack. To cope with these strategies of evasive AI malware, detector can adopt three strategies of Non-defense, Non-AI defense, AI defense. We formulate a Bayesian game theoretic model with these strategies employed by evasive AI malware and detector. We derive pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria in a single stage game from the formulated Bayesian game theoretic model. Our devised work is useful in the sense that it can be used as a basic game theoretic model for developing AI malware detection schemes.