• Korean System Dynamics Review
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.43-60
• /
• 2002

This paper describes the forecast of wholesale price in competitive Korean electricity market using the system dynamics approach. The system dynamics concepts have been implemented with the Ithink software. This software facilitates the development of stock and flow model with information feedback. Using this model, the future wholesale electricity price can be computed hour by hour, quarterly, and yearly. This model also gives the energy planner the opportunity to create different scenarios for the future of deregulated wholesale markets in Korea. Also It will lead to increased understanding of competitive wholesale market as a complex, dynamic system. Research results show that the plant construction appeared in waves of boom and bust in Korean electricity market like real estate construction. That is, the Korea wholesale market's new power plants and the market price will appear the Boom and Bust cycle. It is very similar behavior as real estate industry. In case of consideration of DSM program, The DSM savings lead to a somewhat different timing of the booms in construction and of price spikes. But the DSM programs do not eliminated the fundamental dynamics of the boom and bust. And the wholesale price is maintained at the lower level compared to the case of without DSM program. However, the unexpected result is found that due to the lower market price, Investor make significantly less investment in new CCs, which leads to the higher wholesale price after 2010. It suggests that the DSM Policy must be implemented with the dynamics of competitive Electricity Market.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.31 no.3
• /
• pp.367-391
• /
• 2022

We develop an energy-economy Bayesian DSGE model with the two sectors of electricity generations-traditional (fossil, nuclear) and renewable energy. Under imperfect substitutability between the two sectors, a technological shock on renewable energy sectors does not sufficient to facilitate energy conversion and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Technology innovation on greenhouse gas emission reduction is also required. More importantly, sufficient investment should be derived by a well-functioning electricity market where electricity price plays a signal role in efficient allocation of resources. Indeed, market rigidities cause reduced consumption.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
• /
• v.6 no.5
• /
• pp.627-638
• /
• 2008

With the shift of the electric power industry from a regulated monopoly structure to a competitive market environment, the focus of the transmission expansion planning has been moving from reliability-driven transmission expansion to market-based transmission expansion. In market-based transmission expansion, however, a growing demand for electricity, an increasing number of transmission bottlenecks, and the falling levels of transmission investment have created the need for an incentive to motivate investors. The expectation of profit serves as a motivational factor for market participants to invest in transmission expansion in a competitive market. To promote investment in transmission expansion, there is an increasing need for a systematic method to examine transmission expansion for investment incentives from multiple perspectives. In this paper, the transmission expansion problem in a competitive market environment is formulated from ISO and investors' perspectives. The proposed method uses parametric analysis to analyze benefits for investors to identify the most profitable location and amount for transmission addition. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.2 no.4
• /
• pp.494-499
• /
• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.58 no.8
• /
• pp.1496-1503
• /
• 2009

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. In order to fulfil the commitments of the countries in an economically efficient way, the UNFCCC adapted the emission trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol. If the UNFCCC's scheme is enforced in the country, considerable changes in electric power industry are expected due to the imposed greenhouse gas emission reduction. This paper proposes a game theoretic model of the case when generation companies participate in both competitive electricity market and emission market simultaneously. The model is designed such that generation companies select strategically between power quantity and greenhouse gas reduction to maximize their profits in both markets. Demand function and Environmental Welfare of emission trading market is proposed in this model. From the simulation results using the proposed model the impact of the emission trading on generation companies seems very severe in case that the emission prices are significantly high.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2006.07a
• /
• pp.398-399
• /
• 2006

The procurement of generation and transmission/Distribution capacity in vertically-integrated electric industry is sufficient by facility construction in suitable time. However, the introduction of competitive electricity market increase the efficiency of availability for facilities and fuels. As a result, long-term capacity procurement is required for stable demand-supply balance since it is expected to maintain their generation capacity at a minimum for profit maximization. In this paper, a new long-term capacity procurement mechanism is proposed, which is able to assure supplemental contribution in competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2003.07a
• /
• pp.624-626
• /
• 2003

Transmission pricing is one of important issues related to competitive electricity markets since rational pricing scheme ensures a fair competition between this market participants. Transmission pricing scheme is classified briefly into marginal cost pricing and embedded cost pricing. In economic efficiency, marginal cost pricing is more adequate for competitive electricity market. However, this pricing scheme requires revenue reconciliation since it cannot ensure full recovery of Transco's revenue requirements. This paper presents a new revenue reconciliation to maximize social welfare. For this analysis, this paper provides the results applied by various revenue reconciliation methodologies.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2003.05a
• /
• pp.255-263
• /
• 2003

A multi-agent system designed to represent newly deregulated electricity markets in the USA is aimed at testing the capability of the multi-agent model to replicate the observed price behavior in the wholesale market and developing a smart business intelligence which quickly searches the optimum offer strategy responding to the change in market environments. Simulation results show that the optimum offer strategy is to withhold expensive generating units and submit relatively low offers when demand is low, regardless of firm size; the optimum offer strategy during a period of high demand is either to withhold capacity or speculate for a large firm, while it is to be a price taker a small firm: all in all, the offer pattern observed in the market is close to the optimum strategy. From the firm's perspective, the demand-side participation as well as the intense competition dramatically reduces the chance of high excess profit.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.5A no.4
• /
• pp.311-321
• /
• 2005

A competitive generating company (GENCO) could maximize its payoff by optimizing its generation assets. This paper considers the GENCO's arbitrage problem using price-based unit commitment (PBUC). The GENCO could consider arbitrage opportunities in purchases from qualifying facilities (QFs) as well as simultaneous trades with spots markets for energy, ancillary services, emission, and fuel. Given forecasted hourly market prices for each market, the GENCO's generating asset arbitrage problem is formulated as a mixed integer program (MIP) and solved by a branch-and-cut algorithm. A GENCO with 54 thermal and 12 combined-cycle units is considered for analyzing the proposed formulation. The proposed case studies illustrate the significance of simultaneous arbitrage by applying PBUC to multi-commodity markets.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers P
• /
• v.57 no.2
• /
• pp.186-191
• /
• 2008

The conventional markets is badly damaged by a big fire because of no proper fire fighting management system. The cause of electricity fire is the aging and contact badness of electric equipment. The supervisory detecting system is needed to develop because the electric equipment is located to non visible and non exposing place. In this paper, we investigated the receiving and distributing board, the panel board and the fire prevention system of 17 domestic conventional markets. As a result of survey, capacity of distributing boards is mainly 600A and materials of distributing boards are synthetic resins 49%, metal 44%. ELB is mainly used as branch circuit breaker.