[KSCI] Korea Science Citation Index Service

http://dx.doi.org/10.5370/JEET.2007.2.4.494

A Linearized Transmission Model Based Market Equilibrium In Locational Pricing Environments

Joung, Man-Ho (Dept. of Electrical Computer Engineering, University of Texas at Austin)
Kim, Jin-Ho (Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungwon University)

Publication Information

Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology / v.2, no.4, 2007 , pp. 494-499 More about this Journal

Abstract

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

Keywords

Cournot competition; Deregulated electricity markets; Electricity market equilibrium model; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Power system network constraints;

Citations & Related Records

Reference

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