Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology

  • 제2권4호
  • /
  • Pages.494-499
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  • 2007
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  • 1975-0102(pISSN)
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  • 2093-7423(eISSN)
대한전기학회 (The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers)
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A Linearized Transmission Model Based Market Equilibrium In Locational Pricing Environments

  • Joung, Man-Ho (Dept. of Electrical Computer Engineering, University of Texas at Austin) ;
  • Kim, Jin-Ho (Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Kyungwon University)
  • 발행 : 2007.12.31
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초록

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

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참고문헌

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