• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.177-189
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• 2020

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in great peril. The Appellate Body has ceased to function last December as the United States has blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The focus of this study is on the examination of US's discontent on the Appellate Body and various efforts to reform the Appellate Body. In a recent report, the US Trade Representative raises its concerns on the Appellate Body including 90 days mandatory deadline, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, scope of appeal, advisory opinions, precedent, recommendation, and overreach without offering any viable solutions. Some of WTO members and experts proposed several Appellate Body reform measures but agreement between WTO members is unlikely in a foreseeable future. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms should be seriously considered such as interim appeal arbitration arrangements, separate dispute settlement mechanisms for trade remedies, unilateral retaliatory measures without WTO authorization. Rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system is imperative to small open economies like Korea. The Korean government should actively participate in Appellate Body reform discussions with other WTO members to keep the WTO dispute settlement system from collapsing.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.157-177
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• 2017

World Trade Organization(WTO) has 164 members since it has established on 1995. It plays a significant role in solving the world trade disputes. The process of the dispute settlement mechanism includes five steps: Negotiation, Establishment of experts group, Deliberation of appellate body, Execution and Supervision of Verdict and the Sanctions for Default. It suggested that the higher rate of developed countries using mechanism to solving the disputes than developing countries solving disputes by mechanism through the analysis of dispute of WTO members. Meanwhile, the more powerful economic entity is, the more trade dispute will be. There are several problems of mechanism by analysis the recently famous cases of trade disputes: Overburden of experts panel, Low utilization rate of the mechanism of developing countries, Lack of economic competition policy and labor standard terms and Unfulfillment of retaliatory measures of developing countries towards developed countries. This paper propose proper solutions and advises to improve mechanism of WTO dispute settlement.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.81-113
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• 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers remedies for non-compliance by the introduction of compensation or retaliation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). There are no the provisions under the WTO DSU and it seems unclear what retaliation is attempting to achieve. Therefore, it is unclear whether the goal of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance or to restore the balance between the rights and the obligations of WTO members. It has been claimed the WTO has a strong dispute settlement system by providing retaliation when the recommendations and rulings of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are not complied with. But this seems to be inadequate to bring about effective and timely compliance. Especially there is a problem with free riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is determined from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, providing an incentive to delay compliance. Also the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, according to DSU Article 22.4. However, if the member concerned objections to the level of the suspension proposed, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the nullification or impairment. The arbitrator makes an assessment standard of equivalence by comparing the suspension of concessions or other obligations and the nullification or impairment calculated in terms of the amount of trade. But it is necessary that other standards replace the quantitative standards when the level of the nullification or impairment cannot be quantified by concrete damages.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.31-69
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• 2018

This study examines the role of science in resolving trade disputes. After the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011 that not only jeopardized the people of Japan, but also put the safety of an entire region at risk, the Republic of Korea (Korea) has imposed import bans as well as increased testing and certification requirements for radioactive material on Japanese food products. Japan has challenged these restrictions at the World Trade Organizations Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This study aims to explain how international trade agreements and previous DSB rulings have dealt with different scientific viewpoints provided by confronting parties. In doing so, it will contrast the viewpoints espoused by Korean and Japanese representatives, and then analyzes the most similar case studies previously ruled on by the DSB, including the case of beef hormones and the case of genetically modified crops including biotech corn, both between the United States and the European Communities (EC). This study finds that science is largely subordinate to national interests in the case of state decision-making within the dispute settlement processes, and science has largely been relegated to a supportive role. Due to the ambiguity and lack of truly decisive decisions in the Appellate Body in science-based trade disputes, this study concludes that the Appellate Body avoids taking a firm scientific position in cases where science is still inconclusive in any capacity. Due to the panel's unwillingness to establish expert review boards as it has the power to do, instead favoring an individual-based system so that all viewpoints can be heard, it has also developed a system with its own unique weaknesses. Similar to any court of law in which each opposing party defends its own interests, each side brings whatever scientific evidence it can to defend its position, incentivizing them to disregard scientific conclusions unfavorable to their position. With so many questions that can arise, combined with the problems of evolving science, questions of risk, and social concerns in democratic society, it is no wonder that the panel views scientific information provided by the experts as secondary to the legal and procedural issues. Despite being ruled against the EC on legal issues in two previous cases, the EC essentially won both times because the panel did not address whether its science was correct or not. This failure to conclusively resolve a debate over whose science is more scientific enabled the EC to simply fix the procedural issues, while continuing to enforce trade restrictions based on their scientific evidence. Based on the analysis of the two cases of disputes, Korea may also find itself guilty of imposing an unwarranted moratorium on Japan's fish exports, only to subsequently pass new restrictions on labelling and certification requirements because Japan may have much scientific evidence at its disposal. However, Korea might be able to create enough uncertainty in the panel to force them to rule exclusively on the legal issues of the case. This will then equip Korea, like the EC in the past, with a way of working around the ruling, by changing whatever legal procedure they need to while maintaining some, if not most, of its restrictions when the panel fails to address its case on scientific grounds.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.179-198
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• 2017

The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (The Guidelines) was initially promulgated in 1976 as a form of annex to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. The Guidelines aims at accomplishing the implementation and dissemination of the Responsible Business Conduct. The latest version of The Guidelines, as revised in 2011, directed 47 adhering countries to The Guidelines to set up their respective National Contact Points (NCPs). NCPs are The Guidelines' dispute resolution mechanism for specific instances arising from breach by multinational enterprises of The Guidelines. Korea to date has its own NCP performing its role to offer good offices and facilitates settlement between the parties to the specific instances regarding The Guidelines. However, there has been strong criticism from NGOs and civil society that Korea NCP has not performed well due to lack of transparency and impartiality, especially in the context of the governance of Korea NCP. Under this circumstance, this paper ⅰ) examines current status and problems of Korea NCP, ⅱ) evaluates the core criteria for function and governance of NCPs through a comparative overseas cases study, and ⅲ) suggests improvement plans for Korea NCP.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.11-52
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• 2010

Medical Dispute Arbitration Law had been debated on its legislation several times since Korean Medical Association's submission of the bill to the National Assembly in 1988, eventually in December, 2009, passed the National Assembly Standing Committee and was laid before the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, and thus its legislation is now near at hand. During the long process, it has provided a hot issue with our society. And yet, Medical Dispute Arbitration Law has differed considerably in legislative content depending on the main body of proceeding the enactment, which subsequently was given the mixed comments of 'Act on Malpractice-related Damage Relief' or 'Medical Indemnity Act', and this legislative bill also cannot be free from this debate. It is desirable that medical disputes between doctors and patients be resolved through conciliation between the parties concerned. But, because reaching a compromise is difficult owing to deep emotional conflicts between the parties, difficulties in investigating a cause and requiring a high amount of settlement money, etc., it is inevitable to seek a resolution by third party intervention. By the way, such an arbitration by third party is based on the compromise of the interested parties and thus has a limitation of not being able to satisfy both parties completely. Therefore, the legislative bill made for arbitration of medical disputes between the parties will have to prepare an institutional system for the parties to easily understand and accept. Also, problems occurred in the legislative bill will have to be corrected through an in-depth discussion in order for the legislative bill to work as an effective system.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.307-325
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• 2007

Examining the standards of review adopted by the dispute settlement body of the WTO in its decision on safeguard measures, the Appellate Body offers no coherent guidance or theory as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures adopted by the domestic authorities. It faults the lack of reasoned and adequate explanation in the national authorities' decision to impose safeguard measures, yet its own explanation of the permissible role for safeguard measure could hardly be less instructive. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity to text in its decision but that approach can not work properly when the text is fundamentally deficient from the viewpoints that neither Article XIX nor the safeguard Agreement establish a coherent foundation for safeguard measures due to their vague and abstract provision. Without any coherent theory on guidance as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures, it would be absurd to expect WTO members to produce a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their safeguard measures are in compliance with the WTO roles. In the absence of a thorough renegotiation for the proper operation of the WTO safeguard system, which seems quite unlikely for the foreseeable future, perhaps the unique method out of the current predicament is for the Appellate Body to lead a movement in establishing a sensible common law of safeguards, drawing on extra-textual guidance including the standards of review about their proper role in the WTO safeguard mechanism.