• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.82-89
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• 2020

Article 64 of the Enforcement Decree of the National Contract Act The requirement of the pre-amendment statute related to the adjustment of the contract price was 5% or more of the price fluctuation rate from the date of the contract. However, the meeting requirement was changed from 5% or more to 3% or more from the date of signing of the Presidential Decree No. 19035 to 2005. 9. 8. The method of adjusting the contract amount was also changed to determine the contractor's desired adjustment method at the time of contract. Alleviating these requirements and revising the empowerment of contract partners is intended to prevent difficulties in achieving smooth objectives by applying to public construction contractors without unfairly benefiting or unfavorable to contract partners. Even if the standards are relaxed and the rights are secured as described above, if the existing provisions for the adjustment of price fluctuation are applied, unlike the original purpose of the government system, the Korea Bank's price economic statistics classification method and the contract construction classification criteria applied in public construction work Due to the inconsistency, it can be seen that the amount of adjustment for price fluctuation by construction type is excessive and underestimated. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze problems through cases and to make appropriate construction cost adjustment through improvement measures.

• Proceedings of the Society of Korea Industrial and System Engineering Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.343-348
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• 2002

We are concerned with a long-term replenishment contract for the ARIMA demand process in a supply chain. The chain is composed of one supplier, one buyer and consumers for a product. The replenishment contract is based upon the well-known (s, Q) policy but allows us to contract future replenishments at a time with a price discount. Due to the larger forecast error of future demand, the buyer should keep a higher level of safety stock to provide the same level of service as the usual (s, Q) policy. However, the buyer can reduce his purchase cost by ordering a larger quantity at a discounted price. Hence, there exists a trade-off between the price discount and the inventory holding cost. For the ARIMA demand process, we present a model for the contract and an algorithm to find the number of the future replenishments. Numerical experiments show that the proposed algorithm is efficient and accurate.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.105-115
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• 2005

By committing to a long-term replenishment contract, buyers can purchase a product at a lower price from a supplier who is less pressured to find new customers due to the long-term contract and can charge a discounted price. We develop an analytical model from the buyer's perspective to investigate a capacity reservation contract. We are considering the system with a single supplier and a buyer. The buyer can purchases any desired amount from a spot market at a higher price in addition to the contracted amount. For such a system, we propose an algorithm to derive the optimal contract terms. The result of computational experiments shows that the algorithm finds the global optimum solution in a resonable amount of time.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.243-252
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• 2015

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer under the cap-and-trade emissions regulation and a permit supplier. We study joint production quantity and investment in reducing permit production cost decisions for centralized and decentralized supply chains. We formulate two supply chain contracts with aims to coordinate the decentralized supply chain; wholesale price contract and cost-sharing contract. Under the cost-sharing contract, the manufacturer shares a part of the investment in reducing permit production cost and then is allowed to purchase emission permit at a lower price. We analytically find that the proposed cost-sharing contract with reasonable parameters can coordinate the supply chain whereas the wholesale price contract is not desirable to achieve the system-wide profit. Numerical example is followed to support the analysis.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.16
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• pp.59-81
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• 2001

There are two methods of quantifying the damages when the contract is avoided. One is 'concret' assessment, the other is 'abstract' assessment. The former looks to the actual cost incurred by the aggrieved party in concluding a contract for the substitute transaction, while the latter is based on the market price. The concrete method of assessment forms the starting point in the Civil Law systems. In the Common Law systems, it is likewise available. The aggrieved party is entitled to recover the difference between the cost of cover or (as the case may be) the proceeds of resale and the contract price. Both systems also recognize the abstract method of assessment. If the aggrieved party does not resell or cover, damages are equal to the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the market price. The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles recognize expressly both concrete and abstract methods. Under the relevant articles, the aggrieved party can recover the damages assessed by one of the methods as well as any further damages such as loss of profit, incidental and consequential damages.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.959-972
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• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.26
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• pp.87-111
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• 2005

The buyer must pay the price under the contract and must take delivery of the goods of contract. The buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and such formalities under the contract. The remedial system of the rights of the seller is easier than that of the buyer, for the obligations of the former are less complicated. The seller has the right to avoid a contract provided two conditions are fulfilled : (a) the buyer must have committed a fundamental breach of contract, or (b) the additional period for performance set by the seller in the case of non-performance must have expired. A decision is more difficult to take in the case of a delay where there is no fixed-term contract, to clarify the situation the seller may set a Nachfrist. It is essential that the contracting parties in Korea should understand the provisions of CISG.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.49-69
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• 2008

This study is to analyze the case law on the disputes of the ex-im contract of steel bar from Yugoslav to Egypt, for which awards were made by the ICC Arbitration Court, trying to find out the characteristic approach of the tribunal toward arbitration case dealing with socialistic country, Yugoslav and Islamic Egypt. An Egyptian importer and an Yugoslavian Exporter concluded a contract, with an option to purchase an additional quantity. for the steel bar. The importer exercised this option as provided in the contract. But the exporter refused to honor the option, due to the fact that the world market price for the steel bar has gone up. As a result, the importer had to purchase the steel bar as a replacement from a Rumanian company at the price higher than the original contract. And it has initiated arbitration under the arbitration clause at the ICC Arbitration Court to claim compensation for the loss due to the price difference. CISG and ULIS were closely studied along with the Yugoslav Law to determine whether the exporter could be exempted from the liability to damages. But the tribunal denied to accept the exporter's contention. The tribunal decided that the importer was entitled to damages due to the exporter's failure to deliver the additional quantity of goods at the original price. It was due to the fact that the price increase was not extremely sudden & high enough to exceed a reasonable entrepreneurial risk and also could be taken into account when concluding the contract.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.17-31
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• 2010

This study investigates two-stage return policy and recycling issues in an e-marketplace supply chain consisting of consumers, a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer, a focal company in the e-marketplace supply chain, considers the recycling of commercial returns so offers the retailer a buy-back contract of which transfer payment consists of a wholesale price and a buy-back price. Then, under the given contract offer, the retailer determines a selling price and a return policy to control consumers' demand and return requests. We consider the retailer's opportunistic behavior and supply chain coordination issues based on the principal-agent paradigm. We compare the first-best and second-best optima and conduct comparative static analyses to evaluate the performance results of the buy-back contract and provide important managerial implications.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.7
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• pp.414-419
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• 2004

In TWBP new uncertainty will be increased. Risk management is risen to a important problem. Vesting contract makes market Players trade at fixed price in TWBP early stages. In the case of advanced country, market players manage risk with a future contract. When a risk management method moves from vesting contract to future contract, it may have to use together two contracts for schedule period. In this paper, risk management strategy that use vesting contract and forward contract at the same time is proposed.