• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.185-226
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• 2015

As in some developing countries and more recently some developed countries worldwide and in the Asian region, Australia has faced significant internal opposition and public debate especially over treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). As outlined in Part II(1), concerns have re-emerged and escalated since the first-ever claim was brought against Australia regarding its tobacco plain packaging legislation, in 2011 by Philip Morris Asia under an old BIT with Hong Kong. However, Australia signed bilateral FTAs with Korea in 2014 and with China in 2015, including ISDS protections, prompting several sets of parliamentary inquiries (Part II(2)). Australia's close trading partner, New Zealand, had already concluded an FTA with China in 2008 that included more expansive ISDS-backed investor protections. In 2015, the New Zealand Parliament has been debating ratification of its own FTA with Korea, with ISDS also now attracting growing scrutiny, as elaborated in Part III below. In both bilateral FTA negotiations, the present Korean government seems to have reverted to a strong preference for concluding investment agreements with extensive ISDS protections, despite public and parliamentary debate around 2011 in the context of ratifying its FTA with the United States. As mentioned briefly in the concluding Part IV, Korea's stance has significant implications for the future trajectory of treaty-based ISDS - and indeed international arbitration more generally - in the Asia-Pacific region, and perhaps even globally.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.201-216
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• 2018

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union's Common Commercial Policy now belongs to the exclusive competence area of the EU, including the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. Regarding the bilateral investment protection treaties (BITs) between the EU Member States, the European Commission is of the view that such BITs should be discarded. On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in the Achmea BV v. Slovakia case that a BIT between the EU Member States, as well as arbitral awards based on that BIT, is not subject to request for preliminary rulings under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thus they are not compatible with the EU law. However, the judgment did not silence the controversy. Instead, many people questioned the legal reasoning and the legitimacy of judgment, and therefore the problem is still ongoing.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.95-126
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• 2009

One of the controversial issues in investor-state investment arbitration is the interpretation of "umbrella clause" that is found in most BIT and FTAs. This treaty clause requires on Contracting State of treaty to observe all investment obligations entered into with foreign investors from the other Contracting State. This clause did not receive in-depth attention until SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines cases produced starkly different conclusions on the relations about treaty-based jurisdiction and contract-based jurisdiction. More recent decisions by other arbitral tribunals continue to show different approaches in their interpretation of umbrella clauses. Following the SGS v. Philippines decision, some recent decisions understand that all contracts are covered by umbrella clause, for example, in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina and Enron Corp. V. Argentina. However, other recent decisions have found a different approach that only certain kinds of public contracts are covered by umbrella clauses, for example, in El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentina and CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina. With relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, most of tribunals have the position that the contractual remedy should not affect the jurisdiction of BIT tribunal. Even some tribunals considered that there is no need to exhaust contract remedies before bringing BIT arbitration, provoking suspicion of the validity of sanctity of contract in front of treaty obligation. The decision of the Annulment Committee In CMS case in 2007 was an extraordinarily surprising one and poured oil on the debate. The Committee composed of the three respected international lawyers, Gilbert Guillaume and Nabil Elaraby, both from the ICJ, and professor James Crawford, the Rapportuer of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, observed that the arbitral tribunal made critical errors of law, however, noting that it has limited power to review and overturn the award. The position of the Committee was a direct attack on ICSID system showing as an internal recognition of ICSID itself that the current system of investor-state arbitration is problematic. States are coming to limit the scope of umbrella clauses. For example, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT detailed definition of the type of contracts for which breach of contract claims may be submitted to arbitration, to increase certainty and predictability. Latin American countries, in particular, Argentina, are feeling collectively victims of these pro-investor interpretations of the ICSID tribunals. In fact, BIT between developed and developing countries are negotiated to protect foreign investment from developing countries. This general characteristic of BIT reflects naturally on the provisions making them extremely protective for foreign investors. Naturally, developing countries seek to interpret restrictively BIT provisions, whereas developed countries try to interpret more expansively. As most of cases arising out of alleged violation of BIT are administered in the ICSID, a forum under the auspices of the World Bank, these Latin American countries have been raising the legitimacy deficit of the ICSID. The Argentine cases have been provoking many legal issues of international law, predicting crisis almost coming in actual investor-state arbitration system. Some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, already showed their dissatisfaction with the ICSID system considering withdrawing from it to minimize the eventual investor-state dispute. Thus the disagreement over umbrella clauses in their interpretation is becoming interpreted as an historical reflection on the continued tension between developing and developed countries on foreign investment. There is an academic and political discussion on the possible return of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. The paper will comment on these problems related to the interpretation of umbrella clause. The paper analyses ICSID cases involving principally Latin American countries to identify the critical legal issues arising between developing and developed countries. And the paper discusses alternatives in improving actual investor-State investment arbitration; inter alia, the introduction of an appellate system and treaty interpretation rules.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.141-165
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• 2007

This study aims to make a contribution to the promotion of trade and economic development of South Korea, and, at the same time, call attention to the increasing trend of investment agreements concluded within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) by examining theoretically FTAs and dispute resolution and investigating systematically the conclusion procedure of agreements, and the system, institutions, and jurisdiction of dispute resolution, and presenting these findings to the government and investors involved. The most problematic aspect in the legal process of arbitration involving disputes over investment is that of arguments concerning the right of jurisdiction. When a dispute arises, even though an investor files for arbitration at an ICSID institution, the parties become involved in another energy-consuming argument even before proceeding to the hearing and decision of the original plan in cases in which the respondent of the dispute files an objection to the decision rights of the arbitral tribunal. As the main basis for this type of plea, the point of non-existence of jurisdiction is first raised where the applicable dispute does not fall under the range of investments defined in individual investment contracts or investment agreements such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). To avoid an open-ended definition of investment for the range of investments, articles concerning investments in the FTA and NAFTA between Canada and the USA adopt the limited closed-list method. Article 96 of the FTA between Japan and Mexico applied the same abovementioned method of limited form of definition regarding range of investments and concluded BITs between member countries of APEC applied a similar method as well. Instead of employing the previously used inclusive definition, the BITs concluded between countries of Latin America and the USA are equipped with limited characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, to correspond with this necessary condition the three following requirements are needed : 1) fixed investment funding; 2) expected profits resulting from such investments; 3) and the existence of fixed risk bearing.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.187-213
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• 2012

The purpose of this article is to examine Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Agreements. Most BITs and other investment treaties provide for FET of foreign investments. Today, this concept is the most frequently invoked standard in investment disputes. It is also the standard with the highest practical relevance: a majority of successful claims pursued in international arbitration are based on a violation of the FET standard. The concept of FET is not new but has appeared in international documents for some time. Some of these documents were nonbinding others entered into force as multilateral or bilateral treaties. Considerable debate has surrounded the question of whether the FET standard merely reflects the internationalminimum standard, as contained in customary international law, or offers an autonomous standard that is additional to general international law. As a matter of textual interpretation, it seems implausible that a treaty would refer to a well-known concept like the "minimum standard of treatment in customary international law" by using the expression "fair and equitable treatment." Broad definitions or descriptions are not the only way to gauge the meaning of an elusive concept such as FET. Another method is to identify typical factual situations to which this principle has been applied. An examination of the practice of tribunals demonstrates that several principles can be identified that are embraced by the standard of fair and equitable treatment. Some of the cases discussed clearly speak to the central roles of transparency, stability, and the investor's legitimate expectations in the current understanding of the FET standard. Other contexts in which the standard has been applied concern compliance with contractual obligations, procedural propriety and due process, action in good faith, and freedom from coercion and harassment. In short, meeting the investor's central legitimate concern of legal consistency, stability, and predictability remains a major, but not the only, ingredient of an investment-friendly climate in which the host state in turn can reasonably expect to attract foreign investment.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.37-57
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• 2017

On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.