• 대한전자공학회논문지TC
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• 제49권1호
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• pp.53-58
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• 2012

게임 이론적 시각으로 p-persistence 슬롯화된 ALOHA를 비협력 게임으로 구성하고, 이 게임에서 Nash equilibrium을 구해 찾아 패킷 전달을 시도할 확률 값을 마련한다. Nash equilibrium의 수학적 표현에는 반드시 활성 변방국의 수가 포함되지만, 많은 실제 응용에서 이러한 수를 거의 알 수가 없다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 패킷의 전달을 시도할 지 결정하기에 앞서 활성 변방국의 수를 예측하는 Bayes 풍의 방식을 제안한다. 제안하는 Bayes 풍의 방식은 변방국이 스스로 자연스럽게 구할 수 있는 최소 정보만을 필요로 하지만 상당량의 정보에 의존하는 방식에 비해 경쟁력 있는 예측 성능을 보여 준다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제5권3호
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• pp.542-559
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• 2011

Most game-theoretic works of Aloha have emphasized investigating Nash equilibria according to the system state represented by the number of network users and their decisions. In contrast, we focus on the possible change of nodes' utility state represented by delay constraint and decreasing utility over time. These foregone changes of nodes' state are more likely to instigate selfish behaviors in networking environments. For such environment, in this paper, we propose a repeated Bayesian slotted Aloha game model to analyze the selfish behavior of impatient users. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium mathematically and empirically. The proposed model enables any type of transmission probability sequence to achieve Nash equilibrium without degrading its optimal throughput. Those Nash equilibria can be used as a solution concept to thwart the selfish behaviors of nodes and ensure the system stability.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제12권12호
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• pp.5819-5840
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• 2018

Considering the topology of hierarchical tree structure, each cluster in WSNs is faced with various attacks launched by malicious nodes, which include network eavesdropping, channel interference and data tampering. The existing intrusion detection algorithm does not take into consideration the resource constraints of cluster heads and sensor nodes. Due to application requirements, sensor nodes in WSNs are deployed with approximately uncorrelated security weights. In our study, a novel and versatile intrusion detection system (IDS) for the optimal defense strategy is primarily introduced. Given the flexibility that wireless communication provides, it is unreasonable to expect malicious nodes will demonstrate a fixed behavior over time. Instead, malicious nodes can dynamically update the attack strategy in response to the IDS in each game stage. Thus, a multi-stage intrusion detection game (MIDG) based on Bayesian rules is proposed. In order to formulate the solution of MIDG, an in-depth analysis on the Bayesian equilibrium is performed iteratively. Depending on the MIDG theoretical analysis, the optimal behaviors of rational attackers and defenders are derived and calculated accurately. The numerical experimental results validate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed scheme.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.238-242
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• 2021

Game theory has been regarded as a useful theoretical tool for modeling the interactions between distinct entities and thus it has been harnessed in various research field. In particular, research attention has been shown to how to apply game theory to modeling the interactions between malign and benign entities in the field of wireless networks. Although various game theoretic modeling work have been proposed in the field of wireless networks, our proposed work is disparate to the existing work in the sense that we focus on mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. More specifically, we propose a Bayesian game theoretic modeling for mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. In our modeling, we formulate a two-player static Bayesian game with imperfect information such that player 1 is aware of the type of player 2, but player 2 is not aware of the type of player 1. We use four strategies in our static Bayesian game. We obtain Bayesian Nash Equilibria with pure strategies under certain conditions.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제33권3호
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• pp.129-146
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• 2023

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator's marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권3호
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• pp.113-143
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• 1997

Most of the conflict problems between 2 persons can be represented as a bi-matrix game, because player's utilities, in general, are non-zero sum and change according to the progress of game. In the bi-matrix game the equilibrium point set which satisfies the Pareto optimality can be a good bargaining or coordination solution. Under the condition of incomplete information about the risk attitudes of the players, the bargaining or coordination solution depends on additional elements, namely, the players' methods of making inferences when they reach a node in the extensive form of the game that is off the equilibrium path. So the investigation about the players' inference type and its effects on the solution is essential. In addition to that, the effect of an individual's aversion to risk on various solutions in conflict problems, as expressed in his (her) utility function, must be considered. Those kinds of incomplete information make decision maker Bayesian, since it is often impossible to get correct information for building a decision making model. In Baysian point of view, this paper represents an analytic frame for guessing and learning opponent's attitude to risk for getting better reward. As an example for that analytic frame. 2 persons'bi-matrix game is considered. This example explains that a bi-matrix game can be transformed into a kind of matrix game through the players' implicitly cooperative attitude and the need of arbitration.

• 무역학회지
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• 제43권6호
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• pp.1-24
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• 2018

본 연구는 개별기업들이 교역활동과정에서 분쟁이 발생할 경우 국제상사간의 분쟁해결도구로써 중재를 선택하는 이유를 게임이론의 관점에서 구성하였다. 중재에 관한 많은 연구들이 진행되어왔지만 중재를 수요자의 입장에서 살펴본 이론 연구는 드물었다. 본 연구에서 제시된 모형은 기업이 분쟁해결도구를 전략적으로 선택할 수 있다는 전제하에서 중재가 완전베이지언 내쉬균형이 되는 조건을 게임의 대가(payoff)를 비교함으로써 찾아보았다. 이를 통해 알 수 있는 것은 첫째, 중재를 사회의 분쟁해결수단으로 고려할 때 분쟁당사자들의 성향에 대해 고려할 필요가 있다는 점, 둘째 중재를 균형전략으로 만드는 중요한 지표 중의 하나는 중재와 소송의 절대이익이 아닌 두 분쟁해결수단을 통해 기대되는 이익의 상대적인 차이가 중요하다는 점을 보일 수 있었다. 마지막으로 간단한 국제상사의 분쟁사례를 통해 이러한 이론이 어떻게 적용되는지를 살펴보았다.

• 대한기계학회논문집A
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• 제35권10호
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• pp.1299-1306
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• 2011

본 연구에서는 측정된 균열 데이터를 토대로 변동하중 하에서의 균열성장모델 변수들을 베이지안 모델변수 추정 방법을 통해서 확률적인 분포로 구하는 방법을 제시하였다. 모델변수의 확률분포를 구하기 위해 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 샘플링 방법을 이용하였다. 변동하중 하에서는 균열성장 모델이 더욱 복잡해 짐에 따라 기존의 MCMC 기법으로는 확률분포를 잘 구하지 못하므로 주변확률밀도분포를 제안함수로 사용하는 MCMC 기법을 새롭게 제안하였다. 모델변수의 추정을 위해 여러 크기의 일정 진폭 하중 하에서 시편시험을 수행하여 얻은 균열성장 데이터를 이용하였다. 추정된 변수들을 사용하여 변동하중 하에서의 시편에 대해 균열성장 예측을 수행하였고, 이를 실제 시험 데이터를 통해서 검증하였다.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.215-242
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• 2010

본 연구는 유가충격 및 에너지절감유도정책충격의 효과를 고려할 수 있는 베이지안 동태확률일반균형모형의 구축을 통해 이들 외생적 충격들의 역할과 함께 현재 우리나라에서 진행 중인 고효율 에너지 소비구조로의 전환이 유발시키는 경제적 효과에 관해 분석하였다. 분석 결과에 의하면 유가상승충격은 소비, 고용, 투자 및 산출량에 부정적 효과를 주었으며, 자본 1단위당 에너지 소비량 절감을 유발시키는 에너지절감유인정책충격은 에너지 소비량의 절감과 함께 소비, 고용, 투자 및 산출량에 긍정적 효과를 주는 것으로 나타났다. 특히, 분산분해 결과는 유가충격이 설비가동률, 에너지 소비량 및 산출량의 단기적 총 변동에 가장 큰 영향을 미치며, 에너지절약정책충격 역시 기술충격과 유가충격에 비해 그 크기와 지속성 면에서 미미한 수준이나, 이들 변수들의 단기적 총 변동을 일정부분 설명할 수 있는 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로 석유소비의 비중 축소 및 에너지 소비의 효율성 증대는 유가충격이 주는 부정적 효과를 약화시켜, 이와 같은 에너지 소비구조의 전환이 유가변동의 충격을 축소시키고 있다는 최근의 논의들과 부합됨을 확인할 수 있었다.