Journal of Arbitration Studies (한국중재학회지:중재연구)

The Korean Association of Arbitration Studies (한국중재학회)
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Arbitrator's Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach

  • Joon Yeop Kwon (School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University) ;
  • Sung Ryong Kim (Department of Commerce and Trade, Kyungpook National University)
  • Received : 2023.07.31
  • Accepted : 2023.09.01
  • Published : 2023.09.01
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Abstract

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator's marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.

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References

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