• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.54
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• pp.77-113
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• 2017

In late Chosen(朝鮮), the concept of illustrious virtue(明德) became an important issue of debate. However, previous studies did not focus on how the concept emerged as an issue. This paper aimed to explore the problem, and for this purpose, paid attention to Horak(湖洛) debate. Oiam(巍巖) Yi Gan(李柬), in the course of discussion with Namdang(南塘), finally argued that mind(心) clearly distinguishes from temperament(氣質). The goals of the claim were to clearly divide mind and temperament, and to emphasize mind's control of temperament. Through this, he wanted to reject the possibility of being affected by temperament in aroused state(未發). And he presented the concept of illustrious virtue as a critical evidence supporting his argument. He argued that because mind is same with illustrious virtue, it has a special status that essentially distinguished from the temperament, even if both mind and temperament are all material force(氣). This argument led to new discussion trend in the debate. it was to form a definition of the mind, based on defining the relationship between spiritual perception(虛靈知覺), temperament and illustrious virtue. The trend was reflected in the debate on 'Whether illustrious virtue is the same for everyone or varies from person to person(明德分殊)'. Through the process of analysis in this paper, we could detect a tendency that definition of mind has become an independent subject.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.36
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• pp.229-264
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• 2009

This paper aims for a study on the theory that mind is Li(principle). The method of research is laid emphasis on searching for the historical development of the perception Theory in late Cho-Sun. First of all, I investigated a meaning of the perception theories of Ho-Rak school, that were criticized in the Cho-Sun academic world. The next, I investigated the theory of Li-ju-Ki-ja that was raised by Yi Sang Jung. He thought that Li is supervisor and Ki is assistance. And he put a construction on the Perception Theories of Toegye school. Yi Jin sang's theory of perception is the result of criticism against Ho-Rak school, and a fresh and in-depth construction of Yi Sang Jung's perception theory. His viewpoint was contradiction to the theory of Sim si Ki(the theory that Mind is made of Ki). And he rediscovered the human conscience that was born endowed from Heaven.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.54
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• pp.349-386
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• 2014

Noju Oh Hui-sang(1763-1833) is one of the neo-Confucian scholars representing with Hong Chik-pil the Kiho-Nak School from the late 18th to the early 19th century. He did sincerely not only succeed theories of Kiho School originated from Yulgok, but also strengthened the main view of the Nak faction by clarifying the theoretical stance of it derived from Kim Chang-hyop. Not only he does suggest critical points of view against Ho faction in terms of Horak Controversy, but also criticizes heterodox account, which raised by an inner circle of Nak faction. In this vein, Oh established the neo-Confucian ways of realization of morality and ideal society by setting up his own points of view on mind and bright virtues that are followed by various issues of Horak Controversy. My paper will examine the values of Oh's account of Nature-Principle in the light of intellectual historical context by paying a special attention to his critical views of Ho faction. Oh's main idea is how to systematize practical foundation of realizing morality. Thus, he wants to theoretically explain both the practice of morality and the reality of pure moral mind in order to establish concrete practices of them in the real world. In doing so, he pays attention to mutual inclusive relationship between Principle and Matter(ki:氣). The mutual inclusive relationship between them can be exactly applied into the relationship between mind and Nature. So, the realityof moral principle explicitly implies the pure goodness of moral agency. Furthermore, his elucidation of logical relationship between mind and Nature and its values via the ontological understanding of them is to set up a system of cultivation, i.e., realizing practical foundation of pure moral mind. In conclusion, we can evaluate that Oh's account of Nature-Principle, at least, aims not only at establishment of moral agency and its reality in a theoretical dimension, but also at a guarantee of their realization in the world.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.35
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• pp.73-108
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• 2012

Researches about the Horaknonjaeng(湖洛論爭) have succeeded by focusing on the Osangnonbyeon(五常論辨)?Mibalnonbyeon(未發論辨). In a way of these researches, philosophic thought of Gwon Sangha(權尙夏) is dealt in a comparison and in that process his philosophic thought seems to be known. However, these researches are treating several thoughts so it is difficult to find accurately what point describes the position of his thought in the korean confucian thought as origin of Hohak(湖學). In this paper, therefore, I examine Gwon Sangha's theory of mind-nature by focusing on the understanding the concept of mind-nature in Hansujaejib(寒水齋集) and find its position in history of thought as an origin of forming Hohak. Before 1709, Horaknonjaeng don't break out, Gwan Sangha had been formed that Inmulseongsangi(人物性相異) of Osangpyeonjeon(五常偏全) based on the understanding of the fact that ensuring of Bonyeonjiseong(本然之性 性善) in Gijiljiseong(氣質之性) and under this influence scholars of Hohak formed thoughts and insisted Osangpyeonjeon(五常偏全 人物性相異) during Horaknonjaeng. In the point of Simseongilmul(心性一物) focusing on nature, he didn't admit the Jujaeseong(主宰性) of mind. This is the efforts of finishing the controversy of Simseongigi(心性二岐) and the efforts of finding the relation between Simseon(心善). Such thoughts are set before the Horaknonjaeng and basing on these influences, scholars of Hohak formed their thoughts and insisted the Gibulyongsa(氣不用事 未發氣質有善惡).

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.35
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• pp.109-129
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• 2012

At this point, in Confucianism's schools debated about analysis for early theory and latterly it of nature between human and animal in Nongam Kim Changhyob's Confucianism. Oh Heeshang argued early theory about Shanguzaezungyongmunmok, written by Kim Changhyob, and establishment of theory about Yokuonyudozaelonshabyonnokbyon, written by him. Kim Changhup, brother of Kim Changhyob, argued so early theory about Shanguzaezungyongmunmok. O Yubong, student of Kim Changhyob, argued establishment of theory about Sobyon and Zabzee, written by Kim Changhyob. While, Yim Songzu argued early theory and establishment of theory about Zabzee. As a result, presenting researchers argued the same as. That is, they interpret early theory about difference of nature between human and animal in Kim Changhyob. they interpret about the same of nature between human and animal in it. However, Kim Changhyob wrote difference of nature between human and animal in Shanguzaezungyongmunmok. While, he wrote difference it and the same it in Yokuonyudozaelonshabyonnokbyon. He thought the same li between human and animal. However, he thought difference hyongki them. Furthermore, He wrote difference it and the same it in Zabzee. Therefore, they had depended on Kim Changhyob. As a result, posterity scholars interpreted early theory and establishment of theory about his theory. they depended on his authority. However, he changed himself theory.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.59
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• pp.9-38
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• 2018

Joseon Neo-Confucianism had important disputes throughout its hundred years of history. Starting in mid-16th century, Four-Seven Dispute focused on 'Qing (情, emotion)' while Horak Dispute that emerged in early 18th century put emphasis on whether people and things have the same 'Xing (性, nature).' These two disputes lasted until late Joseon. In that process, their issues were clearly recognized and consequently, characteristics of Joseon Neo-Confucianism were well demonstrated. With Western power surging in since mid-18th century, Joseon Neo-Confucianism should develop logic to cope with the Western power. One of responding logics was Zhulilun (主理論, theory of reason) in Neo-Confucianism. Diverse discussions particularly on 'Xin (心, mind)' were expansively made. From the notion of Xin Tong Xing Qing (心統性情) that Xin converges with Xing and Qing, an argument that Xin should be seen as 'Li (理, reason)' and another that Xin is basically 'Qi (氣, force of nature)' were up against each other. The academia heated up with issues raised such as whether Xin and Mingde (明德, bright virtue) are the same notion and whether Mingde should be seen as 'Li' or 'Qi', etc. Defining morality dispute in the late Joseon along with Four-Seven Dispute and Horak Dispute as 'three major disputes in Joseon Neo-Confucianism,' this paper focuses on clarifying their status, actuality and significance. Morality dispute was not only a theoretical dispute. It has significance in the aspect of 'topicality.' It directly and indirectly affected movements against Western and Japanese power, loyal troop's activities and independence movement as well. Compared to Four-Seven Dispute and Horak Dispute, morality dispute is more complex and expansive. In addition, it requires systematic organization of data. Intercomparison of three major disputes is one of key topics to determine characteristics of Joseon Neo-Confucianism.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.35
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• pp.35-73
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• 2009

This thesis aims at making clear correlation between the controversy that the nature of people and things is equal or different each other and Sung Confucianism, which is closed and discriminative. For this aim, I am looking closely at philosophy-reason prose that deals with the nature of people and things, from the early days of Chosun when Sung Confucianism became a new trend of thought to the later days when the controversy that the nature of people and things is equal or different had begun in earnest. This philosophy-reason prose has had gradual and important change. There are four different view points toward the nature of people and things. According to the first view point, people are the nucleus of the world. For the second one, things are thought to be important enough to be valued, but people are still the only core of the world. The third view point is that people and things are equally important and they are all the core of the world. Finally, the fourth view point regards people inferior to things and it says that things need to instruct people by scolding their bad behavior. There is a correlation between the view point of the nature of people and things and the attitude of an author. If some scholars think that people are the most important nucleus of the world, they tend to consider Sung Confucianism as the only school. On the contrary, other scholars who think that people and things are equal tend to respect other schools with open mind. In conclusion, the heated debates of the 18th century was an acute pain to destroy the closed and discriminative character of Sung Confucianism. It has contributed to innovate the thought toward the nature of people and things and the reformism of practical science have also done important role in the process of modernism's being groped by itself.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.41
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• pp.185-222
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• 2014

Nog-Moon Yim Seong-Joo(녹문 임성주) is a philosopher of late Choseon Dynasty of the 18th Century. He concluded that the debates between the school of Ho and that of Rack originated from the seclusion of Li(理) and Ki(氣), and theorized the new Li and Ki theory according to his own perspective. The prime point of Nog-Moon's Philosophy is said to be Li-Ki dongshil(理氣同實), Mind and Nature ilchi(心性一致) ; he proves his prime potints based on his pure and clean Ki substance. Thus Li-Ki is reduced to monism from dualism, and Mind-Nature(心 性) is reduced to mind. Since the basis of the existence of Mind is Ki(氣), Nog-moon's theory of Substance is concluded to be Ki-monism. Nog-Moon presents his great philosophy of Ki monism suggested by Jeong Myeong-Do's monistic methodology; he explains the universality of Substance and the diversity of Phenomenon with the logical structure of ilwonbunsu(一原分殊). The characteristics of Nog-Moon's philosophy is that ilwon(一原) and bunsu(分殊) are bonnyeon(本然) identical, which means Substance and Function(體用) are identical, or bonmalilchi(本末一致). It means Mind and Nature are bonnyeon(本然) identical, Ki and Mind and Nature are identical. With the expression of seongrihak (性理學) Gijil(氣質) is not different from bonnyeon(本然). Therefore 1 define the philosophy of Nog-Moon had been built on the context of a sage.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.35
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• pp.7-42
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• 2012

The Ho-Rak controversy is an internal dispute in the Kiho School. Both Ho and Rak adopt the theories of Yulgok(栗谷) as their common standard of right arguments. The controversy continues almost two hundred years after the dispute between LEE Gan(李柬) and HAN Wonjin(韓元震). However, it does not develop rich theoretical resources. The fundamental issue of Ho-Rak controversy is how to define the relation of mind(心) and temper(氣質). Ho School regard temper as material of the mind, and so they insist that mind and temper are ultimately the same. But Rak School regard temper as desire of the body, and so they insist that mind and temper are the another one. The viewpoint of Rak School does not correspond to the view of the traditional Neo-confucianism. So we should understand that mind and temper are ultimately the same. However if we define that mind and temper are the same, and they act at the same time, then we can not insure the foundation of pure goodness in human mind. LEE Chulyoung(李喆榮) defines that mind and temper are ultimately the same, but they act alternately. It is the exact definition about the relation of mind and temper.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.36
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• pp.43-74
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• 2013

This paper aims to analyse Han Wonjin's criticism centered on Kim Changhyup's theory of Jigak(知覺). In the early 18th century, Kim Changhyup whose position considered as the leader of Rakhak(洛學) circle was the central figure in the debate on the controversial subject of Jigak. Han Wonjin as an opinion leader of Hohak(湖學)'s legacy was required to argue with his counterpart in order to establish his circle's standpoint. The main issue they discussed was the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak. Kim contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Gi(器). Similarly, the relation between Sim(心) and Sung(性) is that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigak is not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sung as the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Han argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to be a moral activity. In criticizing Kim Changhyup, Han maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigak as a blind function with no moral sense. If one admits Jigak can have moral contents on its own without the connection with Ji, then one would have to allow two moral foundation, which leads one's idea into heretical beliefs. Han holds that Jigak can a moral function only when it is grounded upon Ji. In conclusion, Han emphasizes Ji as the base of Jigak that enables Jigak to realize morality while Kim emphasizes the role of Jigak as the principal agent of moral activity.